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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation I present the empirical analysis of Japanese outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) determinants with a particular focus on the effect of Political Environment (PE) and Democracy 
on Japanese Multinational Companies (MNCs) activities.  
In Chapter I the survey of literature is presented. The survey includes the literature discussions 
from the following published papers: Deseatnicov (2009); Deseatnicov and Akiba (2011a, 2011b, 
2012a, 2012b). 
In Chapter II general patterns of the recent Japanese outward FDI are reviewed. A comparison of 
developed and developing countries as well as regional specifics is also provided. 
I present the data description and hypotheses in Chapter III. My estimation model is constructed 
on the basis of the OLI (ownership, location and internalization advantages) and knowledge-capital 
models. Various measures of PE and Democracy are included as additional explanatory variables with 
market potential, wages, skilled workforce endowments, investment cost and openness. The role of 
Technological development, National Culture and Real Exchange Rate is also examined. Thus, the 
data discussion establishes a foundation for empirical analysis in Chapters IV-VII. This chapter 
includes data discussions from the following working and published papers: Deseatnicov (2009, 
2012); Deseatnicov and Akiba (2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b).  
In Chapter IV the effect of PE on Japanese outward FDI to a sample of 30 countries over the 
period of 1995-2008 years is examined. The main analytical framework is established. Traditional FDI 
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determinants are derived from OLI and knowledge-capital models. In addition to PE the effects of two 
newly introduced factors, namely Technological Index and National Culture, are also analyzed. This 
chapter includes discussions from the following published papers: Deseatnicov and Akiba (2011a, 
2011b). 
In Chapter V the analysis is extended by including a real exchange rate level (RER) and 
examining two counties’ groupings: by the level of economic development (in developed and 
developing economies) and by region (Euro-zone, European Non-Euro-zone and Asian countries). 
Since the results suggested a nonlinear relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI, a 
theoretical model is proposed to support the empirical findings. This chapter includes discussions from 
the following two papers: Deseatnicov (2012); Deseatnicov and Akiba (2012a). 
In order to reconsider empirical findings of the Chapters IV and V a stricter analysis is proposed 
in Chapter VI. First, an alternative theoretical model is suggested in order to establish hypotheses of 
non-linear relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI. Second, a strict empirical analysis of 
the PE effects on the Japanese MNCs’ activities is presented. This chapter includes discussions from 
the following paper: Deseatnicov and Akiba (2012b). 
I extend the analysis by introducing Democracy as an additional explanatory variable in Chapter 
VII. The host countries sample is also enlarged to 55 countries over a period of 1995-2010 years. First, 
a theoretical model in the same fashion as in Chapter VI is suggested in order to establish hypotheses 
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of non-linear relationship between Democracy and Japanese outward FDI. Second, an empirical 
analysis of PE and Democracy effects on Japanese MNCs activities is conducted. In addition, causality 
between PE and Democracy as well as their interaction effect on Japanese outward FDI is examined. 
Currently the results of this stage of the research were presented at the following three conferences: 
International Congress of Humanities and Social Sciences Research, July 24-28, 2012, Paris, France; 
The 71st Annual Meeting of The Japan Society of International Economics (JSIE), October 13-14, 
Konan University, Kobe, Japan; The 11th International Conference of The Japan Economic Policy 
Association (JEPA), October 20-21, 2012, Nagoya Gakuin University, Nagoya, Japan. 
Following is the brief summary of my findings: 
1. The proposed traditional independent variables (market size, investment cost, wage cost, 
openness, and skill difference) can reasonably explain recent Japanese outward FDI. 
2. The most probable form of Japanese outward FDI depends on the level of economic 
development of the host countries. In case of developed countries Japanese MNCs exhibit 
more horizontal FDI characteristics while in case of developing countries Japanese MNCs 
exhibit more vertical type characteristics. 
3. Two newly introduced variables, namely Technological index and National culture are 
also robust and significant. Both Technological index and National Culture are negatively 
associated with Japanese outward FDI.  
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4. RER level has different effects for developed and developing countries. In case of 
developing countries, depreciation of host countries’ currency is associated with increased 
Japanese FDI. In case of developed countries, depreciation of host countries’ currency is 
associated with lower Japanese FDI. 
5. PE, one of the main concerns of this dissertation turned out to have diverse effects on 
Japanese MNCs activities depending on the level of host countries’ economic 
development. In case of developing countries PE increase has a negative effect on 
Japanese outward FDI while in case of developed countries a positive one. The non-linear 
inverted U-shape relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI was confirmed both 
theoretically and empirically. 
6. Democracy, as well, is differently signed for developed and developing countries 
exhibiting a similar non-linear inverted U-shape relationship with Japanese MNCs’ 
activities. In case of developing countries higher Democracy is associated with higher 
Japanese FDI. In case of developed countries higher Democracy is associated with lower 
Japanese FDI.  
7. A causality test between PE and Democracy showed that in case of developed countries 
Democracy Granger causes PE, while in case of developing countries PE Granger causes 
Democracy. The interaction term analysis of their common effect on Japanese outward 
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FDI showed that in case of developed countries Japanese MNCs might seek lower 
democracy associated with higher PE, while in case of developing countries a higher 
democracy associated with an increase in PE. 
8. Finally, I suggested an assumption of a three-dimensional association with two inverted 
U-shape functional relationships between PE, Democracy and Japanese outward FDI. 
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PREFACE 
In this dissertation, I present an empirical analysis of the determinants of the Japanese outward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Specifically, the effects of institutional factors, such as Political 
Environment and Democracy, on Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing countries will be 
analyzed in addition to traditional and some newly introduced determinants. This area of research is 
quite new, and as such, the hypotheses and results introduce an alternative perspective of outward FDI 
behavior. 
FDI activity is defined as an investment that is aimed at acquiring control in the foreign company 
and it is often associated with Multinational Companies (MNCs) activities. (Markusen, 2009). 
Through FDI MNCs get access to larger markets, lower resource prices, cheap labor and other benefits 
that can provide them with higher profitability and stable growth. On the other hand the host countries 
can benefit not only from the capital, but also from managerial and technological knowledge, access to 
international business culture and practice, improved productivity etc. (Estrin, Hughes, and Todd, 
1997; Lankes and Venables, 1996). These benefits facilitate economic growth of host countries 
(Ozturk, 2007). In line with this FDI are considered by local governments as an important source of 
economic growth, and are often stimulated through various governmental policies (Sinn et al., 1997). 
Hence, FDI determinants play a particular role in the world economics. Thus, it became an acute topic 
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recently and many scholars have addressed this important phenomenon in their theoretical and 
empirical work.1 
One of the reasons for this is that starting from the beginning of the 1990’s World FDI has been 
growing considerably reaching its highest level in 2007. Despite of its decline recently due to the 
global crisis according to UNCTAD (2011) there are significant prospects for World FDI recovery and 
growth reaching its 2007 peak in 2013 (UNCTAD 2011). Thus, the role of FDI in the global finance 
has been increasing considerably in the last few decades, and one might expect its importance to 
become ever higher in the near future. In line with this, it is important to understand what economic 
factors are driving the direction, as well as the level of FDI flows from developed economies such as 
Japan.  
Theoretically this aspect in international economics is still in the egg of its development. For 
instance, Lucas (1990) in his famous paper “Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries?” 
initiated an important theoretical dispute of why capital flows from developed economies to developed 
ones and not to developing. In fact, classical economic theory predicts that capital should flow from 
rich to poor countries due to the law of diminishing returns of capital. Under standard assumptions 
(two countries, same good, constant returns to scale’s production function, output generated by 
homogeneous capital and labor input) differences in income per capita reflect differences in capital per 
                                                           
1
 For a general overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the FDI determinants see, for instance, 
Faeth (2009). 
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capita. Hence, lack of capital in poor counties implies higher return to investment. Thus, if capital is 
allowed to flow freely between countries, it would flow to poor countries until returns on investments 
are equalized between the two countries. Suggesting these standard theoretical reasoning Lucas (1990) 
presented a simple arithmetic according to which marginal product of capital in India should be about 
58 times than that of United States. Hence, the capital should massively flow to India and other 
developing nations. However, in reality massive capital flows were observed in between rich nations 
and only little flows from rich to poor nations. Thus, Lucas (1990) and other studies suggested several 
modifications to traditional neoclassical assumptions in order to explain the actually observed capital 
flows from rich to rich countries.  
Despite this clear logic and attempts to “modify” neoclassical theory, one can observe recently 
that a share of FDI to developing countries is growing intensively. According to UNCTAD (2012) in 
2011 FDI inflows to developing and transition economies surpassed FDI inflows to developed 
economies with a share of 51% of Global FDI. This fundamental shift in FDI structure is in contrast to 
the theoretical prediction. What is the reason? Is there something wrong with the theory or with 
empirics?  
The scope of this dissertation is to contribute empirically to the dispute by addressing a question 
of what factors can influence FDI outflows from Japan, as one of the leading developed economies. 
On the one hand, in 2010 Japan was the 8th largest country in the world by the volume of outward 
direct investment with an amount of 57 billion US$. (JETRO, 2011). Since 1990’s Japan has been 
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continuously one of the main suppliers of world FDI. On the other hand, Japan is a highly developed 
country considered to be one of the 3 largest world economies by the level of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Thus, it is of particular interest to understand what are the factors driving Japanese MNC’s 
activities.  
Literature review in the field shows that there are only a few theoretical attempts to provide a 
model of MNC’s behavior.2 Dunning’s (1992) Ownership Location Internalization (OLI) framework 
and Markusen’s (2002) Knowledge-Capital Model (KCM) are considered as the main established 
approaches to FDI theoretical analysis. These models propose a number of determinants that explain 
MNC’s outward FDI activities. In contrast to theoretical work, a large amount of empirical research 
was performed in order to propose various FDI determinants. In course of time many FDI 
determinants were proposed by the literature. For instance, Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski (2011) 
analyzed the robustness of FDI determinants using Bayesian Model Averaging and included 56 
different explanatory variables in their analyses that were mainly used in previous studies.  
Recently, institutional factors began to play a crucial role in the global economy. The society has 
observed huge Political and Democratic changes in the world in recent decades. Collapse of the 
Socialist countries and appearance on the map of new countries; dictatorships in the middle-East, 
terrorist attacks, political instability, and financial crises led to an economic environment where MNCs 
are highly responsive to the prospective risks to their investments. For instance, Japanese MNCs had a 
                                                           
2
 An extensive literature review is presented in Chapter I. 
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negative experience in Middle East in 1970-1980s when some of their assets were expropriated by 
some Middle East host country governments. In these circumstances, the main scope of my analysis is 
to emphasize the role of political environment (PE) and democracy in the host countries as ones of 
important determinants of Japanese outward FDI. PE represents the level of corruption, government 
stability, regulatory environment, and other political factors that might increase the risk of investment 
and the associated costs. Democracy environment might have implications on the cost of investment 
as well. Although according to the theoretical literature there are many factors that might influence 
FDI decisions, PE and Democracy are considered recently to play an important role in the 
International Economic environment (Blonigen, 2005), and may well compliment traditional FDI 
determinants. Note that, theoretically, it may be difficult to address PE and Democracy effects on 
MNCs’ activities since, it is not easy to define its economic cost. Thus, an empirical analysis might 
first suggest the direction and level of PE and Democracy effects on Japanese outward FDI. And these 
findings may serve for further theoretical and empirical analysis. In addition, Exchange Rate, 
Technological Index and National Culture compliment my analysis as additional explanatory 
variables. All these factors incorporated in a panel data model together with traditional FDI 
determinants are analyzed by means of various econometric techniques. 
There are six major objectives in this dissertation. First is to examine the role of uncertainty and 
institutional factors on Japanese Outward FDI activities. Although Japanese FDI has been considered 
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as a sample country among many others in cross-section or panel data analyses, there is seldom any 
empirical analysis isolating and focusing on these aspects explicitly for Japanese FDI activities.3 
The second major objective is to examine the role of these factors as determinants of FDI in 
developed and developing countries. Although some studies addressed the determinants of FDI to 
developed or developing countries separately,4 there are at best few studies comparing the different 
level of economic development.5 
The third major objective is to introduce an alternative composite index reflecting multiple 
dimensions of host country's PE for empirical investigation, the Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) data. 
To my knowledge, this composite index has rarely been used previously in the analysis of FDI. Thus, I 
am interested in how differently Japanese MNCs behave with respect to the index.6  
The fourth major objective is to employ three different measures of Democracy (International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Polity, and Freedom House) and to estimate their effects on Japanese 
Outward FDI to developed and developing countries. To my knowledge, there has been no study 
addressing this aspect of host countries’ institutional environment as it affects Japanese MNCs’ 
activities. 
                                                           
3
 To my knowledge, Peng and Beamish (2008) is a rare example of a study that addressed Japanese outward FDI 
and explored the effect of host countries’ National Corporate Responsibility Index (a possible alternative 
measure of political environment) on Japanese MNCs’ activities. 
4
 For instance, several studies influenced by “Lucas paradox” addressed institutional factors as determinants of 
capital flows and FDI (Daude and Stein, 2007; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008). 
5
 An exception may be again the work of Peng and Beamish (2008), and Urata and Kawai (2000). 
6
 To my knowledge Clare and Gang (2010) is the only study that used ECR data to measure political stability as 
one of the determinants of US outward FDI to 53 countries. 
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The fifth major objective is to analyze a composite effect of PE and Democracy on Japanese 
outward FDI to developed and developing countries. A simple logical reasoning suggests that PE may 
well influence Democracy by providing a stable policy and regulatory environment. On the other 
hand, increased civil liberties through Democracy may well change the PE in the representative 
country. Thus, it is plausible to hypothesize that different level of PE and Democracy, and their 
composite effect might have a multiple impact on FDI to developed and developing countries. 
The sixth major objective is to use various econometric techniques with a particular emphasis on 
panel data generalized method of moments (GMM) model. Most of the previous studies used ordinary 
least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS), fixed effects (FE) models, random effects (RE) 
models and others. However, the GMM model was rarely used for the study of FDI, although this 
phenomenon might be expected to have a dynamic effect in its behavior.7 Thus, this study aims at 
analyzing panel data by mean of GMM method. Nevertheless, pooled OLS and FE methods are also 
reported. 
Chapter I presents a survey of the literature. In order to facilitate later discussion, this survey is 
divided in 5 sections. First, a survey on the general theories and empirical works related to FDI 
determinants is presented. As already mentioned, a substantial amount of literature addressed this 
subject and thus proposed various determinants that might influence FDI decisions. Since the scope of 
                                                           
7
 Asiedu and Lien (2011) is a recent rare example of a study that strictly employed GMM method to explore the 
democracy, FDI and natural resources relationship in 112 developing countries over the period 1982-2007.  
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my analysis is to emphasize uncertainty and institutional factors effects, the main objective of this 
section is to identify the traditional determinants that will serve as control variables for future 
analyses. The second section addresses purely Japanese outward FDI determinants. Thus, in order to 
verify and compliment control variables of determinants identified in the previous section I present a 
short analysis of Japanese outward FDI determinants literature. The third section addresses the 
literature on political environment as an FDI determinant. As discussed earlier PE is considered as one 
of the important factors in the global economy. Few studies emphasized this factor and most of them 
addressed only developing countries. However, there is still some ambiguity in the effect of PE on FDI 
in developed and developing countries. Thus this section supports future discussion of the issue in the 
dissertation. Since I also emphasize a role of exchange rate (ER), the next section discusses the main 
literature and empirical results of the ER effects on FDI flows. And finally, the last section addresses 
recent literature on another important institutional factor, namely, Democracy that is said to be an 
important issue in the global economy. Since most of the developed countries have attained high-level 
democracies, and most of developing countries are pursuing a goal of increasing democracy, it is of 
particular interest to emphasize the role of Democracy for FDI. Thus, this section presents a survey of 
some previous research in this area.  
Chapter II investigates general patterns of Japanese outward FDI. By presenting the data 
background of the study I aim at establishing a foundation for the later discussion of economic forces 
and hypotheses that might influence Japanese outward FDI. I discuss, in this Chapter, the dynamics of 
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Japanese outward FDI, its structure and distribution. A special attention is paid to the gradual shift of 
FDI from developed to developing countries in view of the earlier discussed “Lucas paradox”.  
Chapter III presents the data description and hypotheses that are planned to be explored 
empirically in the following Chapters IV-VII. First, I discuss the dependent variable’s data sources and 
calculation specifics. Second, I present control variables that are derived from traditional FDI 
determinants suggested by Dunning’s Ownership Location Internalization (OLI) and knowledge 
capital models. Third, I discuss some newly introduced variables (technological index and national 
culture), followed by details on real exchange rate calculations. Finally, I present a detailed data 
discussion of the two main focuses of my dissertation, namely PE and Democracy. 
The objective of Chapters IV through VII is to present an empirical analysis of institutional 
factors effects on Japanese outward FDI under different samples, assumptions and econometric 
models. All these chapters follow an identical structure and flow of explanation. A special attention is 
paid to the variables of interest analyzed. Thus every chapter consists of at least four sections. First, 
section 1 presents the main objectives and framework of this chapter. The econometric specification is 
described in section 2, and aims at presenting the econometric methodology used in the analysis. 
Results and their discussions are presented in section 3. Section 4 summarizes main findings and 
addresses limitations of the study. However, in Chapters VI-VII I introduce an additional section to 
present a theoretical model that attempts to support the empirical analysis and conclusions. In Chapter 
V a theoretical model is presented in the appendix. 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
xix 
Chapter IV presents the results of empirical analysis of the PE effects on Japanese outward FDI to 
a sample of 30 countries. The pooled nature of the sample aims at understanding the nature and 
characteristics of the Japanese outward FDI determinants. The main variable of interest is PE. 
However, two more new variables are introduced in the specification, namely Technological Index 
and National Culture.  
In Chapter V the analytical framework is broadened by dividing host countries in two distinct 
regional categories: developed and developing countries and Euro-zone, non-Euro-zone and Asian 
countries. In addition, Exchange Rate (ER) is added as an explanatory factor, and in what follows 
some new hypotheses are proposed in its behavior. In order to support the empirical findings a 
theoretical model is suggested in the appendix. The model takes into consideration randomness of 
exchange rate, and represents a full optimization with respect to all the choice variables to solve for 
FDI and taking into account possible influences from other endogeneous variables. PE is introduced in 
the model as a probability to retain profits after possible expropriation by the local government. The 
analysis, in fact, shows that the relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI may be non-linear. 
For this reason, the objective of Chapter VI is a more sophisticated econometric analysis of the 
purely Political Environment effects on Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing countries 
for the period 1995-2009. First, a simple theoretical model is introduced to establish theoretical 
hypotheses of non-linear relationship between PE and FDI. Second, various econometric methods are 
used in order to depict the underlying effects of PE on Japanese outward FDI flows. 
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Chapter VII extends the analysis by a new institutional variable, namely Democracy. After 
conducting the literature review, I actually suspected that the relationship between Democracy and 
FDI may well be non-linear. Thus, first, similar to the Chapter VI theoretical model with respect to 
Democracy is introduced in order to establish hypotheses of non-linearity. Second, various measures 
of Democracy are used in the empirical analysis. In addition an interaction between PE and 
Democracy and their common effect on Japanese MNCs’ activities are addressed as well. The results 
confirm a new finding of non-linear behavior of Japanese FDI flows in response to PE and Democracy 
changes. 
Chapter VIII concludes my dissertation. The objectives, theoretical models, econometric approach 
and main findings are summarized. The significance and implication of the study is discussed as well. 
Finally, the study limitations and future research possibilities are presented.  
By and large, the dissertation aims at econometric analysis of institutional factors on Japanese 
outward FDI. I address the theoretical issues of this problem only to the extent necessary to support 
my empirical findings with respect to PE and Democracy, and to suggest alternative theoretical 
explanations. Thus, my theoretical assumptions and hypotheses with respect to traditional variables are 
based on the previous research in the field. The main contribution and novelty, if any, consists in the 
fact that this is the first study that has attempted to analyze the effects of PE and Democracy on 
Japanese MNCs activities. The findings of the dissertation are important not only for empirical 
research and for better understanding of FDI related policies and MNCs activities, but also for 
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shedding some light on the theoretical debate of the “Lucas paradox” and actually observed 
movements of capital between nations. 
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1 
CHAPTER I THE SURVEY1 
The history of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) could be traced back to the beginning of the 20th 
century when most of FDI flows were targeting railway construction industries (Twomey, 2000). The 
economists started to pay more attention to this phenomenon and to the theoretical reason for FDI 
behavior in the 1950s. And since Mundell’s (1957) attempt to explain FDI flows in terms of relative 
factor endowments and relative factor costs, a large number of theoretical and empirical works 
appeared to modify, elaborate, and/or propose new or alternative models for FDI flows. This survey is 
aimed at facilitating later discussions in the dissertation and thus I address the relevant literature only 
to an extent necessary to establish a theoretical background for this work. 
In the section A I address main trends and developments of the general FDI theory. The section B 
presents some works on Japanese outward FDI. Sections C, D, E discusses Political Environment 
(PE), Exchange Rate (ER) and Democracy effects on FDI respectively. The main focus of the 
discussion in all sections is FDI determinants. Although there is an extensive literature on the 
relationship between FDI and Economic development, this subject is beyond the scope of the current 
study.2 
                                                           
1
 This chapter is based on a published paper: Deseatnicov, Ivan “Theoretical approaches to FDI determinants and 
Japanese FDI specifics” Economica Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova 5(69), October 2009: 81-91 
2
 An interested reader may find a literature discussion of the relationship between FDI and Development in 
McGrattan (2012); Clark et al. (2011); Kose et al. (2009). 
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A. The theoretical and empirical approaches to FDI determinants 
1. Definition and characteristics of FDI 
Before starting a discussion on FDI theoretical background it is important to identify what I 
include under the concept of Foreign Direct Investment – FDI. In general, capital flows can be divided 
into official and private flows. Official flows are multilateral funds (from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc) and bilateral funds (flows between governments). 
Private capital flows from one country to another could take a form of FDI, Portfolio Investment or 
private bank loans. Recently, remittances started to play an important role as well especially in 
developing countries.  
According to the IMF definition “a direct investment relationship arises when an investor resident 
in one economy makes an investment that gives control or a significant degree of influence on the 
management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy.” (IMF, 2009). A threshold of at least 
10% ownership in the foreign subsidiary is considered to be necessary for an FDI relationship.  
Many FDI types and forms occurring in Global Business sometimes overlap each other. The 
organizational structure of an investment FDI can be categorized as horizontal, vertical, or platform-
type. In case of Horizontal FDI a Multinational Company (MNC) replicates identical production 
facilities across countries. A vertical FDI arises when an MNC fragments the production process 
internationally, thereby locating each stage of production in the country where it can be done at the 
least cost. Finally, a platform-type FDI occurs when an MNC establishes a production in another 
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country aimed at serving demand in yet a third countries. The capital participation in an FDI could be 
classified as green-field when a foreign subsidiary is constructed “from scratch”; mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A); and joint-ventures. Another type particular to Japan is called “keiretsu”, defined 
as a set of companies with interrelated business relationships and shareholdings. Some other 
classifications exist but they remain out of the scope of this study and thus are not addressed here. 
In sum, FDI are undertaken by an MNC mainly in order to ensure a managerial control over a 
subsidiary. An MNC may arise under different forms. FDI usually brings many other benefits for the 
host country that could be short-term (e.g. access to international business culture and practice, an 
alternative to official financial aid) and long-term (e.g. managerial and technological knowledge) 
nature. On a micro-level there is some evidence that FDI promotes the competitiveness of local firms 
(Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan, 1994). From a macro-perspective technology spillovers may stimulate 
economic growth, employment, wages etc. (Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee, 1998). Thus, long-term 
and macro-level benefits allow a host country better ability to exploit its absolute and comparative 
advantage. For these reasons FDI attracting policies are highly related to a good understanding of the 
factors that influence MNCs decisions. Many theories have arisen on this issue and I present them in 
what follows here. 
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2. Theoretical background 
With the fast development of FDI and MNCs many theoretical and empirical approaches were 
undertaken in order to explain and provide evidence for the FDI trends and MNCs decisions. 
Consequently, two main lines of research emerged through the history of FDI study. The first one was 
based on the institutional theories (e.g. Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) that appeared in the late 1930s 
and was focused on firm’s internal functioning and a behavior explanation. Thus the FDI theories were 
mostly concerned with the firm-level specifics and determinants. The other set of literature is based on 
the neoclassical international trade approach (Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model) and its further 
modifications proposing FDI models and determinants (Helpman, 1985; Krugman, 1983; Markusen, 
1984; Vernon, 1966). Eventually these two approaches merged. In recent literature a so-called 
knowledge-capital model presents a broadly taken approach to FDI modeling and explanation 
(Markusen, 2002; Markusen et al., 1996) that incorporates horizontal and vertical FDI within firm-
level determinants and country characteristics. 
In sum, the existing theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes many aspects of FDI and 
proposes a number of different determinants whose significance needs to be tested and confirmed 
empirically under different assumptions and econometric settings.  
3. Firm-based theories 
In the beginning of 20th century a number of studies on firm’s internal organization appeared. 
These studies addressed the companies’ internal organization, functioning, behavior and decision 
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making. FDI determinants theories emerged from this approach and they could be classified in two 
main categories: ownership advantages theories (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969) and Dunning’s 
Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) framework. (Dunning, 1992) 
3.1 Original theory 
The concepts developed by Coase (Coase, 1937, 1993) and followed by Williamson (1975) 
inspired the firm-specific theories. Among the firm growth theories, Coase (1937) pioneered in 
focusing on the emergence, not performance, of companies. His approach was referred later as a new 
institutional economics. The economization of “transaction costs” represents the key concept of the 
theory. When a firm is involved in the market operation, it must incur transaction costs associated with 
market business operations. It is not free of cost to market and there is a cost of identifying “fair” 
market prices. It takes time and money to do this. If however a firm decides to produce an intermediate 
product within the company and internalizes the production process, then these transaction costs are 
reduced.  
Built on Coase’s theory Williamson (Williamson, 1975; Williamson and Winter, 1991) discussed 
two behavioral assumptions: bounded rationality and “Opportunistic” behavior.3  These behavioral 
particularities complimented by market imperfection will induce a firm to decide whether to undertake 
                                                           
3
 “Bounded rationality is the idea that in decision-making, rationality of individuals is limited by the information 
they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision.” 
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002) Opportunistic behavior occurs where one party takes advantage of his superior 
knowledge, in order to further his/her interests, by failing to disclose such information to the other party. 
(http://www.ventureline.com/accounting-glossary/O/opportunistic-behaviour-definition/)  
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market transaction or to internalize production process. From this perspective firms emerge in order to 
economize on transaction costs due to market imperfection, bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Accordingly, such concept might be applicable to a MNCs decision process to undertake FDI. These 
considerations inspired the appearance of related firm-specific theories of FDI. 
3.2 Ownership advantages theories 
Inspired by institutional theory, Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger (1969) approached the FDI 
nature by criticizing the neoclassical trade approach for its limited ability to explain FDI. According to 
them the neoclassical view could not explain FDI, as it assumed perfect competition whereas, 
according to Hymer and Kindleberger, FDI needed structural imperfections to flourish. 
Hymer (1976) pointed out that FDI involves also the transfer of firm-specific assets, a lá 
Williamson, including managerial and technological skills, and not just financial flow of capital. He 
introduced the concept of “monopolistic advantage” that represents the exclusive and unique nature of 
the firm-specific assets. This fact allows MNCs to face disadvantages while operating in the foreign 
market. Kindleberger (1969) expounded the same approach by introducing “monopolistic advantages” 
possessed by MNCs: product differentiation, marketing skills, pricing policy etc; patented or secret 
technology, and easier access to capital; economies of scale; government policies concerning imports 
and customs unions. Thus, Hymer-Kindleberger theory argued that MNCs needed these ownership 
advantages in order to operate efficiently on the local market facing the local competitors. 
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Knickerbocker (1973) extended Hymer-Kindleberger theory for oligopolistic market. According 
to him, oligopolistic firms pay attention to the other companies’ behavior. They pay great attention to 
what their rivals are doing and are inclined to undertake “follow-the-leader” strategy in case a 
competitor establishes plant in the foreign market.4 In reaction to foreign firms “invading” their home 
market the oligopolistic firms tend to establish a plant outside their home market. The last case was 
proved empirically by Graham (1978) when analyzing the reaction of European’s MNCs to US FDI in 
Europe. 
Thus, ownership advantage approach provided a grounded theoretical base and many empirical 
studies were undertaken in order to check the reality of the concept. Most of them proved to be robust 
for the considered countries and markets showing that such ownership advantages as R&D and 
advertising expenditure, managerial resources, technology, labor skills, firm size and others had an 
effect on FDI activity.  
3.3 Dunning’s OLI framework 
The natural development of FDI theories and approaches to this phenomenon (international trade 
theory, the theory of the firm, institutional theory and location theory) inspired a number of different 
FDI explications. Based on the Coase’s and Williamson’s concepts (internalization theory) and taking 
into account traditional trade theories, Dunning (1979) brought together various arguments to create an 
                                                           
4
 In case the MNCs are large enough (have the largest shares in the world market) they tend to become leaders 
and extend their influence by FDI. 
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eclectic paradigm of FDI synthesizing the advantages to firms to operate internationally, and the mode 
of entry (FDI, export and/or licensing).   
The eclectic paradigm of FDI, also called OLI framework, incorporated three main advantages: 
Ownership advantage (O-advantage); Internalization advantage (I-advantage); Location advantage (L-
advantage). According to Dunning (1992) O-advantage is related to the firm’s production process and 
represents the extent to which a company possesses its firm-specific assets compared to other foreign 
companies.  The O-advantage usually takes the form of patents, technical knowledge, management 
skills and reputation which serve as determinants of FDI. Provided that the first advantage is assured 
the following FDI determination derives from the level of firms perception of rationality to use these 
intangible assets internally (compared to licensing or export). The I-advantage occurs due to the public 
good nature of the firm-specific assets and is associated with Coase and Williamson’s transaction 
costs. According to Dunning, an MNC decides to become involved in FDI when it perceives that 
transaction costs of licensing or export are higher than production process internalization through FDI. 
Finally, as soon as first two advantages are assured the motives to establish a plant or producing 
abroad are related to the L-advantages usually under form of access to protected markets, favorable tax 
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treatments, lower production and transport costs, lower risk and favorable structure of competition 
etc.5 
Taking into consideration its all-encompassing nature, the OLI framework could be applied to 
different countries, industries, firm specific variables; to different types of FDI. Thus the OLI 
framework allows different types of FDI determinants depending on the research context. The OLI 
framework was tested empirically through various researches and analyses (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; 
Kogut and Chang, 1991; Barrell and Pain, 1996). The determinants derived from the OLI framework 
have been found to explain adequately MNCs’ activity under empirical investigation (e.g. ownership 
advantages, market size and characteristics, factor costs, transport costs, protection and some other 
factors). 
 In sum, based on a broadly developed theory of firm a number of FDI determinants’ theories 
emerged. These theories approached the phenomenon in different ways. Some of them took a number 
of factors endogenously, the others exogenously or did not consider them at all. 6  However, 
                                                           
5
 However, Dunning’s OLI framework was criticized by Itaki (1991) that Ownership-advantage is redundant and 
inseparable from Location or Internationalization advantage.  Ownership-advantage is inseparable from 
Internalization-advantage as a firm can make use of Ownership-advantage (e.g. technology) only trough 
Internalization. Ownership-advantage should be considered in economic terms. Hence, its cost and its 
profitability are of primary importance, from which follows that it is inseparable from Location-advantage. 
Under this view Dunning’s OLI paradigm might be considered more as an attempt to categorize the FDI 
determinants. Thus, it is more likely to be considered not as a theory, but as paradigm, ‘taxonomy’ etc.  
6
 For instance, Coase and Williamson saw a firm as emerging endogenously due to “transaction costs” function. 
On the other hand Hymer, Kindleberger and Dunning examined monopolistic advantages as exogenously given.  
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internalization of the firm-specific assets under market imperfection remained the principal important 
idea of all theories.  
4. International trade based theories 
An alternative line of research on FDI determinants was inspired by the ideas of theories of 
international trade. These theories emerged through time into different frameworks. 
4.1 Original theory 
Comparative advantage introduced by David Ricardo (Ricardo, 1951) is the main concept at the 
base of neoclassical theory of international trade. Heckscher (1949) and Ohlin (1933) extended this 
concept within the neoclassical trade theory by introducing a general equilibrium model with two 
factors (usually capital and labor), two countries and two goods, which is the so-called Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model.7 The main assumptions of this model are perfectly competitive goods and factor 
markets; identical constant returns to scale production functions and zero transport costs. The HO 
theory is based on the factor endowment differences within the countries. Hence a country which is 
capital abundant will export goods that use capital intensively and labor-abundant country will export 
labor-intensive goods. In the process factor prices tend to be equalized. Hence, the fundamental 
economic notion of the substitutability under the scarce resource assumption is incorporated. 
                                                           
7
 Standard HO model examines a set-up of two countries, two goods and two factors of production. The factors 
endowment is different within countries. All markets (of two commodities and two factors of production) are 
perfectly competitive. Each country’s equilibrium requires national utility maximization, maximization of 
national income and balanced trade. Balanced trade ensures market clearing, and, at equilibrium world prices, 
both countries consume goods in the same proportion. 
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However, considering HO model assumptions within FDI determinants aspects a number of 
criticisms appeared: factor movements and intra-firm trade are excluded;8 international trade agents 
are assumed to be nation states, not MNCs; 9 HO model assumes zero transport costs which is at odds 
with reality;10 and the HO model employs only two factors (capital and labor) without considering 
other factors. 11  These criticisms and a progress of firm-based theories inspired the evolution of 
international trade theory under different forms incorporating FDI aspects in order to explain its 
determinants. 
4.2 Location theories and Economics of geography 
In order to address the critics of neoclassical approach concerning transport costs, the so-called 
location theories emerged. These were mainly preoccupied with the question of where and how 
companies locate their plants which is directly related to FDI determinants. 
                                                           
8
 Two influential neo-classic papers by Mundell (1957) and (Markusen, 1983) challenged this assumption. 
Mundell used the HO framework to show that international trade and factor movement are substitutes. On the 
other hand Markusen challenged this conventional wisdom and showed that eliminating barriers to factor 
movement results in complementarity. 
9
 By introducing internal increasing returns to scale Krugman (1979) pioneered a so-called New Trade Theory 
aimed at explaining an intra-industry trade. In his classic work Melitz (2003) took  a step further by suggesting 
firms heterogeneity and thus stressing the importance of firms rather than sectors in international trade. 
10
 This “space-less” aspect of HO model was summarized and interpreted in a seminal paper by Krugman (1991) 
where a production agglomeration appeared "as the outcome of the interaction of increasing returns, trade costs 
and factor price differences." (Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2009). 
11
 Limitation to only two factors of production led for instance to a Leontief paradox. Leontief (1953) pointed 
out that the United States as the most capital intensive country actually exported labor intensive products which 
was at odds with HO model prediction. Gruber, Mehta, and Vernon (1967) proposed a solution to this paradox, 
insisting on the necessity to take into consideration another, third factor input like firm-specific assets such as 
technological assets and management skills. 
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Dicken (1992, 1998) proposed a “least-cost approach”, the main idea of which was that 
companies tend to choose their location in order to minimize transport costs incurred in collecting 
necessary materials and transporting finished products to the final client. Even though production costs 
usually exceed transport costs, the location theories approach to FDI determinants deserves attention.  
In the same spirit Krugman (1983, 1991) modeled a so-called “economics of geography”. A basic 
question in this approach was why manufacturing activities agglomerate in one place and agricultural 
in another. The main conclusion of the theory involves the idea of increasing returns to scale (IRS) and 
externalities’ effects. Krugman argued that once the concentration of manufacturing activities has 
started in one place, it will be more effective from the economical point of view to locate additional 
production plants in the same area, since it will be cheaper to buy factor inputs, raw materials and 
intermediate products with lower transport costs.12 
4.3 Vernon’s Product Life cycle theory 
Another approach to the FDI determinants within international trade theory was proposed by 
Vernon (1966). The logic of his product life cycle theory is based on the dynamic interpretation of the 
FDI determinants and trade with a particular emphasis on the technological standardization process.13 
                                                           
12
 In a monopolistic competitive market IRS will give rise to a higher variety of products and intra-industry trade 
will increase within countries. For instance, Toyota will sell more cars in Europe while BMW will sell more cars 
in Japan. In addition, as argued by Krugman, once the concentration of manufacturing has started, externalities’ 
effects will result in increased economic potential for manufactures to base their production facilities near the 
already concentrated area since it will be cheaper to buy factor inputs, raw materials and intermediate products 
which this area may provide with a lower transport costs. 
13
 However, Akamatsu (1961) was probably the first who proposed this approach to explain FDI by introducing 
the so-called “flying-geese” principle (see Section B). 
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According to Vernon three main phases of the product evolution process should be considered, 
namely new, mature and standardized products. In the first phase the non-standardized character of the 
new products requires communication between producers and customers leading to decision to locate 
production facilities in the home country, and the foreign market demand is met by exports. According 
to the “dynamic” nature of the product life cycle at the second phase the company will shift production 
facilities overseas either to reduce production and distribution costs or because there exists a threat to 
their market position. Due to economies of scale the overseas production will serve the host country 
market, and as it evolves, can start serving third country market or even home country market. And 
finally as the production process becomes totally standardized production facilities can be moved to 
countries with lower costs, mainly developing countries. 
4.4 Horizontal and Vertical FDI theories 
Inspired by the HO model, FDI determinants theories evolved into some more complicated 
frameworks by introducing imperfect market assumption and incorporating or taking endogenously 
the emergence of MNCs. The notion of knowledge-capital regarded as firm-specific asset was 
proposed by Markusen (2002) in response to OLI framework ownership advantage considerations.14 
                                                           
14
 For example, a business blueprint could be regarded as an item of knowledge-capital since first, it can be 
easily transferred from one plant to another without inquiring high transport costs (fragmentation property), 
second it is a skilled-labor intensive work product (skilled-labor intensity property) and, finally, it can be used 
simultaneously by two and more MNCs plants (jointness property). (Markusen, 2002) 
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Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1985) were one of the first to introduce MNC activity in an 
international trade general equilibrium model putting into the primary place the FDI phenomenon. 
Helpman (1985) assumed a model with monopolistic competition in horizontally differentiated 
goods; trade costs set to zero and MNCs choose producing in one place due to increasing returns to 
scale. These MNCs produced headquarters services as firm-specific factors, taking the internalization 
of their production as given.  Firms could be located abroad when differences in factor endowments 
were large and factor price differences existed. Thus, Helpman proposed a factor-proportions 
hypothesis that held that with asymmetric factor endowments, human-capital-abundant countries 
generated FDI. Intra-firm trade appeared because of headquarter services and exports in intermediate 
goods. This explained the existence of vertically integrated firms with geographically fragmented 
production. 
Markusen (1984) proposed a general equilibrium model in order to explain horizontally integrated 
firms..15  Knowledge-capital gave rise to firm-level (or economies of multi-plant operation) scale 
economies due to its “joint-input nature”. MNCs could increase their efficiency by providing 
knowledge-capital to all its entities and eliminating the duplication of joint input that could occur 
otherwise.  
                                                           
15
 The model implied a world with two countries, two commodities produced in both countries from labor and 
sector-specific capital. Corporate (or control) activity was specific to MNC’s activity in the home country. The 
world production of a good was monopolized by MNC. The MNC equilibrium would lie on the efficient MNC 
world production frontier in the sense that MNC would maximize its profit from X commodity’s output given 
level of the other Y commodity production. It was assumed that factor markets and Y industry are competitive. 
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Helpman and Markusen approaches were extended, for instance, in Horstmann and Markusen 
(1987) in a way that MNCs were not assumed to be given and may have (or have not) arisen 
endogenously.16 The main assumptions of the model were existence of firm-specific costs; existence 
of tariff and transport costs and existence of plant-scale economies. The main conclusion of this model 
was that MNCs appeared in the industries with large firm-specific costs and high tariff and transport 
costs, but relatively small plant scale of economies. This so called “proximity-concentration 
hypothesis” was similar to Krugman’s economics of geography considerations.17 
4.5 Knowledge-capital model theories 
Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (2002) integrated the theories related to vertical and 
horizontal firms in a so called knowledge-capital model. According to Markusen, knowledge-capital is 
a broad term that includes “the human capital of the employees; patents, blueprints, procedures, and 
other proprietary knowledge, and finally marketing assets such as trademarks, reputations, and brand 
names.” (2002, 18) This knowledge-capital has three defining assumptions. First is fragmentation in a 
sense that the location knowledge-based assets may be fragmented from production. Second is skilled-
labor intensity meaning that these assets are skilled-labor intensive in comparison to final production. 
                                                           
16
 MNCs’ activity was not assumed to be given initially (in comparison to Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1985) 
models). “It provided conditions on a widely assumed production and transportation technology sufficient to 
result in either a mixed MNE-domestic production pattern on the one hand or a solely domestic production 
pattern on the other.” Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 109) 
17
 This proximity concentration hypothesis was based on a trade-off between maximizing proximity to customers 
and concentrating production to obtain scale economies. Thus, firms could either trade their knowledge of how 
to produce directly (through investment) or indirectly (by trading commodities). If overseas production was 
cheaper than trade then the firms preferred to invest.  
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And third is jointness suggesting that knowledge-capital may be used simultaneously by a larger 
number of plants without largely increasing the costs. Thus, the model assumed two countries, two 
factors and two goods, one good with constant returns to scale and second good with plant and firm 
level scale of economies. Relative endowments, country size, high and low transport costs (as a 
measure of trade costs), and FDI ban were taken as changing factors. The economic logic of the model 
dictates that horizontal FDI would appear in case when FDI are allowed, high trade costs exist 
(meaning export becomes costly) and factor endowments in the countries are similar. These 
considerations come from the jointness (“public good”) property of the knowledge-based capital. 
Vertical FDI appear due to fragmentation of knowledge-capital’s location and the production. The 
basic idea that motivates vertical FDI is different factor endowments, meaning existence of skilled-
labor intensive activities in headquarters with relatively low wages and unskilled-labor intensive 
activities in the foreign country coupled with relatively low wages. In addition, scale economies 
should stimulate production in the foreign country. Thus, Vertical FDI would appear when FDI was 
allowed, trade liberated (meaning transport costs are relatively low) and different factor endowments 
exist. Consequently Markusen argued that horizontal MNCs were more common case than vertical 
MNCs. 
Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) estimated the knowledge-capital model using panel data of 
US inward and outward foreign affiliate sales for USA and 36 other countries including such factors as 
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market size, factor endowments and transport costs. This analysis tested knowledge-capital model 
hypotheses regarding the importance of MNCs activity between two countries as a function of certain 
characteristics of those countries.18 They found that MNCs activity is increasing in their economic 
sizes, the relative skilled-labor abundance of the home country and the interaction between size and 
relative endowment differences. Markusen and Maskus (2002) analyzed horizontal, vertical and 
knowledge-capital models from the point of view of the world FDI trends. The results confirmed to a 
certain extent horizontal and knowledge-capital models, but little evidence was found for the vertical 
model.  
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) introduced a third mobile factor (physical capital) to the knowledge-
capital model to highlight the interaction between trade agreements and FDI flows. They suggested 
that export platform FDI is undertaken to serve not only the host country, but also to produce goods 
that are subsequently exported to neighboring countries. Thus they highlighted the importance of a 
comprehensive account of regional trade agreements.  
Finally, Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) developed a general model of FDI in a multi-
country world. It predicted how neighboring country characteristics (e.g., GDP, trade costs, 
endowments, etc.) affect FDI in a given host country, depending on the specific FDI motivation 
                                                           
18
 These characteristics were country size, size differences, relative endowment differences, and trade and 
investment costs. 
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(horizontal, vertical, export-platform, etc.). They found mixed evidence and only weak support for 
export-platform and vertical interaction FDI. 
In sum, despite some critics of the neoclassical international trade model (HO), a few theories 
attempting to examine MNCs’ activities were inspired by it, and by incorporating several aspects of 
firm-based theories it has evolved into knowledge-capital models that have a good explanatory power 
for FDI phenomena.  
B. Essays on Japanese outward FDI determinants 
In 1960-1970s Japanese FDI started to emerge globally and several studies extended the 
theoretical literature taking into consideration Japanese MNCs experience. Kojima (1978) considered 
the HO model and based on Japanese MNCs experience, proposed an extended model for explaining 
FDI. According to him one should distinguish trade-creating FDI and trade-replacing FDI. Trade-
creating FDI usually are created by small firms that transfer production from high-wage economies to 
low-wage economies, manufacturing labor-intensive products. The final product is aimed at serving 
the home country market. The trade-replacing FDI are usually undertaken by large firms 
manufacturing technology-based products in order to serve the host market.  
Akamatsu (1961) approached FDI in the same way as Vernon (1966) proposing a dynamic 
explanation of FDI according to three stages of the product development and standardization, namely 
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new, mature and standardized. A concept of “flying-geese pattern” was introduced in his works.19 
Komiya (1988) viewed FDI as transfer of managerial resources. Horaguchi (1992) introduced 
managerial resources as a third factor of production in the HO model. Note however that most of these 
theories were mainly inspired by observations of Japanese FDI in 1960s-1980s.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Japanese MNCs activities in the last two decades were not 
addressed empirically. Some empirical literature on FDI determinants considered Japan among FDI 
source countries (e.g. Edwards, 1990; Wei, 2000). Japanese FDI activities alone also have been 
scrutinized empirically. For example, an econometric test conducted by Cieslik and Ryan (2004) was 
aimed at investigating which of the gravity model (GM, hereafter) or economic potential model (EPM, 
hereafter) can better explain Japanese outward FDI into EU and its candidate countries (a total of 30 
countries). 20  Although the GM has been popularly used in empirical examination of FDI, they 
hypothesized that the EPM may be preferred for investigating Japanese FDI, because Japanese MNCs 
                                                           
19
 The concept originated in Akamatsu (1961) work. Its name came from a metaphorical analogy of the figure 
showing inverted U-shape pattern of import, production, and export with the flying pattern of wild geese. 
According to Akamatsu, the fundamental pattern of “flying geese” follows 4 stages: import of manufactured 
goods; start of domestic production of consumer goods and import of foreign capital; start of domestically 
produced consumer goods’ exports; and decline of consumer goods exports while domestic capital goods start to 
be exported. 
20
 Gravity model for FDI is inspired by analogy with international trade theory. In the international trade 
perspective the gravity model specified trade flows between countries as a function of the GDP of each country 
and the distance between countries. Although initially it was only an empirical approach, in the course of several 
theoretical attempts a theoretical foundation for it was established by a series of papers. (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Deardorff, 1998) Unfortunately, a theoretical foundation for a gravity approach to FDI (in the 
sense that FDI is specified as a function of GDP of each country and the distance between them) was not 
established. Nevertheless, it is sometimes used in analogy to the trade theory approach.  
Economic potential model for FDI is inspired by economics of geography theories (see section A.4.2, e.g. 
Krugman 1983). In this sense it states that FDI activities tend to concentrate as a function of population 
distribution and industrial location.   
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typically locate in countries with higher economic potential. They utilized the index of economic 
potential for some location (i), defined as the sum of the volume of economic activity in the all other 
locations (j), divided by the distance between (i) and (j). Invoking an F-test, they found that the EPM 
encompasses the GM at the reasonable significance level. This conclusion was confirmed by the 
Hausman specification test for panel data estimations when accounting for country-specific 
heterogeneity. 
Tanaka (2009) estimated a knowledge-capital model for both Japanese and US foreign affiliate 
sales together.21 For Japan he used a panel data-set developed by Matsuura (2004) of Japanese MNCs 
activities for the period of 1989-2002. Tanaka (2009) employed system GMM estimation as proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) and found that both market access and relative skill endowment matter 
for foreign affiliate sales. Japanese MNCs activities were encouraged by relative unskilled labor 
abundance in the host country, which is associated with vertical FDI motives. On the contrary, US 
MNCs activities were encouraged by relative skill abundance which favors horizontal FDI. However, 
it would have been better to distinguish between developed and developing host countries in the study, 
as their economic characteristics might be quite different depending on their economic development. 
                                                           
21
 Tanaka (2009) replicated the estimation model used by Carr et al. (2001) but augmented it by a number of 
additional explanatory variables like dummies for bilateral trade agreements, bilateral investment agreements 
and some others.  
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Although the study was augmented by several additional explanatory variables, institutional risk and 
political factors were not taken into consideration. 
In sum, Japanese MNCs activities inspired a number of theoretical works that mainly followed the 
logics of neoclassical trade theories. A number of empirical works addressed Japanese FDI 
determinants. By and large, despite their importance institutional risk, political factors and democracy 
were not at the center of Japanese FDI research.22 In addition, a rare study distinguished among 
developed and developing economies.23 Thus, these aspects are of particular interest in view of recent 
world economics shift and in this study I address them from the Japanese FDI perspective. 
C. Political Environment and FDI: an overview of literature 
Political factors have been emphasized recently as an important factor in international economics. 
For instance, Blonigen mentioned that the "quality of institutions is likely an important determinant of 
FDI activity, particularly for less-developed countries" (2005, 390). While he argued that a negative 
impact of poor institutions on FDI leaves no room for doubt, it is difficult to confirm empirically the 
effects of institutions because of several problems inherent to the data; measurement errors and little 
informative variations over time, among others. 
                                                           
22
 Nevertheless, few papers (e.g. Peng and Beamish 2009) addressed political environment related concepts as a 
Japanese FDI determinant. They are discussed in the next section although the number of studies is limited in 
both content and results. 
23
 To my knowledge few rare examples are Urata and Kawai (2000) and Makino, Beamish, and Zhao (2004). 
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Although the theoretical modeling of the effects of political factors on international investment 
activities has been scarce, Lipschitz, Lane, and Mourmouras (2006) is an exception. They argued that 
institutional factors "that determine the perceived risk of confiscatory taxation or exchange controls, as 
well as unclear property rights and uneven application of laws and contracts" (2006, 214) could be 
blamed as a source of smaller capital inflows for ten Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. 
There have been many empirical investigations of political risks on FDI activities. For example, 
Edwards (1990) presented a cross-section estimate of OECD's FDI to 58 least-developed countries 
(LDC) sample countries, using data of the sample means for the period 1971-1981. Although he found 
that "both economic and political variables affect the distribution and magnitude of FDI", the political 
variable's "relative importance is not very high when compared to that of other regressors". The 
political risk factors Edwards used were some structural reform measures. 
Singh and Jun (1996) were  one of the first to analyze the impact of political environment for a 
sample of 31 developing countries and found by a panel data estimation that the political “risk” turned 
out to have a negative and significant effect on FDI. The political risk was captured by an index 
developed by Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) with six internal causes of political 
risk.24 According to them FDI host countries are structurally different. In the group of low FDI inflows 
                                                           
24
 They are fractionalization of the political spectrum (linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization) and 
coercive political risk (dependence on and/or importance to a hostile power), and 2 symptoms of political risk 
(societal conflict involving demonstrations and street violence).  
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countries MNCs activities are more labor intensive and thus sociopolitical instability is more 
important. In the group of high FDI inflows MNCs activities are more capital intensive and thus a 
perception of political stability from a long-term perspective is more important.  Another empirical 
analysis with cross-section estimation was presented by Wei (2000) who used a sample of bilateral 
FDI from 12 OECD source countries to 45 host countries. The political risk variables include 
corruption, bribes, or transparency.25 In order to avoid a difficulty associated with estimation with 
zero-FDI observation, he used a modified Tobit model and found that a rise in either the tax rate on 
MNCs or the corruption level in a host country reduces inward FDI, and that American investors are 
more averse to corruption in host countries, but not necessarily more so than average OECD countries. 
In their recent work Blonigen and Piger (2011) analyzed, using Bayesian statistical techniques, 
the FDI determinants inclusion probability in the empirical model. They tried to emphasize all main 
determinants in the literature. Host-country legal and political institutions quality was also analyzed 
but its inclusion probability was found to be low. They used three variables for political environment 
and institutions, namely: political stability, legal institutions, and corruption, but the contents and the 
sources were not disclosed. On the other hand Eicher et al. (2011), using a similar approach and the 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) political environment data, found that FDI flows increase 
                                                           
25
 Some of the data were undated, however. 
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if there is lower corruption and internal relations tensions in the host country, as well as if there is 
lower corruption, better bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability in source countries. 
To my knowledge, Clare and Gang (2010) is the only empirical study that used the Euromoney 
Country Risk Score as a measure of political environment. First, they established a simple theoretical 
model of a firm’s expected utility maximization with respect to FDI given risk aversion and in the 
presence of exchange rate risk. However, their model represented only partial maximization and not 
full optimization. In Chapter V below a reformulation of their model with a full optimization to 
account for exchange rate and political risk is presented. Then, they analyzed the effects of exchange 
rate and political risk on inward FDI to 53 countries during the years 1999-2003 and found that 
political stability has a positive effect on FDI only for developing countries. Moreover, when the 
analysis moved from “Manufacturing” to “All industries” the result changed to a paradoxical negative 
effect. For that matter my redefinition and re-estimation of political factors below suggests a 
complimentary explanation to this phenomenon. 
Effects of political environment on FDI activities have also been examined empirically with panel 
data. For example, Busse and Hefeker (2007) used a panel consisting of 83 developing countries 
covering the period 1983-2003. They considered 12 different political risk variables that may affect 
their inward FDI. The data source is the ICRG provided by the PRS (Political Risk Services) Group. 
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They stressed that an endogeneity problem was inherent to some explanatory variables, 26  and 
therefore, to avoid the possible effects through endogeneity, they employed the GMM method for 
estimation. They found that the seven out of a total of 12 political indicators were closely associated 
with FDI, implying that a country with a lower political risk and better institutions receives more FDI. 
Another, a smaller panel data analysis was reported by Dhakal, Mixon, and Upadhyaya (2007) for 8 
CEE countries for the period 1995-2004. They considered government regulation as political risk, and 
found that it had a significant negative effect on inward FDI as expected. In a more recent study 
Hayakawa, Kimura, and Lee (2011) analyzed Country risk effect on the FDI inflows to 93 countries 
(including 60 developing countries) for a period from 1985 to 2007. They considered aggregate 
Political risk and its 12 components as well as financial risk and its 8 components in a long-term and 
short-term perspective.27 They found that aggregate Political risk index deters FDI inflows while 
financial risk shows different significances. Using different data sets and estimation techniques, 
several other studies also confirmed to a considerable extent the significant negative effects of political 
risk for MNCs when undertaking FDI (Busse, 2004; Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova, 1998).28 
                                                           
26
 For instance, in an open economy “FDI may increase the host country capital stock, bringing new technologies 
and increasing Gross National Income (GNI) growth rates (and hence GNI per capita)”, which is one of the right 
hand side variables (Busse and Hefeker, 2007). Hence, an endogeneity problem may appear. 
27
 Hayakawa, Kimura and Lee (2011) pointed out that Political risk refers to the quality of institutional 
environment. Thus, high sunk costs make investors sensitive to uncertainty that is translated in unstable 
institutional environment. On the other hand, financial risk refers to a probability that a country will face 
difficulties in repaying its foreign liabilities. 
28
 Gastanaga et al. (1998) and Busse (2004) all used samples of developing and emerging countries. The 
numbers of countries were, 49 and 114, respectively. All of them performed a panel data analysis for the period 
of 1970-1995 and 1970-1997, respectively.  
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Empirical literature on the effects of political risk on FDI reviewed above were mostly aggregate 
analyses by aggregating FDI activities in a multi-country setting. Lipschitz et al. (2006) used a sample 
of 10 CEE countries, whereas both Edwards (1990) and Wei (2000) considered outward FDI from 
OECD countries including Japan. Hayakawa et al. (2011) considered FDI inflows without specifying 
explicitly the FDI source countries. Blonigen and Piger (2011) analyzed FDI stocks, affiliate sales and 
Mergers and Acquisitions in OECD and Worldwide samples including Japan. Eicher, Helfman and 
Lenkoski (2011) addressed FDI flows using the OECD International Investment Database which 
includes Japanese FDI data as well. On the other hand, in Busse and Hefeker (2007) or Dhakal et al. 
(2007) Japanese FDI was disregarded, meaning that the effects of political risks on Japanese FDI 
activities alone were ignored.  
As I discussed in Section B Japanese FDI determinants have been scrutinized empirically as well. 
However, to my knowledge, there is only a single study addressing the effects of institutional risk, 
political factors or democracy on Japanese FDI. Only Peng and Beamish (2008) is in a sense close to 
mine in spirit, in which they empirically investigated Japanese FDI using a panel data set of 50 host 
countries from 1999-2003 by OLS and random effect regressions. They examined the relationship 
between FDI and host country's corporate social responsibility (CSR) environment. A composite 
index, a National Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI), based on a series of CSR has been 
developed as a composite index comprising 7 broad components which include several measures of 
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political environment such as the "business cost of corruption" or the "degree of civil freedom" as 
basic data. They first derived a testable hypothesis for developed countries that FDI increases with 
lower NCRI, because NCRI is an indicator of the corporate responsibility institutions in host countries. 
But their novelty is summarized in their discussion for developing countries, summarized as the 
second testable hypothesis claiming that NCRI has a positive relationship with FDI. They reported that 
both hypotheses are successfully vindicated empirically, and the results are robust after several 
additional checks. 
Several interesting facts are drawn from the studies reviewed above. First of all, the Political 
Factors have been taken from various data, often represented by an aggregate (or composite) index 
incorporating multiple dimensions of socio-economic, and internal and external political and/or 
institutional characteristics. As a result, secondly, political factors may reflect different needs of 
political environment and/or different cost sensitivity to those factors for MNCs. Thus, thirdly, MNCs 
behave differently, depending on such factors as host country's development stages. As a consequence 
the effects of political factors on FDI may have different results for developed and developing 
countries. Specifically, the multiple dimensions of aggregated political environment indices have 
made it difficult, if not impossible, to reach a corroborative effect on FDI in empirical research (Peng 
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and Beamish, 2008).29 Thus, in this dissertation I aim at depicting direct and composite effects of 
political factors on Japanese outward FDI. 
D. Exchange rate and FDI: an overview of literature 
Exchange rate might be perceived by Japanese MNCs as an additional risk that can affect future 
profits. In general, exchange rate (ER) effects have been analyzed in the research literature by means 
of three factors: level, volatility and expectation. In this dissertation I aim at examining exchange rate 
level effects on the Japanese outward FDI activities in developed and developing countries. Thus, I 
discuss here only the literature related to these effects. 
Early perceptions of ER effects on FDI stated that there might be a minor role of this factor due to 
the two directions by which ER affects FDI decision. On the one hand, lower ER levels (appreciation 
of the source country’s currency) meaning lower costs of the factors of production in the host country 
serve as an incentive for FDI. On the other hand, revenues generated by the foreign subsidiaries and 
converted in the source country currency will also be devalued. However, actual observations were 
contradictory to these presumptions and, thus, a number of theoretical and empirical works addressed 
the need to consider ER effects on FDI flows. One of the first theoretical attempts to explain the 
effects of exchange rate on FDI was undertaken by Cushman (1985). He analyzed both theoretically 
and empirically bilateral real exchange rate risk, expectations and level effects on FDI. First, he 
                                                           
29
 One commonly observed feature of those composite indices is that the correlation between them is high (e.g. Alesina and 
Wagner, 2006). 
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established an elegant firm-level model of international investment that depends on the interaction of 
exchange rate level and expectations, trade linkages, and the financing options a firm may have. By 
examining four possible regimes for an MNE he suggested that host country currency appreciation 
would negatively affect inward FDI. Second, using a 1963-1978 annual dataset of FDI outflows from 
US to UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan he confirmed this theoretical prediction that host 
country currency appreciation has a negative effect on inward FDI.  
In the course of theoretical and empirical research two main hypotheses were introduced to 
explain FDI behavior in response to ER changes. First, Froot and Stein (1991) suggested a model 
where the capital market is imperfect due to informational asymmetries.30 Thus, they argued that a 
host country’s currency depreciation increases inward FDI through a wealth effect in this context. 
Thus, foreign investors increase competitive bidding advantage by means of a higher reservation price. 
This hypothesis was confirmed empirically for FDI inflows to United States and West Germany 
during 1973-1988. However, the result for Japan was not significant.  
Second, Blonigen (1997) proposed an alternative hypothesis of exchange rate effect on acquisition 
FDI caused by firm-specific assets in the context of goods market imperfection. Companies have 
                                                           
30
 In the previous works on international capital mobility (Mundell, 1968) it was suggested that in a perfect 
capital mobility market if a currency is depreciated, host country agents  may borrow a loan in a foreign currency 
and thus exploit the same advantages as potential foreign investors. However, Froot and Stein (1991) argued that 
due to informational asymmetries about assets payoffs it may be costly to finance the investment only from 
external funds and thus an internal wealth increased with a currency appreciation provides a competitive 
advantage when bidding for assets. 
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different access to markets provoking a purchase of firm-specific assets to be more susceptible to 
currency movements. Using a dataset of Japanese acquisition FDI to US manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries during 1975-1992 he provided evidence that US dollar real depreciation 
stimulated acquisition FDI with a higher significance in the high-technology industries. In a more 
recent study Buch and Kleinert (2008) found a support for this hypothesis by means of a panel data 
analysis of German FDI to OECD countries during the period of 1997-2002. On the whole, it seems 
that theoretical and empirical works support the hypothesis of FDI being stimulated by host country 
real exchange rate depreciation. 
Nevertheless, some ambiguity still exists on the effects of ER changes. For instance, Stevens 
(1998) gave opposite evidence using the same model as Froot and Stein (1991) but extending data 
over 1973-1991 periods. Healy and Palepu (1993) also obtained similar opposite results in their 
analysis. 
A number of studies addressed the effects of exchange rate on Japanese outward FDI. Japan was 
often included as a sample country among others. As mentioned above, for example, Blonigen (1997) 
analyzed real ER change effects on Japanese FDI activities together with some other developed 
countries. However, some empirical research considered ER change and volatility effects on 
exclusively Japanese FDI activities. For example, Urata and Kiyota (2004) analyzed Japan’s FDI 
activities at aggregate and industry level as well as for different regions (World, East Asia, Latin 
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America). Using a dataset of Japanese outward FDI to 127 partner countries for the period 1990-2000 
they found that a real depreciation of host country currency attracts Japanese FDI while large volatility 
in exchange rate has a negative effect.31 Based on Japanese outward FDI to China analysis, Xing and 
Zhao (2008) argued that real Yen appreciation induces FDI to China and reverse imports from the 
subsidiaries back to Japan. They suggested that Yen appreciation raises production cost in Japan and 
thus stimulates a production shift to low cost countries through FDI together with importing back to 
serve Japanese domestic market. As follows, Chinese exporters may lose a competition with Japanese 
MNCs that would lead to higher profits and increased welfare under reversed imports in Japan. In a 
more recent paper Takagi and Shi (2011) considered Japanese FDI to 9 Asian economies during the 
period of 1997-2008 and found that host currency real appreciation decreases FDI. That is in line with 
previous theoretical predictions (Froot and Stein 1991; Blonigen 1997). In sum, previous studies that 
examined Japanese outward FDI flows found evidence for positive effect of host country real currency 
depreciation. 
Several interesting facts are drawn from the studies reviewed above. Most of the empirical 
research considered bilateral FDI between developed countries. Japanese FDI activities related 
research addressed mostly developing and emerging market economies. However, there has been 
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 A particularity of this study consisted in their focus on industry level analysis. In addition, they examined 
sources of real exchange rate movements and excluded the impacts of the failures of the law of one price from 
the ‘true’ exchange rate volatility.  
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minimal research focusing specifically on Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing 
countries. Since the channels of exchange rate effect on FDI might differ significantly depending on 
the host country’s stage of development, in this dissertation I aim at contributing to this aspect in the 
FDI research literature. 
E. Democracy and FDI: an overview of literature 
Due to the difficulty in theoretical modeling, democracy effects on FDI as well were mainly 
addressed through empirical research. However, due to the novelty of this area the number of works is 
relatively limited.  
The debate started with Huntington and Dominguez (1975) who claimed that autocratic rulers 
provide a better economic environment for both domestic and foreign investment since they are more 
able to enact efficiency-enhancing policies. One of the first empirical investigations was undertaken 
by Oneal (1994) who analyzed effects of authoritarian regimes on US FDI flows to developing 
countries. In fact, his objective was to statistically estimate neo-colonialism theories (O'Donnell, 1988) 
arguing that an old colonialism was replaced by a new one characterized by a cooperative behavior 
between MNCs and authoritarian governments in order to exploit labor at the expense of human and 
civil rights. However, he reported that there is no statistically significant relationship between regime 
type and FDI flows despite the fact that investment returns are higher under authoritarian regimes than 
democratic ones. On the other hand, Rodrik (1996) regressed FDI with a number of control variables, 
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such as the black-market premium for foreign currency, economic growth rates and the population, as 
well as his democracy indicator. FDI represented the value of foreign investment by US MNCs 
affiliates in 40 countries. The indicator for democratic rights was statistically significant and the sign 
indicated that countries with stronger democratic rights received more capital from US MNCs. A few 
years later, a study by Harms and Ursprung (2002) supported Rodrik’s results. They showed that 
democratic rights and foreign investment are positively associated in their country sample of 62 
emerging market and developing economies. In fact, a hypothesis that “workers’ rights are curtailed” 
(2002, 653) under autocratic regimes and MNCs enjoy a favorable business climate was not 
confirmed. On the contrary, the results showed that actually liberal rights induce FDI activity that 
could be explained by the fact that in a more democratic countries educated labor force became a more 
valuable factor of production. Hence, workers release their pressure for redistribution, and share and 
protect MNCs interests in the domestic political process. In these circumstances MNCs tend to value 
more the predictability of the democratic governments.   
By and large, in 2003 two influential papers in the field by Li and Resnick (2003) and Jensen 
(2003) approached this question by a sophisticated analysis and proposed different conclusions. Li and 
Resnick (2003) analyzed FDI net inflows to 53 developing countries in the period of 1982-1995 and 
found that Democracy actually might discourage FDI. The reason is that more autocratic governments 
may provide a better business environment for monopolistic/oligopolistic companies and protect them 
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from labor unions. They used Polity IV index as a measure of Democracy. On the contrary, Jensen 
(2003) suggested that Democracy might encourage FDI since it provides a more stable business 
environment and increases property rights protection. The mechanism behind this stability induced by 
the host country government may be represented in the ‘audience costs’ and ‘veto players’ aspects. 
These two factors actually impose restriction on government and ensure higher stability. In this sense, 
MNCs activity is attracted by a long-term stable business environment. Jensen analyzed Democracy 
effects, measured by Polity III index, on FDI net inflows to 114 developed and developing countries in 
the period of 1970-1997.  
In continuation, Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006) replicated Li and Resnick (2003) analysis by 
augmenting their sample with 46 developing countries over the period 1984-2001. They slightly 
changed the democracy measures and used Polity IV, Freedom house and Vanhanen (2000) indexes. 
In addition, they added a property right protection variable calculated from ICRG dataset. By 
employing panel corrected standard error (PCSE) method for times-series, cross-section (TSCS) data 
they argued that democracy has a positive effect on FDI inflows. In fact, they argued that FDI is a 
function of factor endowments and rent-seeking by ‘domestic capital’. Thus, in developing countries 
that are more democratic, rent-seeking pressure is lower, which stimulates MNCs activity. Choi and 
Samy (2008) reexamined the theoretical reasoning of Li and Resnick (2003) and Jensen (2003) and 
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found that different arguments (namely, veto players, audience costs, and ‘democratic hindrance’)32 
actually might induce different effects on MNCs. They constructed their own variables for veto 
players, audience costs and democratic hindrance. By employing panel data OLS, Fixed effects and 
Random effects analysis to 81 developing economies they concluded that democratic environment 
might encourage FDI inflows although the effects and mechanism are not clear. Another recent study 
by Guerin and Manzocchi (2009) addressed the effects of political regime on FDI from 14 OECD 
source countries to 24 emerging host countries over the period 1992-2004. By using a more 
sophisticated random-effect Tobit model to exploit information from zero entries they concluded that 
democracy does have a positive effect on the amount and probability of FDI flows from developed to 
emerging economies. They argued that political regime might influence the allocation and efficient use 
of production factors, technology adoption and hence will affect total factor productivity and return on 
investment. Hence, FDI inflows may be attracted by this mechanism in order to obtain higher profits 
and enjoying a higher political stability. In their study they used Polity IV data for measuring a degree 
of democratization, democracy dummy and Freedom House political rights index. 
In one of the recent works, Asiedu and Lien (2011) used three different composite indices for 
democracy; the data on political rights published by Freedom House, the democracy index published 
                                                           
32
 Veto players represent a number of agents (e.g. chambers of the legislature, a supreme court etc.) that actually 
may exercise a pressure on the government policies. Audience costs may be translated in the prospects of loosing 
domestic support. Policy hindrance represents some impediments to MNCs oligopolistic or monopolistic 
behaviors that may be created by the host country government. 
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in Polity IV, and the ICRG index. They estimated a dynamic panel data model for 112 developing 
countries over the period 1982-2007 and found that all three composite indices had a positive effect on 
FDI “in countries where the share of natural resources in total exports is low” and negative effect on 
FDI “in countries where exports are dominated by natural resources”. In this regard their finding is 
somewhat parallel to mine hypothesis of non-linearity between Democracy and FDI that is derived in 
Chapter VII below.  
Mathur and Singh (2013) are probably one of the first who mentioned a possible effect on FDI of 
an interaction between Democracy measured by the Freedom House index and PE measured by the 
Corruption perception index. They analyzed a panel of 29 developing countries in the period of 1980-
2000 and found that more democracy attracts less FDI. In addition, a decrease perceived corruption 
might encourage FDI to the host country. They extended the analysis with the cross effects of property 
rights with corruption. They noted that corruption could be related to the property right protection. 
Thus, a decrease in corruption means an increase in property right protection, and hence increases 
FDI. From the cross effect of democracy and corruption they suggested that more democratic 
countries attract less FDI. Although they discussed that the simple correlation coefficient between 
property right protection and corruption is 0.7 but between democracy and property right protection is 
only about 0.1 they simply mentioned the difference in the correlation coefficients without discussing 
possible underlying systematic relationships. 
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Several interesting facts are drawn from the studies reviewed above. Effects of democracy on FDI 
in various empirical works also gave rise to wide varieties of results with little consensus. In 
particular, democracy could either encourage or discourage FDI depending on different samples, 
specifications and estimation techniques. One important note here is that most studies addressed only 
developing or joint sample of FDI host countries and there is a minimal study discussing only 
developed countries as FDI recipients. For instance, Mathur and Singh mentioned that “their results 
could change "dramatically" if they focused on developed economies.” (2013, 1001) Moreover, to my 
knowledge, a study on Democracy effects on Japanese outward FDI has not been conducted until now 
although Japan is a developed country with a large share in global outward FDI. Thus, it is plausible to 
suggest that the effects of Democracy on Japanese FDI might be different depending on the stage of 
countries’ economic development and this is the scope of my analysis. Finally, it is worth mentioning 
that many measures of Democracy were used to test the hypotheses, but the most widely used were 
ICRG Democratic accountability, Polity IV and Freedom house indexes. The reason is that these 
sources provide a consistent long-term data for a large number of countries and thus allow analyzing 
the effects of democracy under different frameworks and settings. 
F. Final remarks on preceding literature 
In view of these recent theoretical and empirical developments, this dissertation aims at 
empirically analyzing the Japanese FDI flows by a regression model reflecting the OLI eclectic and 
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knowledge-capital models’ hypotheses, with the possible determinants derived from these theoretical 
frameworks. 33  The knowledge-capital models (Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Carr et al., 2001) 
proposed different types of FDI flows (horizontal, vertical) to emerge endogenously, and to be 
encouraged by a number of factors such as: GDP, Skill Difference, Investment cost, Trade cost, and 
some other explanatory variables. The objective and the logic of knowledge-capital models are not 
only to understand the FDI determinants, but also, if possible, to distinguish the horizontal and vertical 
FDI flows. The OLI theoretical framework allows for different alternative determinants in order to 
explain the FDI flows from Ownership, Internalization and Location advantage perspectives. 
As put forth above, the dissertation focuses on Japanese FDI, with particular emphasis on the 
effects of institutional risks namely political factors and democracy. I use another composite index for 
Political Factors here, the Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) Index. Democracy is examined using 3 
different measures: ICRG democratic accountability, Polity IV and Freedom House. In addition the 
effects of exchange rate are emphasized as important for Japanese MNCs activities in developed and 
developing countries over the period of 1995-2010. I also examine two new explanatory variables that 
have not previously been examined for Japanese FDI explicitly. These are the National Culture and the 
Technological Index. It is my contention that, among many traditional FDI determinants, these are not 
to be neglected in the modern fast changing and globalizing society from the point of view of political 
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 For a discussion see Section A 3.3 and 4.5 sections 
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economy. The contribution of this investigation, if any, rests on the fact that mine is the first attempt to 
analyze empirically the effects of Political Factor and Democracy exclusively on Japanese FDI flows 
within different economic stages of countries’ development. 
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CHAPTER II GENERAL PATTERNS OF JAPANESE OUTWARD FDI 
The scope of the dissertation is to analyze the determinants of Japanese outward FDI over the 
period 1995-2010 with particular focus on institutional risks such as Political Environment and 
Democracy. The period that starts in 1995 is a representative one since it is related to the Japanese 
economy after the burst of the 1989 economic bubble. In fact, deflation started in 1990s and its 
associated economic stagnation affected various parts of Japanese economy on a local and 
international level. Nevertheless, Japanese MNCs continued to play an important role on a global 
level.  
In this chapter I establish a foundation for my discussion in the dissertation by presenting the most 
important FDI data trends. I discuss the general patterns and structure of Japanese outward FDI flows 
over the period 1990-2010.  
FDI attracted the attention of economists in the 1950s but because its extensive growth started in 
the end of 1980s it became an important research area. In fact, starting from the 1990s World FDI 
outflows had been increasing at a high pace reaching its highest level in 2007 before the debt crisis 
(see figure 2.1). Gradually, FDI flows became a highly important source of capital for countries’ 
development thus representing another important aspect in the world economics.  
Many theoretical and empirical works tried to address a question of FDI determinants due its 
importance. For instance, a seminal paper by Lucas (1990) initiated an important theoretical 
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discussion of why capital flows from developed to developed economies. In a standard neoclassical 
theory capital, on net, is expected to flow from richer to poorer countries.1 Assuming that countries 
produce the same goods with the same constant returns to scale production technology using capital 
and labour as factors of production, differences in per capita income reflect differences in per capita 
capital, and a law of diminishing returns implies that the capital return is higher in poorer economy 
(less productive). Thus, if capital is allowed to move freely between countries, new investments would 
appear in poorer countries until return on investment is equalized. Suggesting these standard 
theoretical reasoning, Lucas (1990) presented a simple arithmetic according to which marginal product 
of capital in India should be about 58 times that of United States. . Hence, the capital should massively 
flow to India and other developing nations. However, in reality massive capital flows were observed in 
between rich nations and only little flows from rich to poor nations. Thus, Lucas (1990) suggested that 
if some neoclassical theory assumptions are slightly modified this puzzle could be solved. By and 
large, it is this fundamental work that is associated with the so-called “Lucas paradox”. 2  
                                                           
1
 The degree of rich/poor countries is defined from the level of capital-to-labor ratios. Countries that have 
relatively higher capital-to-labor ratios are considered to be relatively richer than those countries that have 
relatively lower capital-to-labor ratios. 
2
 This paradox was examined both theoretically and empirically by many scholars. Neoclassical theory 
assumptions’ modifications undertaken by the research in the field could be separated in two groups of 
explanations. First, it addressed differences in fundamentals that influence production structure of the economy. 
(King and Rebelo, 1993; Razin and Yuen, 1994; Gomme, 1993) Second, it suggested international capital 
market imperfections (sovereign risk, asymmetric information) and thus capital doesn’t flow to poor countries 
due to market failures. (Gertler and Rogoff, 1990; Gordon and Bovenberg, 1996) 
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However, FDI inflows to developing countries increased considerably in the last decade reaching 
a share of 51% of global FDI inflows in 2011. (UNCTAD 2012; see figure 2.1) What a fundamental 
shift! In this sense the other side of the coin comes to the first place. What are the factors that 
influence FDI flows to the countries with different level of economic development? This doctoral 
dissertation contributes to the related literature from the institutional risk point of view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Inward FDI: total and by countries' group (1990-2011, billions of US dollars). 
Source: UNCTAD, based on the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
It is true that Japan as a developed economy invested extensively in the last two decades. 
According to UNCTAD World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2012) in 2011 Japan was ranked as the 
8th country in the world by the level of outward FDI flows with the amount of $114 billion. As 
compared to other main world FDI suppliers Japanese MNCs activities have been relatively stable in 
51% 
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the last 2 decades. Nevertheless, in 2011 Japanese outward FDI flows surpassed each of the United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, French and German outward FDI flows. (see figure 2.2) 
 
 
Figure 2.2. US, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands and German outward FDI flows 
evolution (1990-2012, billions of US dollars) 
Source: UNCTAD, based on the FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
Thus, although Japanese MNCs activities have its peculiarities, the factors that influence their 
behavior are highly important on a global scale. For instance, as reported by JETRO (2012), due to the 
2008-2009 debt crisis major European economies started to withdraw their investment from 
developing/emerging economies putting those developing countries in a more vulnerable situation 
since they need capital for continuous growth. Despite this tendency Japanese MNCs have been 
increasing their investment in emerging/developing countries. Thus, Japanese FDI plays an important 
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global role for balancing the capital flows distribution. For instance, in 2010 the share of developing 
countries as recipients of Japanese FDI represented 54% (see figure 2.3). According to JETRO’s 
(2012) report one could expect an increase in Japanese FDI to developing countries particularly in 
Asia.3 (see figure 2.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Japanese FDI in developed and developing economies (billions of US dollars) 
Source: OECD statistical database 
In a regional perspective, North America was one of the main recipients of Japanese outward FDI 
in 1990s. It was accounted mostly for automobile and electronic sectors. Although after a bubble 
period Japanese MNCs relatively slowed down their active participation in the international activities 
                                                           
3
 There has been no unanimously agreed definition of "developed" countries, which implies the definition of 
"developing" countries is also quite ambiguous and arbitrary. Researchers used various definitions in their 
research, such as OECD membership (Voyer and Beamish, 2004), United Nations (UN) country classification 
system (Makino et al., 2004), and World Bank’s country classification according to income (Yu et al., 2004). In 
this Chapter as well as in Chapter V and VII I use an OECD membership as a criterion for developed countries. 
In Chapter VI I use a UN classification of developed and developing countries. Although the differences are 
minor, using different classification increases the results robustness. 
54% 
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the regional diversification of outward FDI increased. For instance, at the end of 1990s up to the 2008-
2009 debt crisis in Europe the share of Japanese outward FDI to the European continent increased 
considerably. In 2007 European economies received the highest 32% share of Japanese FDI. Starting 
from the middle of 2000s Asian countries began to play a more important role as host countries for 
Japanese MNCs activities. For instance, in 2010 they received the highest 38% share of Japanese FDI. 
Several reasons could be put forth. First, China’s economic growth led to an increased interest from 
international investors including Japanese ones to this country. Second, many Japanese MNCs saw 
Asian countries as an attractive destination for their investments in order to exploit low cost 
production opportunities (see figure 2.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Japanese outward FDI regional distribution (1990-2010, billions of US dollars) 
Source: OECD statistical database 
Europe, 32% 
Asia, 
38% 
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Traditionally United States of America (USA) is the most important Japanese FDI host country in 
North America. Many Japanese MNCs are strongly linked to US. For example, According to JETRO 
(2012) in 2011 – June 2012 five out of ten biggest Japanese mergers and acquisitions were targeting 
US companies. In Latin America Brazil has the biggest market with high prospects for growth and 
thus it receives most of Japanese FDI. Although the share of Oceania is relatively small in the total of 
Japanese outward FDI Australia keeps an important role for Japanese MNCs. As mentioned above, 
Asian countries recently became an attractive destination for Japanese FDI. China, ASEAN countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam), and India are major host countries. In Europe, the main destinations for Japanese FDI 
are European Union countries. (see table 2.1).  
Table 2.1. Japan’s outward FDI by country/region in 2010-2012 (on the balance of payment basis, net 
flows, millions of US dollars) 
 2010 2011 Share 2012 January-May Share 
Asia 22,131 39,492 34.1 9,873 21.3 
China 7,252 12,649 10.9 5,646 12.2 
ASEAN* 8,930 19,645 17.0 1,046 2.3 
India 2,864 2,326 2.0 557 1.2 
North America 9,016 15,166 13.1 16,141 34.8 
United States 9,193 14,730 12.7 14,646 31.6 
Latin America 5,346 11,287 9.8 2,314 5.0 
Brazil 4,316 8,290 7.2 1,807 3.9 
Oceania 6,407 8,767 7.6 5,446 11.7 
Australia 6,371 8,149 7.0 5,397 11.6 
Europe 15,043 39,841 34.4 12,101 26.1 
European Union 8,359 36,052 31.2 11,187 24.1 
World 57,223 115,732 100.0 46,365 100.0 
Source: JETRO 2012 based on Balance of Payment Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan) 
* ASEAN stands for The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As of October, 1st 2012 ASEAN’s 
members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.    
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In this doctoral dissertation discussion I address the European and Asian economies as one of the 
study samples. The reason is that these two regions being quite different in terms of economic 
development attract comparable shares of Japanese FDI. I am interested in how institutional risks are 
affecting Japanese MNCs decisions in a regional perspective as well as in a perspective of host 
countries’ level of economic development. In the last chapter of the dissertation I extend my sample to 
the whole world and try to project the conclusions to overall Japanese outward FDI activity. 
One of European countries’ peculiarities is that they are divided in Euro-zone and non-Euro-zone 
countries.4 For instance, in 1990s the share of Japanese FDI to European non-Euro-zone countries was 
considerable. However, starting from 2001 Japanese MNCs activities in Euro-zone countries has been 
increasing at a higher pace. (see figure 2.5) 
                                                           
4
 In the statistics used in this chapter European Euro-zone countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, and 
Slovenia. (Estonia is not included in the statistics calculation due to data availability problem). European non-
Euro-zone countries include Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Latvia, Bulgaria, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, 
Montenegro, Republic of, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, and Ukraine. 
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Figure 2.5. Japanese FDI to Euro-zone and European non-euro-zone countries (billions of US 
dollars)  
Source: OECD statistical database 
The main recipients of Japanese FDI on the European continent are France, Germany, 
Netherlands and United Kingdom. (see figure 2.6) 
Figure 2.6. Japanese outward FDI to Europe by countries (billions of US dollars) 
Source: OECD statistical database 
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In Asia Japanese MNCs activities were mainly concentrated in China, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
India, Thailand and Singapore. (see figure 2.7) 
 
Figure 2.7. Japan’s outward FDI to Asia by countries (billion of US dollars) 
Source: OECD statistical database 
Despite all these countries having received an important share of Japanese FDI, China remains an 
outlier since it received the highest volume of FDI. (e.g. 13% in total Japanese outward FDI and 33% 
in Asia in 2010 (JETRO, 2011)). Thus, the inclusion of China in my analysis sample should be taken 
with caution. 
In sum, the determinants of FDI flows from Japan and particularly to developed and developing 
economies remain a topic of considerable academic and policy relevance. Asian and European 
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economies as well play an important role and might be a focus of an additional analysis.5 Thus, in my 
econometric analysis of Japanese outward FDI determinants I first address a pooled sample of 30 host 
countries in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, VI, and VII I analyze separately developed and developing 
countries. I also add some discussion on European and Asian countries in chapter V. Next, Chapter III 
is devoted to present the data used in the study with a more detailed discussion of Political 
Environment (PE) and Democracy data patterns with relation to Japanese MNCs activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 Industries distribution of Japanese outward FDI is also an important research area. However, in this doctoral 
dissertation the focus of the analysis is limited to host countries specifics and particularly at the Political 
Environment (PE) and Democracy level. Thus, I do not discuss here the distribution of Japanese MNCs activities 
by industries. 
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CHAPTER III DATA DESCRIPTION AND HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter I present the data measurement issues and the related hypotheses. They are used 
throughout the following analytical chapters. As an analytical framework I employ a panel data 
analysis of different samples. 
The basic panel data model is specified in a reduced form as: 
Yit = µi + X'itβ + εit.                                                              (1) 
Where Yit is the net annual outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t. µi is a 
constant specific to each country, and X’it denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary 
in the cross-section and in the time dimension. β is a vector of unknown parameters, and εit is a 
stochastic error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t.1 In every econometric 
specification I discuss countries samples and variables used for the analysis. 
Thus, in section A I present the sources, calculation specifics and other necessary details for my 
control variables. In section B I add two newly introduced variables namely Technological index and 
National culture. I pay a special attention to my variable of interest Real Exchange Rate (RER) 
(section C), Political environment (PE) (section D) and Democracy (section E). In addition to the 
measurement details I also discuss some patterns and their relation to Japanese outward FDI. 
                                                           
1
 In general, I estimate different structures of the panel model under different assumptions. The constant is 
specific to each country only under the fixed effects estimation. 
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A. Dependent and control variables 
Some previous studies have measured FDI activity through affiliate sales of FDI stock in the host 
country. This activity was processed and measured in several ways: FDI divided by GDP, FDI per 
capita, FDI sum of home and host country and others. I use FDI flow as my dependent variable, as this 
both provides a greater amount of observations and, allows statistical inferences for flow effect of real 
FDI.  
Throughout the analytical chapters several FDI measures are used in order to confirm the 
robustness of the results. In table 3.1 below I give the information on the variables types used in 
different chapters. 
Data for FDI activity are collected from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) statistical database which provides data on Japanese FDI for a large number of 
countries for the period 1985 to 2010. These statistics were compiled by the OECD statistical division 
from the Bank of Japan and the Japanese Ministry of Finance statistical sources. 2 The data for some 
countries and years were missing. In order to increase the sample’s size I added the missing data 
directly from the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance statistical databases. Thus, the data may 
be considered consistent and adequate for the scope of this dissertation. I use the statistics reported in 
US dollars in Chapter IV, VI and VII in my analysis. In Chapter V I use the statistics reported in 
                                                           
2
 This study pursues a goal of analyzing general outward FDI without industries’ specification. Thus I will not 
present here FDI by industry details.   
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Japanese Yen in order to avoid endogeneity problem.3 FDI flows are not logarithmically transformed 
since they are positive and negative for some countries in different years. In addition, FDI measure is 
not normalized (e,g. by GDP) since I am interested in the actual effect of the examined variables on 
FDI flows. I expect that a problem of heteroscedasticity which might appear due to a high standard 
deviation of FDI measure will be reduced by the use of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation. 4 In fact, this is one of the reasons why the GMM Arellano-Bond estimator is preferred to 
other alternative econometric methods of panel data analysis.5 Finally, in Chapter VII FDI measure 
(FDI) is averaged over 3 years to smooth out cyclical fluctuations and thus allowing for an additional 
robustness check. 
There are several alternative sources of Japanese MNCs activities. First, JETRO database 
provides data of Japanese FDI for a large number of countries for the period 1965 to 2004.6 This 
dataset was prepared by JETRO from Ministry of Finance (MOF) statistics for Japan's inward and 
outward FDI, MOF Policy Research Institute Monthly Finance Review, and Bank of Japan foreign 
                                                           
3
 In Chapter V one of the additional explanatory variables of interest is Real Exchange Rate. Suppose FDI is 
driven to some extent by a nominal exchange rate of yen/dollar. If Japanese FDI as a dependent variable is also 
recalculated from Yen to US dollar using a nominal exchange rate of yen/dollar, then an endogeneity problem 
might appear since nominal exchange rate of yen/dollar can affect both sides of the estimated model.   
4 Nevertheless in Chapter V’s Appendix 4, Chapter VI’s Appendix 6 and Chapter VII’s Appendix 4 I present 
additional estimations with a transformed dependent variable in order provide additional evidence to the results. 
The FDI dependent variable is transformed in several ways that allow for scaling down its variance. 
5
 For econometric details see the following Chapters IV, V, VI and VII. 
6
 Figures for FY1994 and before were released in US dollars. From FY1995 onwards, figures were first released 
in Japanese yen and converted to US dollars using the Bank of Japan average inter-bank rates for the applicable 
period. 
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exchange rates. The database includes statistics for 167 countries and includes MNCs activities in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. However, the statistics was discontinued in 2004 
and consistent data are presently provided for a considerably lower number of countries. Nevertheless, 
I used this dataset to estimate the empirical model in the same way as described in Chapter IV. 
However, because of historical nature of the data and since the results were mostly consistent with the 
ones calculated using OECD database I do not include them in this dissertation due to space 
limitations.7  
Second, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) conducts and reports 
Survey of Overseas Business Activities of Japanese Enterprises. One of the survey inquiries includes 
capital investment in overseas affiliates as well. The survey covers all Japanese enterprises that had 
affiliates abroad. These data were used for instance by Todo (2011) to analyze the effects of Japanese 
enterprises’ total factor productivity on FDI activity. However, the survey is not mandatory for all the 
companies. Thus, it is well known that the data vary within every year and their consistency is 
questionable. For instance, the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) attempted 
to adjust the data in their RIETI FDI database but only for affiliate sales and employment indices. The 
main scope of my dissertation is to analyze the effects of PE, ER level and Democracy in a macro-
                                                           
7
 The results of this analysis can be found in Deseatnicov and Akiba (2011a). 
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perspective. Thus, a consistent database for the whole period that is available through OECD database 
is of higher priority for the successful analysis. 
Table 3.1. Variables used in the analysis 
Abbreviation Data source, specifics Scale/ Unit 
measure 
Chapter use 
FDI 
FDI OECD statistical database Million US$ Chapter IV, VI 
FDI OECD statistical database Million JP Yen Chapter V 
FDI 
OECD statistical database, 3-year  
average Million US$ Chapter VII 
GDP 
LOG_GDP Real GDP, World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
Billions US$ Chapter IV, V, VI, VII 
Skill difference 
SD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) 
Scale [-10;10] Chapter IV, V, VI, VII 
Labor cost 
LOG_W World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) 
US$/hour Chapter IV, V, VI, VII 
Openness 
TCREAL Penn-World Tables, inverse to 
Openness 
Constant prices Chapter IV 
Openness Penn-World Tables Constant prices Chapter V, VI, VII 
Investment cost 
ICREAL World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) 
Scale 1-100 Chapter IV, V, VI 
IC World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) 
Scale 1-10 Chapter VII 
Distance 
DIS Indo.com km Chapter IV, V, VI 
Technological Index 
TI World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) 
Scale 0-30 Chapter IV 
National Culture 
NC World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(WCY) 
Scale 0-10 Chapter IV 
Real Exchange Rate 
RER International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
normalized by GDP deflator 
2005 = 100 Chapter V 
Political Environment 
PE Euromoney Scale 0-25 Chapter IV, VII 
PE Euromoney Scale 0-10 Chapter V, VI 
Democracy (Dem) 
ICRG International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) Democratic Accontability 
Scale 0-1 Chapter VII 
Polity Polity IV Scale 0-1 Chapter VII 
FH Freedom House (FH) Political Rights Scale 0-1 Chapter VII 
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Third, Toyo Keizai Inc. also conducts a survey over all the listed companies in Japan about their 
foreign subsidiaries. The results are published in Japanese Overseas Investment: A complete listing by 
firms and countries. For instance, these data were used by Cieslik and Ryan (2004) in order to 
compare gravity and economic potential approaches in explaining Japanese outward FDI into an 
enlarged Europe. However, again this is survey-based data in terms of companies’ activities and 
number of investments. In my dissertation I am interested in the effects of PE, ER and Democracy on 
the value of Japanese outward FDI and thus this dataset is not adequate enough to provide consistent 
data for the scope of the analysis. 
Based on this consideration I consider OECD database as the most appropriate source of the 
Japanese outward FDI data in the context of my dissertation. Thus, these data are used in the analytical 
chapters of the dissertation as a source for dependant variable – Japanese outward FDI flows.   
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital and/or the OLI hypotheses.8 First is LOG_GDPit representing the market 
size for country i at time t that has been considered as one of the first principal determinants of FDI.9 
The greater market is accessible through FDI, the higher should be FDI flow. Thus, I expect a positive 
                                                           
8
 See Chapter I for details. 
9
 The market size allows for economies of scale exploitation and offers significant growth perspectives 
(Morrissey and Rai, 1995). It is calculated by the logarithm of Gross Domestic Product measured in $US 
billions. 
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sign of GDP on FDI. The GDP data are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database, and are reported in constant 2000 US$. 
Second, human capital of the host economy is another important factor for FDI flows (Markusen 
and Venables, 1998, 2000). It has been argued that two important aspects should be considered for 
human capital: skill endowment and labor cost. Skill endowment for ‘country i’ at time t is proxied by 
SDit=S(J)-S(i), where S(J) and S(i) mean the skill scores for Japan and the i-th host country, 
respectively. The data source of the index is the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY, hereafter). 
It is based on the Executive Opinion Survey that is sent to executives in top and middle management 
in all of the economies covered by the WCY. The respondents answer a question on a scale 0 to 6 
whether skilled labor is readily available in the economy. The average value for each economy is then 
calculated and converted into a 0 to 10 scale. In this way the skill score measures the level of the 
skilled labor availability in each country; the higher the score is, the easier is to get a skilled labor. 
Thus, SDit in effect represents the difference of the skill score for the host country relative to that of 
Japan. Hence, the sign for this variable is expected to be positive in case Japanese MNCs are looking 
for cheap unskilled labor (as the knowledge-capital model predicts can happen in case of vertical type 
FDI 10 ), and negative in case Japanese FDI flows are attracted by host countries’ skilled labor 
abundance (as can happen in case of horizontal FDI). 
                                                           
10
 According to Ekholm et. al (2007) the theoretical and empirical evidence is mixed in case of platform-type 
FDI. 
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In addition, availability of low cost labor is expected to stimulate FDI of vertical type where the 
cheap wage is considered to be of high importance (Sahoo, 2006; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Kumar, 
1994). Labor cost can be proxied by wage cost (Lankes and Venables, 1996; Nunes, Oscategui, and 
Peschiera, 2006). Thus, LOG_Wit, which is the log of employees compensation received in US$ per 
hour for country i at time t, represents the labor cost.11 The data were deflated using CPI price index.12 
The sign of this variable is expected to be negative as higher labor cost is expected to discourage FDI 
flows. Nevertheless, wages are extremely difficult to measure (in particular in developing countries) 
and thus their values should be carefully used and interpreted. 
The next explanatory variable is OPENNESSit of the host country which is opposite to trade 
cost.13 In general the impact of openness is linked to the type of FDI (Lankes and Venables, 1996; 
Holland and Pain, 1998; Sahoo, 2006; Asiedu, 2002). Horizontal FDI is attracted by high trade 
barriers first because of the high alternative export cost to the host country, and second as it also 
creates barriers for the competitors. On the other hand, vertical FDI (which is export-oriented) is 
attracted by relatively opened economy. The openness is expected to have negative sign in case of 
horizontal FDI and positive sign in case of vertical type FDI. Following some previous studies, 
                                                           
11
 The data source is also the WCY statistics and represents an average salary ($/h) in the host country. However, 
the data are compiled from US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics and National Sources. 
12
 CPI price index source is International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistical database. In case of Taiwan I used 
Taiwan National Statistics (http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5). 
13
 In an ideal setting, trade costs could be decomposed into institutional, political and geographic components. 
However these data are difficult to discover for a wide range of countries and year. So the employed measure 
can serve as an appropriate proxy, keeping in mind that the influence of any of the mentioned components would 
be expected to influence the trade cost measure. 
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openness measures come from Penn-World Tables and are defined as the ratio of the sum of imports 
and exports to GDP. This measure is used in Chapters V, VI and VII. In Chapter IV I use a trade cost 
measure (TCREALit) that is defined as inverse to the OPENNESS, and it is expected to have opposite 
signs to that of OPENNESS. 
ICREALit is investment cost for ‘country i’ at time t that is regarded as impediments and 
difficulties in the operational activity of foreign affiliate in the host country. These include financial, 
juridical, fiscal and other incentives/impediments. Carr et al. (2001) composed an index including the 
appropriate factors for the investment cost. In this dissertation I follow the same approach.14 The 
investment cost was constructed from various indexes of the World Competitiveness Yearbook. The 
index includes the level of control of foreign companies, restraints on negotiating joint ventures, strict 
controls on firing and hiring practices, an absence of fair administration of justice, access to local and 
foreign capital markets, difficulties in acquiring local bank credit, an inadequate protection of 
intellectual property rights, anti-trust and competition laws, and immigrations laws. It is computed on 
scale from 0 to 100 with higher number indicating higher investment cost. The sign of the investment 
cost is expected to be negative, implying that the higher investment barriers are, the lower the 
tendency for MNCs to invest in the host country will be. This measure was used in Chapters IV, V and 
VI. In chapter VII I use an alternative variable (ICit) on scale from 0 to 10  with higher number 
                                                           
14
 A number of empirical works analyzed different investment incentives and their influences on FDI (Barros 
and Cabral, 2001; Haaland and Wooton, 1999, and others). 
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indicating lower investment cost.15 In this case the sign of the investment cost is expected to be 
positive, implying as well that the lower investment barriers are, the higher will be a tendency for 
MNCs to invest in the host country. 
DISi represents distance in kilometers from Tokyo to the Country i’s capital, and thus measures 
the level of geographical separation that might affect MNCs affiliate's decision to invest in the host 
country. Although it is not clear whether distance is included in trade costs or investment costs, it has 
to be taken into consideration as it is a trade impediment.16  
B. Newly introduced variables 
TIit shows technological development of a host country i at time t whose change is also expected 
to influence FDI flows. There could be different reasons. First, technological advantage of the home 
country gives the MNCs competitive advantage over the local firms. But, another way of looking at 
this is also possible. For instance, according to Kogut and Chang (1991), Japanese FDI was drawn to 
R&D-intensive US industries in 1980s. Thus, joint ventures were established for sourcing and sharing 
US technology which was considered to be more advanced at that moment (TIit >0). An index 
accounting for technological development is computed from the data provided by WCY. The index is 
compiled from the level of New Information Technologies penetration, level of technological 
                                                           
15
 The reason for the variable change is that some of the components were discontinued in WCY statistics and 
thus I re-scale the measure in order to ensure data compatibility throughout the whole time period. 
16
 Distance is included only in the common constant econometric specification. And due to its time invariant 
nature, it is not used in Fixed Effects and GMM econometric specifications. 
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cooperation between companies, and level of available financial resources for technological 
development. These sub-indexes are reported by WCY on a scale 0-10 with a higher number 
indicating a higher level of development. Thus, TI is computed on scale from zero to 30, with a higher 
number indicating higher technological development. In case MNCs are expecting to profit from a 
competitive advantage in source country's technology, the TI sign is expected to be negative (i.e. TIit 
<0). However, in case MNCs are expecting to profit from exploitation of the host country R&D 
potential (i.e. TIit >0), the sign is expected to be positive.  
Cross-cultural psychology is also expected to influence the FDI flows. It is proxied by National 
culture openness index for country i at time t, NCit17. For instance, according to Hofstede, Hofstede, 
and Minkov (2010), management practices and peculiarities differ to a certain extent between nations. 
Hence it is expected that MNCs would invest in those locations where management operations would 
be facilitated by opened national culture specifics or by the relatively closed cultural perspectives. For 
the case of Japan, where the cultural aspects are known to differ to a certain extent from other 
countries, this aspect might also play a significant role as FDI determinant. Thus, it is expected to be 
positive (negative) in case Japanese MNCs are oriented towards investment in more culturally open 
(closed) societies.  
                                                           
17
 National culture is an index based on the data from WCY, measuring the level of openness of the host country 
national culture and it is scales from 0 to 10. 
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C. Real Exchange Rate 
RERit is a real exchange rate for ‘country i’ at time t that represents relative price between host 
country and Japanese aggregated goods. The real exchange rate is calculated as ehostit*Phostit/PJPt, and is 
normalised assuming a value in 2005 of 100. Nominal exchange rate, ehostit, is defined as the amount of 
Japanese yen required to purchase one unit of the host country currency. The relative price of country i 
to Japan Phostit/PJPt, is calculated using the GDP deflator index. Yearly GDP deflator data are obtained 
from International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics (IMF-IFS) database. As for 
Taiwan, the GDP deflator data are taken from the National Statistics database. I use the GDP deflator 
rather than consumer or producer price index since I consider FDI for both manufacturing and 
consumption goods industries. Exchange rates of the yen against the host currencies are obtained by 
applying the yen/dollar rates. RER index is calculated in a way that its increase (positive sign) is 
associated with Yen depreciation (host country currency appreciation) and its decrease is associated 
with Yen appreciation (host country currency depreciation). Following previous studies (e.g Froot and 
Stein, 1991) I expect that Yen appreciation will favor Japanese outward FDI. This argument was 
consistently brought to the attention of researchers since a stable Yen appreciation in 1990s was 
regarded as an important incentive for Japanese outward FDI. Thus, I expect a negative sign of the 
RER index for both developed and developing countries.  
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D. Political Environment 
PEit represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t that has recently been emphasized as 
one of the most researchable issues in international economics, as reviewed and discussed in Chapter 
II. Indeed, a political factor usually influences some economic phenomenon not only in domestic 
activities, but also in international environment, and FDI is one of them. For instance, Japanese MNCs 
have a very negative historical experience in the Middle-east in 1970-1980s as well as during Asian 
crisis in 1990s when political instability led to a big financial loss. The political index is calculated 
from the ECR (Euromoney Country Risk) index, and has been scored from 0 to 25 with a higher score 
indicating a lower political risk. This is an alternative and promising measure of PE that seems to be 
overlooked in the literature. According to Euromoney Country Risk methodology this index is 
compiled as follows: “Economists and heads of research worldwide rate each country for which they 
have knowledge from 0-10 across 5 sub factors to equal a score out of 100. The categories of political 
risk scored are as follows: corruption; government non-payments/ non-repatriation; government 
stability; information access/ transparency; institutional risk; regulatory and policy environment. 
Individual experts must apply a value to each sub factor before their score is accepted into the system. 
Individual experts can also modify the sub factor weights to modify their effect on the overall score of 
100. The weight of an individual sub factor can be lowered to a minimum of 10% and to a maximum 
of 30%. This allows the system to capture a second attribute along side of the evaluation of that 
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category, which is the estimated effect of the category.”18  In the Chapters V and VI I rescale the index 
from zero to 10, then the index is subtracted from the maximum value of 10 to indicate that a higher 
number is supposed to indicate higher "political risk". In Chapter IV and VII I keep the original scale 
but I recalculate the index by subtracting it from the maximum value of 25 in order associate a higher 
number with higher “political risk”. 
Although PE does not change considerably in the time dimension I do notice that this index 
fluctuates over the period of my analysis (1995-2010). (see figure 3.1) 19 PE for the whole sample 
fluctuates in the interval [16,20], for developed countries in the interval [19,23] and for developing 
countries in the interval [11,16]. As a whole, PE in the world increased from 1995 to 2010. Indeed, 
terrorist attacks, unstable political situation in Middle-East countries, and several economic crises 
might have caused this general change. PE in developed economies was on an increasing trend until 
2008 and began to drop down in the recent years. PE in developing economies was on a decreasing 
trend in the beginning of the period until 1999, and from 2000 began to increase as well. Thus, 
although the data fluctuations are limited I expect that PE change affected Japanese MNCs activities 
over the period of 1995-2010. 
                                                           
18
 See http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2773899/Euromoney-Country-Risk-Methodology.html for details. 
However, the data on sub factors are not reported in Euromoney Country Risk statistics. Thus, a more detailed 
analysis of political environment sub-factors’ effects on Japanese outward FDI is restrained by data availability. 
19
 The figure is based on calculations of mean for 56 countries (32 developed countries and 24 developing 
countries). A list of countries with their abbreviations is presented in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3.1. PE change over a sample period 1995-2010 for the whole sample, developed economies 
and developing economies. PE values ([0,25] scale) represent a mean for the respective year of the 
respective countries sample (56 countries, 32 developed countries, 24 developing countries). 
Source: Author’s calculations from Euromoney Country Risk.  
According to the conventional wisdom, the Political risk is expected to have negative sign as 
higher political risk might have adverse effects on FDI flows. However, the ECR index includes not 
only political risk, but also government and institutional assessment as the qualitative expert opinions. 
In addition, the ECR index also includes information and policy environment (see table 3.2).  
15.5
16
16.5
17
17.5
18
18.5
19
19.5
20
Po
lit
ic
al
 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t ([
0,
25
] 
sc
al
e) 
Whole sample
19.0
19.5
20.0
20.5
21.0
21.5
22.0
22.5
Po
lit
ic
al
 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t ([
0,
25
] 
sc
al
e) 
Developed Economies
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
17.0
Po
lit
ic
al
 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t ([
0,
25
] s
ca
le
) 
Developing Economies
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
66
Table 3.2. Variables and indicators incorporated into the Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index 
Political 
risk 
Component Score (qualitative expert opinions) 
1 Corruption 10=no corruption, 0=serious corruption 
2 Government non-payments/non-
repatriation 
10=no government interference, 0=high government 
interference 
3 Government stability 10=stable, 0=highly unstable 
4 Information access/transparency 10=unrestricted, 0=totally restricted 
5 Institutional risk 10=efficient and independent institutions, 0=no state 
institution 
6 Regulatory and policy 
environment 
10=highly consistent, 0=no regulatory environment 
exists 
Thus, it is likely that this multiple dimensionality of a composite index may have different effects 
on the MNCs' behavior for FDI, depending on host country's development stages, as will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter VI. 
Moreover, a negative cross-country relationship between PE and FDI in the period of 1995-2010 
is depicted in figure 3.2 and figure 3.3, which shows the association between PE and FDI for 
developed and developing countries.20  
                                                           
20
 In all plot figures I do not include countries outliers that received a high value of Japanese FDI namely United 
States (14761.64 million US$), United Kingdom (5519.55 million US$), Netherlands (5189.70 million US$) and 
Australia (2097.83 million US$) for developed countries and China (3705.41 million US$) for developing 
countries. 
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Figure 3.2. PE ([0,25] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollar), Developed countries, 1995-2010. Values 
are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher PE value is associated with increased political 
risk. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of -23.812, N = 26, R2 = 
0.07. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 3.3. PE ([0,25] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollar), Developing countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher PE value is associated with increased 
political risk. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of -50.68, N = 23, 
R2 = 0.17. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
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This relationship is not confined solely to a cross-country comparison. In fact, various effects can 
cause this relationship. Nevertheless, if plotted by a polynomial fitted approximation the relationship 
between PE and FDI yields inverted U-shape relationship (figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4. PE ([0,25] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollar), All countries, 1995-2010. Values are 
averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher PE value is associated with increased political risk. 
The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of -0.802 for a squared term and 6.503 
for a direct effect, N = 49, R2 = 0.007. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
This relationship suggests that there might be several dimensions inherent to PE measure and thus 
direct and indirect effects of PE on Japanese outward FDI should be analyzed by a more sophisticated 
statistical analysis. I will re-define the hypotheses in Chapter VI of the dissertation. For exposition 
purposes I leave the initially established hypothesis as it is, meaning that higher PE is associated with 
lower FDI flows. 
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E. Democracy 
DEMit  shows a level of democracy of a host country i at time t whose change is also expected to 
influence FDI flows. There could be different reasons. First, higher democracy might be associated 
with higher property rights and thus Japanese MNCs might seek to invest in the countries with higher 
property rights. Second, lower democracy might encourage monopolistic/oligopolistic MNCs 
investments since they could lobby their interests in the less democratic governments. Thus, a 
hypothesized effect on Japanese FDI might be both positive and negative and, as was presented in 
Chapter II, there is no consensus in the literature.  
There are many sources that provide different measures of democracy and none of them is perfect. 
In order to increase the credibility of my results I follow Asiedu and Lien (2011) and use 3 different 
measures of Democracy:  
- International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Democratic Accountability – scored 0-6 with a 
higher score indicating higher democracy.  
According to ICRG manual (Howell, 2007) it is measured as follows: “This is a measure of how 
responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is 
that the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-
democratic one. However, assessing democratic accountability is more complex than simply 
determining whether the country has free and fair elections. Even democratically elected governments, 
particularly those that are apparently popular, can delude themselves into thinking they know what is 
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good for their people even when the people have made it abundantly clear that they do not approve 
particular policies.  Close to an election, such an attitude can have disastrous consequences (e.g., 
Prime Minister Thatcher’s poll tax). Therefore, it is possible for an accountable democracy to have a 
lower score, i.e. a higher risk, for this component than a less democratic form of government.” (2007, 
68) 
- Polity IV – scored “-10”-“+10” with a higher score indicating higher democracy and a lower 
score indicating a higher autocracy. 
This measure was elaborated by Polity IV project and adjusted for time series analysis. In fact it is 
obtained by subtracting Autocracy score from Democracy score. According to Polity IV manual 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2011) Democracy is defined as three essential elements: “One is the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Second is  the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise 
of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and 
in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of 
checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these 
general principles.” (2011, 14) Autocracy is defined “operationally in terms of the presence of a 
distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress 
competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of 
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selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional 
constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and 
economic activity, but it is regarded as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining 
property of autocracy.” (2011, 15) 
- Freedom House (FH) Political Rights – scored 1-7 with a higher score indicating most free 
and a lower score indicating less free nations. 
A rating of one implies that “there are competitive parties or other political groupings, the 
opposition plays an important role and has actual power” a rating of seven indicates that political 
rights are absent. 
To ease comparison between the different measures I follow Acemoglu et al. (2008) and 
normalize them to lie in between zero and one with a higher value implying more democracy. 
For instance, all three measures of Democracy show some tendency to fluctuate over the sample 
period of 1995-2010 (figure 3.5). 
By and large, all three measures of Democracy show a tendency to increase for the whole sample, 
developed economies and developing economies. Nevertheless, FH measure indicates a decreasing 
trend from year 2005 for the whole period and for the developing economies. Thus, all three measures 
are an important proxy for the level of democracy in my sample countries for the sample period and 
they can have an effect on Japanese MNCs activities. 
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Figure 3.5. Democracy change over a sample period 1995-2010 for the whole sample, developed 
economies and developing economies. Author’s calculations from ICRG, Polity and FH measures. 
Values represent a mean for the respective year of the respective countries sample (56 countries, 32 
developed countries, 24 developing countries). A higher value of Democracy index is associated with 
a more democratic environment. 
The importance of countries’ development stage in determining the effect of democracy on FDI 
can be gleaned from figures 3.6-3.11. Interestingly, a negative cross-country relationship between 
Polity and FDI in the period of 1995-2010 is depicted in figure 3.6 which shows the association 
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between Polity and FDI for developed countries and a positive cross-country relationship in figure 3.7 
which shows the association between Democracy and FDI for developing ones.21  
 
Figure 3.6. Polity ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), Developed countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher Polity value is associated with higher 
level of democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of -1575, N 
= 26, R2 = 0.05. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21
 In all plot figures I do not include countries outliers that received a high value of Japanese FDI namely United 
States (14761.64 million US$), United Kingdom (5519.55 million US$), Netherlands (5189.70 million US$) and 
Australia (2097.83 million US$) for developed countries and China (3705.41 million US$) for developing 
countries. 
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Figure 3.7. Polity ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), Developing countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher Polity value is associated with higher 
level of democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 353.68, 
N = 23, R2 = 0.17. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 3.8. ICRG ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), Developed countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher ICRG value is associated with higher 
level of democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 384.23, 
N = 26, R2 = 0.01. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3.9. ICRG ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), Developing countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher ICRG value is associated with higher 
level of democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 158.49, 
N = 23, R2 = 0.004. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 3.10. FH ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), Developed countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher FH value is associated with higher level 
of democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 103.56, N = 
26, R2 = 0.001. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3.11. FH ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), Developing countries, 1995-2010. 
Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher FH value is associated with higher level 
of democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 297.87, N = 
23, R2 = 0.02. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. 
However, in case of ICRG and Freedom House measure the fitted value coefficient seems to be 
positive suggesting a positive association of Democracy with FDI (figures 3.8-3.11). Again, this 
relationship is not confined solely to a cross-country comparison. In fact, various effects can cause this 
relationship. Nevertheless, if plotted by a polynomial fitted approximation the relationship between 
Democracy and FDI yields inverted U-shape relationship for all 3 measures (figures 3.12-3.14). 
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Figure 3.12. Polity ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), All countries, 1995-2010. Values are 
averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher Polity value is associated with higher level of 
democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of -2023.1 for a squared 
term and 2347.9 for a direct effect, N = 49, R2 = 0.01. Countries abbreviations are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Figure 3.13. ICRG ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), All countries, 1995-2010. Values are 
averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher ICRG value is associated with higher level of 
democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of -1355.8 for a squared 
term and 1588.7 for a direct effect, N = 49, R2 = 0.04. Countries abbreviations are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3.14. FH ([0,1] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollars), All countries, 1995-2010. Values are 
averaged by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher FH value is associated with higher level of 
democracy. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a coefficient of -2033.3 for a squared 
term and 2489.4 for a direct effect, N = 49, R2 = 0.11. Countries abbreviations are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
This relationship suggests that there might be several dimensions inherent to Democracy measure 
and thus direct and indirect effects of Democracy on Japanese outward FDI should be analyzed by a 
more sophisticated statistical analysis. In sum, the effects of democracy on Japanese outward FDI 
flows can be both positive and negative depending on the countries’ economic stage of development 
and this is subject of my analysis in Chapter VII. 
This completes the explanation of my variables to be included in the estimation model. As 
evident, my model is a hybrid model of knowledge-capital models and OLI framework as reviewed 
earlier, with additional and explicit consideration of political factors and democracy. 
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I leave this Chapter by presenting table 3.3, summarizing hypothetical signs for the FDI 
determinants discussed above. 
Table 3.3. Hypothetical signs of FDI determinants  
  FDI type 
FDI determinant Abbreviation Horizontal Vertical 
GDP LOG_GDP Positive Not significant 
Skill difference SD Negative Positive 
Labor cost LOG_W Negative Negative 
Openness 
TCREAL Positive Negative 
Openness Negative Positive 
Investment cost 
ICREAL Negative Negative 
IC Positive Positive 
Distance DIS Negative Negative 
Technological Index TI Negative Positive 
National Culture NC Positive/ Negative Positive/ Negative 
Political Environment PE Negative Negative 
Democracy 
ICRG Positive/ Negative Positive/ Negative 
Polity Positive/ Negative Positive/ Negative 
FH Positive/ Negative Positive/ Negative 
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Appendix 1 List of countries used in the calculations 
Developed countries (32 countries) Developing countries (24 countries) 
Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), 
Canada (CA), Chile (CL), Czech Republic (CZ), 
Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), 
Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), 
Korea (KR), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), 
Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway 
(NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), 
Slovenia (SL), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), 
Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), United Kingdom 
(UK), United States (US) 
Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Bulgaria (BG), 
China (CN), Colombia (CO), Hong Kong (HK), 
India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Jordan (JO), 
Kazakhstan (KZ), Malaysia (MY), Peru (PE), 
Philippines (PH), Qatar (QA), Romania (RO), 
Russia (RU), Singapore (SG), South Africa (ZA), 
Taiwan (TW), Thailand (TH), United Arab 
Emirates (AE), Ukraine (UA), Venezuela (VE), 
Vietnam (VN) 
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CHAPTER IV: EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT ON JAPANESE 
OUTWARD FDI1 
A. Introduction 
One of the most notable questions in my study is how Political Environment (PE) affects Japanese 
outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. As discussed in Chapter III various sources of 
Japanese Multinational Companies (MNCs) activities provide the necessary data. In this Chapter I 
first, examine the results of the econometric setting for FDI data coming from the Organization for 
Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) database. This database provides consistent 
Japanese outward FDI flows’ data compiled from Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) statistics. 
Second, the data for 30 countries are pooled together and analyzed using various econometric 
techniques.2 The negative cross-country relationship between FDI and PE over the period of 1995-
                                                           
1
 This chapter is based on the two published papers: Deseatnicov, Ivan and Hiroya, Akiba "Political Risk and Its 
Implications on Japanese Outward FDI Activities" Journal of International and Global Economic Studies 4(1), 
2011: 28-58 and Deseatnicov, Ivan and Hiroya, Akiba "Effects of Political Risks on Japanese Outward Foreign 
Direct Investments: A Panel Data Analysis" Scientific Annals of the "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi - 
Economic Sciences Section 58, 2011: 533-552. 
I would like to express my thanks for constructive comments and suggestions provided by participants and the 
session chair Ms. Sara Calvo on an earlier version of these papers at the ICE-TEA conference (2010). I also 
acknowledge with thanks the comments and suggestions by seminar participants at the Joint Graduate Workshop 
at Waseda University, and Kenichiro Tamaki, Koji Takase, Hisatoshi Tanaka, Hideki Konishi and Ueda Atsuko 
for their advice on my econometric specifications and estimations. Finally, these papers are based on our joint 
works on Japanese Outward FDI with my supervisor, Professor Hiroya Akiba, for whom I would also like to 
express my special thanks. All remaining errors and shortcomings are my own. 
2
 The list of countries is presented in Appendix 1. They represent mainly Asian and European countries. 
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2008 is depicted in figure 4.1, which shows the association between the Euromoney Country Risk 
(ECR) measure of PE and OECD measure of Japanese outward FDI flows.3  
 
Figure 4.1. PE ([0,25] scale, based on ECR data) and FDI (millions of US$, based on OECD dataset, 
1995-2008). Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2008. The regression represented by the 
fitted line yields a slope coefficient of -35.789, N = 30, R2 = 0.011. A higher value of PE on the 
horizontal axis is associated with higher “political risk”. Countries abbreviations are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
However, 3 main outliers might interfere in this statistical association. Both the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands have low PE and obtain high inflows of Japanese FDI. On the other hand China 
has high PE and also obtains high Japanese FDI inflows. As depicted in figure 4.2 if these outliers are 
eliminated the cross-country relationship between FDI and PE becomes positive. Thus, a question 
arises. What is a real impact of PE on Japanese MNCs activities? 
                                                           
3
 For a detailed discussion of FDI and PE measure see Chapter III. 
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Figure 4.2. PE ([0,25] scale, based on ECR data) and FDI (millions of US$, based on OECD dataset, 
1995-2008). Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2008. The regression represented by the 
fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 23.655, N = 27, R2 = 0.063. A higher value of PE on the 
horizontal axis is associated with higher “political risk”. Countries abbreviations are presented in 
Appendix 1. UK, Netherlands and China are excluded. 
The most straightforward approach would be to establish a theoretical model with control 
variables as FDI determinants, additionally include PE measure, and analyze it by a pooled least 
squares method. Although the control variables are selected from previous robust studies as discussed 
in Chapter III, the variety of models suggesting different FDI determinants increases the probability 
for an omitted variable bias. Some other factors may influence both FDI and PE. Thus, I start the 
estimation strategy to control for country-specific factors affecting both FDI and PE by including 
country fixed effects. The major source of potential bias might be country-specific, historical factors 
influencing both Japanese FDI and PE. For example, the government system of the host country (e.g. 
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parliamentary republic, presidential republic, etc) can influence PE by affecting government stability 
and might also be an indirect criterion for Japanese MNCs decision. If these omitted characteristics are 
time-invariant, the inclusion of fixed effects will remove them and this potential bias. For instance, 
compare France and Turkey. France has both lower PE and receives higher level of Japanese FDI 
flows which would suggest that an increase in PE would lead to a decrease in Japanese outward FDI if 
not controlled for fixed country effects. In order to improve the inference on the effect of PE on 
Japanese outward FDI, I estimated the model with panel fixed effects method. 
However, the fixed effect method is not a panacea for omitted variable bias. Moreover, the 
assumption that the conditional mean of the time-varying errors is zero implies that the observed 
covariates in every time period are uncorrelated with the time-varying errors (unobserved 
heterogeneity) in each time period. If either heteroscedasticity or serial correlation are present, then 
fixed effects method does not necessarily estimate a real effect of PE on Japanese outward FDI. In 
addition, I am interested in including lagged FDI in the right-hand side of the model, since previous 
years’ FDI flows might actually stimulate contemporaneous FDI. In this case an efficient estimator is 
considered to be given by generalized method of moments (GMM). In line with the above, the final 
conclusions are based on GMM results. Nevertheless, pooled least squares (also called common 
constant) and fixed effects estimation results are also reported and discussed. 
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In analyzing the Japanese outward FDI determinants I look also at two additional variables 
namely Technological Index (TI) and National Culture (NC). In my opinion these are not to be 
neglected in the fast developing globalized world.4  
Technological development reflects not only the level of new technologies penetration, but also 
the ability and skills of local human resources to operate efficiently with these new technologies. A 
cross-sectional relationship depicted in figure 4.3 seems to show a negative relationship between TI 
and Japanese outward FDI.5 However, as discussed earlier, fixed effects and GMM methods might 
account for unobserved characteristics, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, and thus I will base 
my conclusion on these estimations. 
                                                           
4
 TI and NC indexes are compiled from World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY). For a detailed discussion see 
Chapter III. 
5
 UK, Netherlands and China are excluded from the estimation as outliers. 
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Figure 4.3. TI ([0,30] scale, based on WCY data) and FDI (millions of US$, based on OECD dataset, 1995-
2008). Values are averaged by country from 1995 to 2008. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a 
slope coefficient of -10.96, N = 27, R2 = 0.008. A higher value of TI on the horizontal axis is associated with 
higher technological development. Countries abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. UK, Netherlands and 
China are excluded. 
Since FDI also comes with new managerial and technological methods, it is important how host 
country’s companies and their human resources are able to accept and implement these methods. Since 
in general an international business involves international division of labor, cultural particularities 
might also be important for MNCs. For instance, a mutual agreement between managers on the 
projects and strategies is an important factor for a company’s success. Being from different cultural 
background managerial openness and acceptance of the counterpart’s culture might be crucial for 
mutual understanding. As shown in figure 4.4 a negative cross-section relationship can be observed 
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between NC and Japanese outward FDI. However, again accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation is necessary to establish a final conclusion. 
 
Figure 4.4. NC (based on WCY data) and FDI (based on OECD dataset, 1995-2008). Values are averaged by 
country from 1995 to 2008. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of -19.26, N = 
27, R2 = 0.001. A higher value of NC on the horizontal axis is associated with a more opened society. Countries 
abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. UK, Netherlands and China are excluded. 
Finally, I am interested not only in pure effects of PE, TI and NC on Japanese outward FDI. What 
would be a cross-effect of PE and TI, and of PE and NC on Japanese outward FDI? Is there a 
possibility of these factors’ parallel account by Japanese MNCs? To answer this question I introduce 
two new indexes namely TI*PE and NC*PE. And this is an additional important discussion that I shall 
emphasize in this chapter. 
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In sum, in this chapter I start an econometric discussion of Japanese outward FDI determinants. I 
use three widely used econometric techniques, namely common constant, fixed effects and GMM. The 
main conclusions are based on GMM estimations. In addition to PE as the main focus of the study I 
also examine TI and NC variables that have not been studied for Japanese FDI explicitly.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B presents my empirical model and 
additional data discussion. Section C describes the estimation results. Section D provides the 
summaries and conclusions. 
B. The empirical model and estimation strategy 
This section presents my basic specification for the empirical strategy. The dependent variable in 
the study is FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in US Dollar (FDI), and the independent variables are 
chosen as explained in Chapter III. Two of them (GDP and Wage cost) are expressed in logarithmic 
form, and the other remains as it is, as they represent the computed indexes. The log form allows 
reducing to a certain extent the influence of heteroscedasticity. 6  
The basic model is specified in a reduced form as: 
Yit = µi + X'itβ + εit.                                                                   (1) 
Where Yit is the net annual outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X’it 
denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
                                                           
6
 FDI flows are not logarithmically transformed since they are positive and negative for some countries in 
different years. 
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dimension, β is a vector of unknown parameters, and µi is a constant specific to each country.7 The 
parameter µi is introduced to account for unmeasured specific features of countries concerned, and it 
varies only across countries. εit is a stochastic error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated over all 
i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
(FDI)it = µi + β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit +β4TCREALit    
              +β5ICREALit + β6DISit + β7PEit + β8TIit + β9NCit + εit. 
 
(2) 
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge capital and/or the OLI hypotheses. Their calculation and hypotheses were 
presented in Chapter III. 
The political index (PEit) is calculated from the Euromoney Country risk statistics, and it is 
computed on scale from zero to 25, with a higher number indicating higher “political risk”. The 
Political environment is expected to have negative sign, as higher “political risk” might influence 
negatively FDI flows. 
In addition, since the role of PE in FDI decision is expected to be important, it is of scientific 
interest and practical value to understand whether PE is considered together with other FDI 
determinants when Japanese MNCs make decisions to invest. In order to verify if there are in fact 
                                                           
7
 In general, I estimate different structures of the panel model under different assumptions. The constant is 
specific to each country only under the fixed effects and GMM estimation. 
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those possible influences in historical FDI data, a new approach is applied to check how Japanese 
MNCs behave in aligning together TI and PE, or NC and PE. In order to investigate this possibility, 
two new indexes are considered: TI*PE and NC*PE.  
Thus, two more linear regression models are specified in the panel data analysis. They are aimed 
at examining the effects of PE through interaction with technological development in equation (3), and 
national culture in equation (4)8: 
(FDI)it = µi + β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit +β4TCREALit 
              + β5ICREALit+ β6TI*PEit + β7NCit + εit 
(3) 
and 
(FDI)it = µi + β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit +β4TCREALit 
              + β5ICREALit + β6NC*PEit + β7TIit + εit 
(4) 
TI*PEit captures the interaction effect between TI and PE for country i at time t, and measures a 
level of technological development consideration of a host country when taking into account PE. The 
index shows how much Japanese MNCs might be concerned with technological development and 
political environment together as a factor for FDI decision. Suppose that according to the conventional 
wisdom PE is expected to be negative since a higher “political risk” is associated with lower FDI. If 
Japanese MNCs motivation for FDI is to benefit from a competitive advantage in technology at the 
local market, then TI sign is expected to be negative and, hence, TI*PE is expected to be positive (as 
                                                           
8
 I do not include both NC*PEit and TI*PEit in the estimated equation in order to avoid multicollinearity problem 
that may possibly appear when using interation terms. For instance, a correlation berween NC*PE
 
and TI*PE
 
is 
0.94 and thus using both terms in a single regression is better to be avoided.  
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interaction of two positive signs). However, if Japanese MNCs aim at sourcing and sharing host 
country technology, then TI sign is expected to be positive and, thus, TI*PE is expected to be negative 
(as interaction of a negative and a positive signs). Similarly, NC*PEit captures the interaction effect 
between NC and PE index for country i at time t and measures a level of openness of the host country 
national culture consideration when taking into account PE. The index shows how much Japanese 
MNCs might be concerned with national culture and political environment together as a factor for FDI 
decision. Again, suppose that PE effect on Japanese outward FDI is negative as expected. Then, the 
effect of the interaction term NC*PE will depend on the NC sign (positive in case Japanese MNCs 
prefer more culturally opened societies and negative in case Japanese MNCs prefer more culturally 
closed societies). Thus, it is expected to be either positive or negative depending on the sign of NC.  
The data set consists of annual observations for a period of 1995-2008 for 30 countries. A list of 
countries is presented in Appendix 1. The data source for Japanese FDI is OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) database, and for other variables different sources such as 
the World Development Indicators (the World Bank), the World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(International Institute for Management Development), Penn-World Tables, and Euromoney.  
I apply a panel data analysis in order to capture static and dynamic nature of the FDI flows, 
accounting for at the same time possible heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity. Thus my 
panel data set consists of two dimensions: one dimension is cross-section (30 countries: i = 1,….,N) 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
92
and the other is time dimension (14 years: 1995-2008: t=1,…,T). The total number of observations in 
this context is 420, and can be considered adequate to produce robust estimations for the scope of the 
analysis. The descriptive statistics of the data and the correlation matrix are presented in Appendix 2 
and 3.  
The panel data model is analyzed using 3 different methods: (a) Common constant, (b) Fixed 
effects, (c) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The first, common constant (also called as 
pooled OLS) method assumes that the data set is a priori homogeneous, and that there are no 
differences among the data matrices of the cross-sectional dimension. This assumption is questionable 
for the data set as the sample countries are in fact mainly from Asia and Europe, and thus different in 
size and stage of economic development. However, it is of additional value to look at the common 
constant results to understand a general common tendency of the Japanese FDI flows.  
The second, Fixed Effects method treats the constant as group-specific and allows for different 
constants for each group (which is also called Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimators). 
This method assumes that differences across groups can be captured by differences in the constant 
terms. However, to use this method I need to check whether Fixed Effects indeed should be included 
in the model. To do this the standard F-test can be used to check Fixed Effects against a simple 
Common Constant OLS method. 
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Random effects method handles the constants for each section as random parameters rather than 
fixed, and assumes that each country differs in its error term. This provides some advantages in 
comparison to Fixed Effects estimation as there are fewer parameters to estimate, and an option of 
including dummy variables is acceptable. However, before deploying the Random effects method, a 
Hausman (1978) specification test should be performed in order to confirm the appropriateness of 
using Random effects model. Otherwise, Fixed Effects should be considered as the robust estimation. 
However, all previous methods do not handle to an adequate extent the problem of autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity. By including lagged FDI flows I can change to a dynamic panel model. A 
commonly used method for dynamic panels is the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. As their 
estimator is set up, the fixed effects are eliminated using first differences, and an instrumental variable 
estimation of the differenced equation is performed. In my case I will employ orthogonal deviations 
set-up, as the first differences produced statistically insignificant estimators.9 Thus, the GMM method 
allows us to produce robust estimations for my empirical model.  
C. Results and discussions  
Since dealing with macroeconomic data, I started with a panel unit root test (Nelson and Plosser, 
1982) according to Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), Maddala and Wu 
(1999) and Choi (2001). The results are presented in table 4.1. 
                                                           
9
 An extensive explanation of why first-difference could produce weak instruments and statistically insignificant 
estimation can be found in Arellano and Bover (1995), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Nelson and Startz (1990b, 
1990a). 
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Table 4.1. Panel Unit Root test results 
Variable Name Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-stat 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
FDI -4.92* -7.12* 94.38 165.97 
GDP -7.25* -2.81* 89.20* 88.85* 
Skill difference -24.67* -10.61* 184.03* 250.37* 
Investment cost -5.87 -3.00 98.95 122.54 
Trade cost -11.85 -6.69 159.19 186.08 
Wage costs -2.53 -5.61* 131.99* 239.50* 
Political environment -8.59* -8.40* 180.88* 384.55* 
Technological Index -3.19 -8.89* 189.14* 96.69 
National Culture -5.07 -2.03 161.79* 113.21 
*First difference 
All variables are shown not to have a unit root with the 5% significance level. Hence I can 
consider them stationary, and I can proceed with Panel Data analysis methods. I consider equation (2) 
by using three different methods (namely, common constant, fixed effects, and GMM) in order to 
analyze the Japanese FDI with the data sample under different econometric specifications. The results 
are presented in table 4.2 below. 
In table 4.2, the common constant method provides a preliminary estimation results for panel data 
(Column 2). These estimations present the results under the assumption that there are no differences 
between countries. Several interesting features are disclosed, and in what follows, I give some 
interpretations and evaluations for them.  
First thing to note is that, GDP has a significant role in investor’s decision, as expected. The 
market size (proxied by GDP) that gives prospects for high level of sales opportunity, high level of 
expected growth and hence high level of profitability, is considered by Japanese MNCs to be 
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important. Indeed, the positive coefficient estimate which is statistically significant supports this 
assumption and previous empirical studies (Mainardi, 1992). In addition, from these results I could 
assume that Japanese FDI are mostly of horizontal type. However, the role of vertical FDI still should 
not be underestimated. 
Table 4.2. The determinants of Japanese FDI         (Common constant, fixed effects, GMM) 
Variables Common 
Constant 
Fixed Effects GMM (a) GMM (b) GMM (c) 
FDI(-1)   0.14 (2.97)*** 
0.32 
(5.42)*** 
0.26 
(8.13)*** 
GDP 0.99 (7.13)*** 
1482.46 
(3.86)*** 
2202.71 
(8.03)*** 
810.7493 
(3.95)*** 
891.39 
(4.87)*** 
Wages -304.25 (-2.32)** 
-394.69 
(-2.09)** 
-842.43 
(-3.84)*** 
-731.45 
(-3.72)*** 
-391.49 
(-2.89)*** 
Investment Cost -38.32 (-2.27)** 
-51.77 
(-2.45)** 
-185.14 
(-4.81)*** 
10.73 
(0.61) 
-34.87 
(-3.84)*** 
Skill Difference 282.14 (3.20)*** 
-51.50 
(-0.48) 
-131.85 
(-0.94) 
-49.16 
(-1.19) 
157.42 
(3.56)*** 
Trade cost 2.07 (1.52) 
-1.79 
(-0.69) 
-20.66 
(-2.36)** 
-2.53 
(-1.41) 
-16.70 
(-3.11)*** 
Distance -0.13 (-3.12)***     
Technological 
Index 
-19.58 
(-0.50) 
-92.67 
(-2.21)** 
-203.80 
(-2.60)***  
-79.46 
(-3.15)*** 
National Culture 356.03 (3.16)*** 
-21.08 
(-0.19) 
-657.45 
(-4.11)*** 
-489.41 
(-3.96)***  
Political 
Environment 
-98.40 
(-2.33)** 
14.77 
(0.42) 
214.87 
(2.16)**   
TI*PE    
10.99 
(3.57)*  
NC*PE     19.92 (2.57)** 
Constant 1338.97 (0.79) 
-3066.05 
(-1.44)    
Rsquared 0.19 0.615912    
Durbin-Watson 0.73 1.444624    
F-Statistic 10.59 16.55580    
SE of regression   1335.86 1247.856 1219.38 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a   0.88 0.22 0.59 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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The role of Human capital is also supported by the estimation. Labor cost (LOG_Wit) is 
statistically significant. Its sign is negative and supports the hypotheses that Japanese MNCs are 
looking mostly for locations with a low labor cost that will ensure a lower cost of production and 
higher expected profitability. In addition, Skill Difference (SDit) is negative and significant, which 
supports the hypotheses that Japanese MNCs are looking for a relatively cheap unskilled labor in 
comparison to Japan’s manpower. It allows for diminishing costs and increased business opportunities 
and, in general, is associated with vertical type FDI. Indeed, from 1997-1998 Japanese MNCs have 
been shifting some of its production to Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, China and Central 
and Eastern Europe in order to exploit cheaper labor opportunities and serve host and neighbor 
countries markets especially in electrical and transport machinery sectors. Such examples include 
some Japanese automakers that took on the production from Japan to Thailand with further export to 
third countries like, for example, Australia.  
Trade cost (TCREALit) is positively associated with FDI flows. However, its statistical 
significance is not considerable enough to draw robust conclusion. 
Investment cost (ICREALit) has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant, 
supporting the hypotheses that high level of local impediments in terms of financial, administrative 
and juridical restrictions will negatively influence Japanese FDI flows. Indeed, since 2000 a Free 
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Trade Agreement activity started to boost in East Asia region which facilitated to a certain extent trade 
between countries and might have inspired Japanese vertical type FDI. 
My main concern in the present investigation, Political environment (PEit) as well has a negative 
impact on Japanese FDI as was expected by the prior presumption. Indeed, as historical evidence 
shows (e.g. case of investment in the Middle-East), Japanese MNCs would prefer to reduce 
investments in the countries with higher political instability. In this empirical specification the result is 
significant at the 5% level. However, there still might be a need for reexamination of the estimator, 
since the estimated coefficients are not robustly signed for different estimation methods as discussed 
below.  
On the other hand, Technological index (TIit) has a negative sign but its statistical significance is 
not sufficient to draw a robust conclusion. 
Finally, National culture openness (NCit) is positively and significantly related to Japanese FDI 
flows which supports the hypotheses that National culture represent one of the FDI determinants for 
Japanese FDIs, and it plays a certain role in investors decision. Specifically, Japanese MNCs prefer to 
invest in culturally more opened countries. 
My interpretations given above for the estimated results however do not take into consideration 
the specific unmeasured features of each country. Thus I proceed by estimating equation (2) using 
fixed effects. Fixed effects models assume the constant in an estimation equation as a group specific 
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parameter, and random effects models assume cross-sectional differences in error term. Fixed effect 
redundant tests’ results are presented in Appendix 4.  
According to the regression results only cross-section fixed effects can be shown significant. 
Hence I apply a cross-section fixed general least squares estimation using the White's diagonal 
coefficient covariance method in order to account for heteroscedasticity effects. These estimated 
results are expected to be robust (see Fixed Effects column, table 4.2). 
A Hausmann specification test is performed in order to check the applicability of the Random 
effects method. The results of the test are presented in Appendix 5, from which I conclude that the 
cross-section fixed effects should be preferred to Random effects. Thus, I omit to report here the 
random effects results.  
In order to capture the effects of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, I applied the Arrelano-
Bond GMM estimator using orthogonal deviations with one-period lagged dependent variable.10 The 
results present robust estimator and the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions confirmed the 
appropriateness of the selected instruments. The results are presented in the rightmost 3 columns of 
table 4.2. 
                                                           
10
 I consider a dynamic process in which previous FDI flows might have an effect on the contemporaneous FDI. 
In addition, I assume that the one-period lagged FDI is sufficient enough to capture the information of the 
previous FDI effects on the contemporaneous FDI.  Longer period lags may also capture some information, but 
with a lower explanatory power.  
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In general the GMM estimation results are almost the same results in terms of variables’ sign as 
the previous common constant and fixed effects models. However, there are nonetheless some 
differences.  
The sign of the trade cost (TCREALit) now is negative, and its influence is statistically 
significant at the 5% level (see column GMM(a)). This result shows that Japanese MNCs would prefer 
to reduce their investment if the trade cost is increased. Thus, I could interpret that this result supports 
the assumption that Japanese FDI activities take on average vertical type form. Indeed, as their 
experience shows some of the Japanese investments in Taiwan or China are aimed at producing for the 
Japanese market. However, horizontally oriented types of Japanese FDI still should not be neglected 
and this interpretation has to be reconfirmed by further econometric specifications. 
Technological index (TIit) now has negative and significant effect on Japanese FDI. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that Japanese MNCs would prefer to invest in countries with lower 
technological developments, so that they can exploit technological competitive advantage.  
In addition, the sign of national culture (NCit) also turns out to be negative and significant, which 
is opposite to the previous result. Thus I could interpret that, according to this GMM estimation, 
Japanese MNCs tend to invest in the countries with more closed national culture. This can be 
explained by the fact that Japanese society was historically closed and hence tends to cooperate more 
with the same type of national culture.  
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A seemingly puzzling result of the GMM estimation is the fact that the coefficient of Political 
environment (PEit) is positive and statistically significant for Japanese FDI flows (see GMM(a)). 
Literally interpreted, this suggests that Japanese MNCs tend to invest in the more politically unstable 
countries, which is opposite to my initial presumption. I introduce a new hypothesis and a detailed 
economic explanation of this result in Chapter VI. Nevertheless, I provide some preliminary reasoning 
here as well.  
It should be recalled that my sample period covers the Asian currency crisis and its aftermath 
period, during which the risk ratings of countries hit by the crisis were considerably down-rated. I 
should also note that some FDI activities continue for a long time, implying that some investments 
started from previous periods still continue even after the crisis abated. Thus, I could expect that 
inward FDI by host countries continued to be positive even after their risk ratings deteriorated by the 
crisis, generating a positive and significant estimated coefficient.11 I will come back to this point 
below when discussing the interaction terms of PE.  
It is also worth mentioning that most of the sample countries for my empirical study are relatively 
stable politically. Thus, the relative change in their political situation might not be reflected 
significantly in the FDI decisions. In addition, as noted above, the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 
                                                           
11
 Another possible interpretation of this result could be offered by the fact that most probably the weight of 
potential benefit for Japanese MNCs is higher than the weight of PE uncertainty for the sample of the countries 
used in the analysis. And as soon as one realizes the fact that higher risk is usually associated with higher profits, 
PE could serve as an incentive for Japanese FDI flows. 
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led to the reduction of the ratings of some Asian countries’ political stability. Due to steady 
appreciation of the Japanese yen and wider profitability opportunities, Japanese companies invested 
heavily in those countries, despite the political instability. Such examples could include Thailand, 
Korea, and Philippines, showing up with a positive correlation between Japanese FDI flows and PE 
index. This interpretation is, however, still controversial and is to be confirmed by further empirical 
investigations in the following chapters. 
In order to investigate if there are some interactions between explanatory variables, I performed 
several regressions with interaction variables by Technological development, National culture 
openness, and Political environment for possible determinants when Japanese MNCs make decision to 
invest. In order to check this possibility I estimated equations (3) and (4) using GMM specification. 
The results of the regressions and their comparisons are presented in table 4.2. GMM(b) includes the 
interaction term of TI*PE index and GMM(c) includes that of NC*PE index. 
According to the table all previously analyzed variables keep their signs and significance. Only 
Investment Cost, Skill Difference and Trade Cost are insignificant in GMM(b) specification. 
In addition, two newly introduced interaction terms are significant, as was expected. The first 
interaction term, TI*PE is positively and significantly related to FDI flows (at 1% significance level), 
which supports my presumption that Japanese MNCs are concerned about Technological development 
and Political factor together as FDI determinant when they make decision to invest. I interpret that 
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Japanese MNCs are expecting to profit from a competitive advantage in technology, and hence the 
effects of TI is expected to be negative on FDI. This negative effect interacts with another negative 
effect exerted by PE, and both of the negative effects give rise to a positive coefficient to this 
interaction term. 
The second interaction term, NC*PE is also positively related to FDI. However it is significant at 
5% level. In general, it also supports my presumption that Japanese MNCs are concerned about 
National culture openness and Political environment of the host country together as FDI determinant 
factor when they make decision to invest. According to the GMM(a) estimation NC has a negative 
effect on FDI, as presented earlier, suggesting that Japanese MNCs prefer relatively closed host 
countries. This negative effect interacts with another negative effect exerted by PE (higher “political 
risk” is associated with lower FDI), and, thus, both of the negative effects give rise to a positive 
coefficient to this interaction term. 
Finally, another important finding is that the coefficient of TI*PE is statistically more significant 
than that of NC*PE for Japanese FDI flows. Although my inference rests on the point estimates, this 
statistical fact might suggest that Japanese MNCs are more concerned about level of Technological 
development together with PE of the host country than about level of NC openness together with 
Political Environment as FDI determinant when they make the decision to invest. This result is highly 
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important from the policy prescription perspective as the host countries’ government could consider 
technological development and political stability together when prescribing FDI attracting policies.  
D. Concluding remarks 
This chapter empirically examined the outward Japanese FDI with a panel data of a total of 30 
countries for the period 1995-2008. Based on the OLI theoretical framework and knowledge-capital 
model, a number of traditional determinants (GDP, Human capital indicators, Investment cost, Trade 
cost, etc.) are complemented with three non-traditional determinants for Japanese FDI, namely 
Political Environment, Technological Index, and National Culture. Several different methods are 
applied to this data set, namely a common constant, a fixed effect, and a generalized method of 
moments. 
The main results are mostly consistent with the preceding studies and are robust for all 
specifications. Specifically, market size plays a significant positive role; wage cost is negatively 
associated with FDI flows. Investment cost as well is negatively associated with FDI flows. Skill 
difference influences positively the FDI flows which means that Japanese MNCs prefer to profit from 
the low cost and relatively low-skilled labor. Technological index is also robust and is negatively 
associated with Japanese FDIs. This enables me to interpret that Japanese MNCs prefer to invest in 
countries that are technologically less developed, so that they can ensure technological competitive 
advantage on the local market. 
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Trade cost was not consistent across specifications. However, according to the GMM 
specification which is expected to be robust against autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, it is 
negatively associated with FDI, suggesting that Japanese FDI tends to be of vertical type on average, 
and thus serving not only host countries but also the home country Japan. 
National culture is mostly significant, but signed inconsistently. GMM specification suggests that 
Japanese MNCs tend to invest more in countries with less opened national cultures, which can be 
explained by the historical tendency of the Japanese companies to be more closed and with narrow 
business activity. Further investigation would be necessary to confirm this result, since the estimates 
are not robust across specifications. 
One of my main concerns in this paper, Political environment, was inconsistently signed. In a 
common constant model, it has a negative sign which is consistent with most of the preceding 
literature. However, within the GMM framework the sign turned to positive, implying that Japanese 
MNCs tend to invest in politically less stable countries, with expectations of much higher potential 
profitability. However, a more convincing interpretation suggests that, since some FDI activities 
continue for a long time, they started from previous periods and have continued even after the Asian 
crisis broke up in 1997-98. Thus, I could expect that inward FDI by host countries continued to be 
positive even after their risk ratings deteriorated by the crisis, generating a positive and significant 
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estimated coefficient for PE. Despite this preliminary discussion a more detailed discussion and new 
hypotheses are offered in Chapter VI.  
Finally, interactions between Technological Index and National Culture together with Political 
Environment are considered as FDI determinants. It was shown that Japanese MNCs are more 
concerned about Technological development together with Political environment when they make a 
decision to invest. This result is highly important from the government policies perspective.    
In sum, I conclude that Japanese FDI can be reasonably explained by the proposed independent 
variables. The most probable form of Japanese FDI according to the results is vertical type FDI on 
average. I successfully found that political environment, with interaction with national culture and 
technological indices is, as expected, significantly associated with Japanese FDI flows. These finding 
have important implications for future policy consideration by host countries and academic research 
on Japanese outward FDI. GMM estimation is shown to be robust for this model setting. Thus, in the 
following chapters I use GMM results as a foundation for the results discussion. Generally speaking 
the findings of this chapter are based on the pooled sample estimation. However, as mentioned above, 
some of the coefficients are inconsistently signed  among different econometric settings. This suggests 
a necessity to treat the countries sample differently. Thus, in the following chapters I divide the 
countries sample in developed and developing ones, and examine the relationship between Japanese 
outward FDI and its determinants. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of countries included in analysis (total 30 countries) 
Hong Kong (HK), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Korea (KR), Malaysia (MY), Philippines (PH), 
Singapore (SG), Taiwan (TW), Thailand (TH), China (CN), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France 
(FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), 
Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), Sweden (SE), Austria (AT), 
Turkey (TR), Finland (FI), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ) 
 
Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics of variables in the study 
 FDI LOG_GDP ICREAL LOG_W NC PE SD TCREAL TI DIS 
 Mean  871.86  5.533  34.045  1.948  7.093  4.622  0.66 -10.60  17.66  7449.43 
 Median  238.80  5.485  32.850  2.457  7.130  2.767  0.50  18.73  18.14  8746.00 
 Maximum  19618.84  8.372  61.510  3.882  9.080  18.315  4.60  71.12  26.40  11169.00 
 Minimum -615.67  1.538  14.696 -2.813  3.570  0.00 -1.77 -356.56  7.80  1153.00 
 Std. Dev.  1887.94  1.266  11.037  1.438  0.942  4.38  1.09  84.15  3.99  2826.01 
 Skewness  4.807 -0.250  0.344 -0.871 -0.437  0.919  0.67 -2.06 -0.18 -0.89 
 Kurtosis  34.645  3.509  2.104  2.831  3.330  2.913  3.43  7.04  2.18  2.47 
 Jarque-Bera  19143.00  8.93  22.33  53.66  15.29  59.33  34.39  582.03  13.96  60.46 
 Sum  366181.0  2323.927  14299.15  818.267  2979.46  1941.56  279.14 -4452.39  7418.63  3128762. 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.49E+09  671.896  51048.19  866.505  371.94  8037.10  501.29  2966797.  6675.63  3.35E+09 
 Observations  420  420  420  420  420  420  420  420  420  420 
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Appendix 3. Correlation of variables in the study (t* statistics included) 
Sample: 1995 2008    Included observations: 420 
t-Statistic FDI  LOG_GDP  LOG_W  ICREAL  SD  TCREAL  DIS  TI  NC  
FDI  1         
 -----          
LOG_GDP  0.07 1        
 1.38 -----         
LOG_W  -0.01 0.09 1       
 -0.14 1.79 -----        
ICREAL  -0.03 0.23 -0.69 1      
 -0.69 4.81 -19.79 -----       
SD  0.12 0.04 -0.30 0.4 1     
 2.38 0.83 -6.47 8.94 -----      
TCREAL  0.02 0.42 -0.07 0.39 0.08 1    
 0.36 9.59 -1.54 8.57 1.72 -----     
DIS  -0.09 -0.04 0.51 -0.39 -0.05 0.24 1   
 -1.78 -0.73 12.26 -8.78 -0.98 5.04 -----    
TI  0.03 -0.05 0.64 -0.76 -0.39 -0.40 0.09 1  
 0.58 -1.02 17.11 -23.59 -8.59 -8.98 2.01 -----   
NC  0.07 -0.5 -0.05 -0.33 -0.16 -0.43 -0.01 0.12 1 
 1.33 -11.82 -0.94 -7.25 -3.32 -9.83 -0.23 2.54 -----  
PE  -0.09 -0.05 -0.86 0.73 0.23 0.16 -0.47 -0.64 -0.05 
 -1.85 -1.06 -34.72 22.04 4.91 3.31 -10.94 -17.25 -1.01 
Appendix 4. Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 17.741850 (29,369) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 366.706235 29 0.0000 
Period F 0.667408 (13,369) 0.7950 
Period Chi-square 9.761157 13 0.7133 
Cross-Section/Period F 13.025418 (42,369) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 381.903255 42 0.0000 
     
     
Appendix 5. Hausmann test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 16.09097 8 0.0411 
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CHAPTER V EXCHANGE RATE, POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND JAPANESE 
OUTWARD FDI1 
A. Introduction 
Institutional risks for an MNC in the form of Political Factors and Democracy represent the main 
focus of my dissertation. In this sense the current chapter stands alone since it addresses an economic 
risk expressed in real exchange rate (RER). However, a study of Japanese outward FDI would be 
incomplete if this factor were left without attention. A belief of many economists is that Japanese 
outward FDI actually was stimulated by a continuous Yen appreciation and due to an increased cost of 
production it became more profitable to move Japanese production facilities out of the country. This 
so-called hollowing-out hypotheses is largely accepted. 
Thus, in this chapter I step aside from the main focus of the dissertation and discuss RER level 
effects on Japanese outward FDI along with the Political factors effects. In a sense, this analysis is 
close to Clare and Gang (2010) who were probably one of the first to address these two aspects 
                                                           
1
 This Chapter is based on a forthcoming paper namely Deseatnicov, Ivan and Hiroya, Akiba. 2012. “Effects of 
Exchange Rate and Political Environment on Japanese Outward FDI: a panel data analysis” The International 
Journal of Economic Policy Studies, forthcoming and on one published working paper namely Deseatnicov Ivan. 
2012. “Exchange Rate, Political Factors and Japanese Outward FDI in Europe and Asia: are there any 
differences?” in Working Papers: The European Union Institute in Japan at Waseda University.  
Earlier versions of these papers were presented at various Conferences and Workshops, including IAEC 
(Athens), JEPA (Kwansei Gakuin University), EUIJ (Pusan), GLOPE II (Waseda Univiversity), Graduate 
Workshop (Waseda University), WEAI (San-Francisco). I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professors 
Antonin Rusek, Shujiro Urata, Fukunari Kimura, Young-Ryeol Park, Yi Chae-Deug, Kenichiro Tamaki, Koji 
Takase, Hisatoshi Tanaka, Hideki Konishi, Ueda Atsuko, Paul Bacon, John Devereux, Nathan Cook and Lein 
Lein Chen, and other participants for their critical but constructing comments and suggestions that improved 
these papers considerably. I would like also to thank the European Union Institute in Japan at Waseda University 
for financial contribution to the research performance and presentation. These papers are based on my joint 
works on Japanese Outward FDI with my supervisor, Professor Hiroya Akiba, for whom I would also like to 
express my special thanks. Usual disclaimer applies. 
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together. 2  I extend my established econometric framework by adding an additional determinant, 
namely RER level.3 In order to increase results robustness I examine the Japanese outward FDI flows 
under two aspects: level of economic development and a regional aspect. The former distinguishes 
between developed and developing sample countries.4 The latter includes Euro-zone, European non-
Euro-zone and Asian countries.5 In fact, as shown in Chapter IV some variables were not consistently 
signed under different econometric assumptions, and in particular the PE coefficient turned to be 
positive in the GMM estimation. Although I accounted for unobserved heterogeneity of the cross-
section dimension, an omitted variable bias might still be present. Naturally, level of economic 
development can introduce a large number of differences among countries. Indeed, as shown in 
Chapter III (section D) political environment fluctuates differently in case of developed and 
developing countries (Chapter III, figure 3.1). In addition a positive relationship between RER level 
and both Japanese outward FDI to developed countries and developing countries as depicted in figure 
                                                           
2
 For a detailed discussion of Clare and Gang (2010) see Chapter I. 
3
 For a RER level measure calculation details see Chapter III. Exchange rate (ER) volatility is another important 
aspect of ER effects on FDI flows. However, its analysis represents another big topic in FDI literature and thus I 
leave it out of scope of my study. 
4
 In this chapter I use the OECD membership as a criterion for developed countries. The other countries are 
considered developing. For a classification discussion see Chapter II. 
5
 Euro-zone countries include European countries that officially adopted Euro as their common currency. 
European non-Euro-zone countries include European countries that did not officially adopted Euro as their 
common currency. The countries used in the study and their classification are shown in Appendix 1. 
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5.1 and figure 5.2 suggests that a Japanese Yen appreciation is associated with lower outward FDI, 
which is opposite to the widely accepted hollowing-out hypotheses.6  
However, a polynomial approximation trend for the whole sample depicted in figure 5.3 actually 
suggests that there might be both positive and negative effects on Japanese outward FDI inherent to 
RER level measure. Although these estimations show only a straightforward relationship I could 
conjecture that RER level on Japanese outward FDI is not consistently signed for countries’ different 
level of economic development. Thus, I examine first the effects of RER level on Japanese outward 
FDI to developed and developing countries. 
 
Figure 5.1. RER (2005=100) and FDI (billions of Yen), Developed countries, 1995-2009. Values are 
averaged by country from 1995 to 2009. An RER increase on the horizontal axis is associated with 
Yen depreciation. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 2886.8, N 
= 18, R2 = 0.085. Countries’ abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. UK and Netherlands are 
excluded. 
                                                           
6
 UK, Netherlands and China are excluded from the estimation as outliers. 
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Figure 5.2. RER (2005=100) and FDI (billions of Yen), Developing countries, 1995-2009. Values are 
averaged by country from 1995 to 2009. An RER increase on the horizontal axis is associated with 
Yen depreciation. The regression represented by the fitted line yields a slope coefficient of 1654, N = 
9, R2 = 0.016. Countries’ abbreviations are presented in Appendix 1. China is excluded. 
 
Figure 5.3. RER (2005=100) and FDI (billions of Yen), Whole sample countries, 1995-2009. Values 
are averaged by country from 1995 to 2009. An RER increase on the horizontal axis is associated with 
Yen depreciation. The regression represented by the polynomial fitted line yields a coefficient of -
115.85 for RER2 and 25301 for RER, N = 27, R2 = 0.36. Countries’ abbreviations are presented in 
Appendix 1. UK, Netherlands and China are excluded. 
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Next, I examine the RER and PE effects on Japanese outward FDI in a regional aspect by 
addressing Euro-zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries.7 As can be seen in figure 4, PE 
fluctuated to a certain extent in both Euro-zone and non-Euro zone countries. 8 In general, Political 
Environment in European non-Euro zone countries is higher than in Euro-zone countries, suggesting 
that “political risk” is higher in non-Euro-zone countries. It could be explained by the fact that my 
sampled non-Euro-zone countries include the former Socialist countries (Poland, Czech Republic, and 
Hungary) that have been in transition to the system of market economy and thus are still relatively 
unstable politically. In addition, as can be seen from Figure 5.4, although PE was on a decreasing 
trend in both Euro-zone and European non-Euro-zone countries until 2000-2001, from that time on it 
fluctuated steadily with an inclination towards PE increase. Moreover, in 2009 this increase is even 
stronger for Euro-zone countries. In line with recent reconsideration of Euro-zone stability PE might 
play a crucial role in FDI attraction. In case of Asian countries PE was higher and on an increasing 
trend from 1995 to 2000, and then it began to drop down. Thus, a particular interest represents an 
analysis of two periods: prior to 2000-2001 and after 2000-2001.  
                                                           
7
 I would like to thank Professor Paul Bacon for suggesting this alternative countries’ classification in order to 
account for omitted variable bias. 
8
 The calculations are based on Euromoney data described in Chapter III 
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Figure 5.4 PE fluctuations in Euro-zone, European non-euro zone and Asian countries (1995-2009). A 
PE increase on the vertical axis is associated with higher “political risk”. 
Japanese Yen in real terms experienced appreciation and depreciation in 1995-2011. In particular, 
year 2000-2001 appeared to be a turning point in Japanese Yen behavior. Although it depreciated in 
1995-1998 and appreciated in 1998-2000, since 2000-2001 it was continuously depreciating in real 
terms against Euro-zone and non-Euro-zone countries’ currencies (figure 5.5).  
On balance, both PE and RER drastically changed their trend in years 2000-2001. One of the 
main reasons behind this change might be that in September 2000 Europe, Japan and United States, 
acting together for the first time since 1995, intervened to drive the Euro higher after it hit an all-time 
low. This intervention was first for the European Central Bank since its establishment. This 
coordinated intervention by the three central banks might have turned the appreciating trend of Yen to 
a depreciating one. 
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Figure 5.5. Real Exchange Rate trend (2005=100). An increase of RER measure on vertical axis is 
associated with Japanese Yen depreciation. 
In addition, the Bank of Japan intervened several times after the 9.11 terrorist attack incident in 
New-York city to sell yen for dollars, because it had been worrying about an export-crippling rise in 
the value of the yen.9 These actions might have strengthened the depreciating trend of Japanese Yen. 
In sum, the sample period for my empirical analysis of determinants for Japanese outward FDI can be 
divided into two: prior to 2000-2001 and after 2000-2001. And it seems to be of particular relevance 
for economic and political policies. Thus I advance my analysis for these two periods for Euro-zone, 
European Non-euro-zone and Asian countries. 10 
                                                           
9
 Timeline: History of central bank intervention (Reuters). See http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/24/us-
markets-intervention-timeline-idUSTRE64N3PA20100524 
10 A change in PE and RER can be also observed in 2007-2008. However, the number of observations is limited 
for these years, and thus, I advance the econometric analysis by splitting sample only in two periods: before 
2000-2001 and after 2000-2001.  
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By and large, in this chapter I focus the attention on PE and RER level effects on Japanese 
outward FDI. I examine these effects by applying the established econometric framework to two 
countries’ aspects: level of economic development (developed and developing countries) and regional 
aspect (Euro-zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries). In all the estimations I employ 
GMM model robust specification. For Euro-zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries I 
discuss two important periods: prior to 2000-2001 and after 2000-2001. 
Since the results actually suggest a nonlinear relationship between RER and FDI, and PE and FDI 
I propose a theoretical model that defines a possible non-linear relationship between ER risk and FDI, 
and “political risk” and FDI, thus supporting the empirical findings. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B presents my empirical model. Section C 
describes the estimation results. Section D provides summaries and conclusions. Finally, in appendix 3 
I suggest a theoretical model to explain the obtained empirical results. 
B. The empirical model and estimation strategy 
This section presents my basic specification for the empirical strategy. The dependent variable in 
the study is FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in Japanese Yen (FDI), and the independent variables 
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are chosen as explained in Chapter III. Two of them (GDP and Wage cost) are expressed in 
logarithmic form, and the other remains as they are, as they represent the computed indexes.11  
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit                                                                         (1) 
where yit is the net annual outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it denote 
an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time dimension, β 
is a vector of unknown parameters. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI 
on current FDI. yit-1 is a lagged dependent variable. εit is a stochastic error term, which is assumed to 
be uncorrelated over all i and t. 12  
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
(FDI)it = δ FDIit-1 + β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + β4OPENNESSit + 
β5ICREALit + β6PEit + β7RERit  + εit.       
(2) 
Data for FDI activity are collected from OECD database which provides data of Japanese FDI for 
a large number of countries for the period 1995 to 2009. The explanatory variables are selected mostly 
from those used in many previous empirical studies to test the knowledge-capital and/or the OLI 
(ownership, location and internalization) hypotheses. Their calculations specifics are discussed in 
Chapter III.  
                                                           
11
 FDI flows are not logarithmically transformed since they are positive and negative for some countries in 
different years. Nevertheless, in appendix 4 I provide additional estimation with a transformed FDI measure to 
scale down its variance. The results are consistent with the main body of the chapter. 
12
 In general, I estimate different structures of the
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PEit represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t that has recently been emphasized as 
one of the most researchable issues in international economics, as reviewed and discussed in Chapter 
III. In this chapter I rescale the index from zero to 10, and then subtract from the maximum value of 
10 to indicate that a higher number is supposed to indicate higher "political risk". According to the 
conventional wisdom, the political risk is expected to have negative sign as higher political risk might 
have adverse effects on FDI flows.13 
The data set consists of annual observations for the period 1995-2009. Two sets of countries are 
analyzed by the level of economic development: 20 developed and 10 developing countries14. Three 
sets of countries are analyzed by regional aspect: 11 Euro-zone, 8 European non-Euro-zone and 10 
Asian countries. A list of countries is presented in Appendix 1. In addition, as discussed in section A, 
for the regional aspect analysis I split the timeframe in two periods since both PE and RER showed a 
change in their trend around 2000-2001 that was probably caused by several monetary and political 
events in this period. The data source for Japanese FDI is the OECD database, and for other variables 
different sources are used, such as the WDI (the World Bank), the WCY (International Institute for 
Management Development), Penn-World Tables, and Euromoney.  
                                                           
13
 A detailed discussion of PE measure and data specifics is presented in Chapter III. 
14
 I use a list of high-income OECD members in order to select developed countries and the rest of the countries 
are considered to be developing and emerging economies. 
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I employ a panel data analysis in order to capture static and dynamic nature of the FDI flows, 
accounting for, at the same time, possible heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity. Thus 
my panel data set consists of two dimensions: one dimension is cross-section (20 developed countries 
and 10 developing countries; and 11 Euro-zone, 8 non-Euro-zone and 10 Asian countries: i = 1,….,N) 
and the other is time dimension (15 years: 1995-2009 for developed and developing countries, and 6 
and 9 years: 1995-2000 and 2001-2009 in the regional aspect analysis: t=1,…,T). The total number of 
observations in this context is 300 for developed countries and 150 for developing ones, 66 for Euro-
zone countries in 1995-2000, 99 for Euro-zone countries in 2001-2009, 56 for European non-Euro-
zone countries in 1995-2001, 64 for European non-Euro-zone countries in 2002-2009, 60 for Asian 
countries in 1995-2000 and 90 for Asian countries in 2001-2009, and it can be considered marginally 
adequate to produce robust estimations for the scope of the analysis. The descriptive statistics of the 
data is presented in Appendix 2.  
The panel data model is analyzed using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Generally the 
problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity is characteristic to the economic data sets. Thus, by 
including lagged FDI flows as an additional regressor I can change a static model to a dynamic panel 
model. A commonly used method for dynamic panels is the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator. As their estimator is set up, the fixed effects are eliminated using first differences, and an 
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instrumental variable estimation of the differenced equation is performed.15 In my case I will employ 
orthogonal deviations set-up, as the first differences produced statistically insignificant estimators. 
In addition a cross-term analysis will be performed in order to capture RER direct and indirect 
effects on Japanese outward FDI. Additional specifications are presented in the next section. 
C. Results and discussions  
In this section I discuss the estimation results of the established econometric framework. First, I 
address control variables estimation. Second, I discuss RER effects and finally I present PE effects 
results.  
1. Control variables 
After conducting panel unit root test I found that all variables can be considered stationary at 5% 
significance level. Hence I can proceed with Panel Data analysis methods. I consider equation (2) by 
using GMM method in order to analyze the Japanese FDI with my data samples. Thus, in order to 
address the effects of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, I applied the Arrelano-Bond GMM 
estimator using orthogonal deviations with one-period lagged dependent variable. The results present a 
robust estimator and the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions confirmed the appropriateness of 
the selected instruments.  
                                                           
15
 Since most of the variables are non-stationary in level, the first-differences are used as the instrument variables 
for my GMM estimation.  
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The results of estimation in a regional aspect are presented in table 5.1. In general, they are 
consistent with the prior anticipation of sign conditions as presented in Chapter III. GDP has a 
significant role in investor’s decision as expected for non-Euro-zone and Asian countries for both 
periods (GMM(c), GMM(d), GMM(e), GMM(f)). In case of Euro-zone countries GDP estimator is not 
significant (GMM(a), GMM(b)).  
Table 5.1. The determinants of Japanese FDI to Euro-zone, European non-euro-zone and 
Asian countries 
Countries Euro-zone Euro-zone 
European 
non-Euro-
zone 
European 
non-Euro-
zone 
Asian Asian 
Years: 1995-2000 2001-2009 1995-2001 2002-2009 1995-2000 2001-2009 
Variables GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) GMM(e) GMM(f) 
FDI(-1) 
-0.57 
(-1.35) 
0.03 
(1.01) 
0.13*** 
(3.57) 
-0.51** 
(-2.22) 
0.39*** 
(4.13) 
0.34** 
(2.41) 
GDP 
2112.28 
(0.17) 
-919.78 
(-0.53) 
7153.68** 
(2.26) 
881.19* 
(1.85) 
760.50* 
(1.66) 
2684.91*** 
(3.58) 
Wages 
-56883.74** 
-(2.38) 
-2680.90** 
(-2.57) 
-519.31 
(-1.55) 
167.88 
(0.58) 
-379.02*** 
(-12.92) 
-904.38 
(-0.99) 
Investment Cost 
238.99 
(0,93) 
-78.95** 
(-2.51) 
58.84 
(1.67) 
9.49 
(1.04) 
-18.78 
(-1.06) 
-11.85 
(-0.65) 
Skill Difference 
-4759.56*** 
(-2.81) 
601.17*** 
(2.85) 
-333.01** 
(-2.07) 
-151.03** 
(-2.13) 
156.86*** 
(2.68) 
44.82 
(0.32) 
Openness 
308.02** 
(2.13) 
42.17*** 
(4.53) 
-12.97 
(-1.6) 
-22.71*** 
(-3.1) 
3.59 
(0.41) 
-7.49 
(-1.42) 
Political 
Environment 
3225.70 
(1.29) 
2226.44*** 
(5.35) 
-373.69* 
(-1.95) 
422.35** 
(2.3) 
-297.22** 
-(2.04) 
-266.27** 
(-2.5) 
Real Exchange 
Rate 
-157.81** 
(-2.02) 
55.26** 
(2.52) 
-35.23*** 
(-2.66) 
10.29** 
(2.16) 
20.52** 
(2.55) 
-16.08** 
(-2.09) 
SE of regression 3385.97 1151.25 2588.93 864.53 409.56 834.39 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.48 0.21 0.88 0.78 0.63 0.42 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
The role of Human capital is also supported by the estimation. Labor cost (LOG_Wit) is 
statistically significant both for Euro-zone and Asian countries (GMM(a),GMM(b), GMM(e)). The 
sign of its coefficient is negative. Skill Difference (SDit) is positive and significant for Euro-zone 
countries in 2001-2009 and for Asian countries in 1995-2000 (GMM (b), GMM(e)). The same positive 
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sign occurs in case of Euro-zone countries in 2001-2009. In the case of European non-Euro-zone 
countries the sign is negative and significant for both periods (GMM(c), GMM(d)). Openness 
(OPENNESSit) is positively associated with FDI flows and its influence is statistically significant in 
case of Euro-zone countries in both periods (GMM(a), GMM(b)). In case of European non-Euro-zone 
countries in 2002-2009 the coefficient is negative and significant in GMM(d). 
Investment cost (ICREALit) has a negative sign as expected and is statistically significant for 
Euro-zone countries in 2001-2009 (GMM(b)). In other cases its statistical significance is not strong 
enough to draw a robust conclusion. 
The results of the estimation for developed and developing countries are presented in table 5.2. 
The first thing to note is that, the estimators of the control variables for developed and developing 
countries are of the same sign which suggests that these independent factors, namely GDP, Wages, 
Investment Cost, Skill Difference and Openness have identical direction of influence on the Japanese 
FDI flows, regardless of the stage of development of the host country (GMM(a) and GMM(f)). 
Second, the independent variables are mostly significant and consistently signed for developed and 
developing countries. Big market size (proxied by GDP), openness to trade, relatively unskilled labor 
(in comparison to Japanese man-power) promote FDI. Labor cost (proxied by Wages) and Investment 
Cost have an adverse effect on FDI. Lagged FDI is positive suggesting that the existence of FDI flows 
stimulates future FDI in the same host country. In general the results are consistent with previous 
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literature and the sign condition is satisfied as expected. I note, however, that the estimation 
coefficients for both skill difference and investment cost are not significant for developed countries. 
This result might be caused by some additional bias which is discussed in sub-section 2. 
In sum, in terms of significance and sign the results of the control variables for both samples are 
consistent with the discussion in Chapter IV. Traditional determinants explain adequately the Japanese 
outward FDI flows to developed and developing countries over a period 1995-2009, and to all 3 
regions (Euro-zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries) in both periods. 
Table 5.2. The determinants of Japanese FDI to developed and developing countries 
Countries: Developed Developed Developed Developed Developed Developing 
Variables GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) GMM(e) GMM(f) 
FDI(-1) 0.11 (7.21)*** 
0.05 
(5.29)*** 
0.06 
(8.38)*** 
0.07 
(6.01)*** 
0.07 
(7.21)*** 
0.18 
(5.68)*** 
GDP 1432.58 (7.99)*** 
571.6 
(3.00)*** 
641.46 
(2.66)*** 
1103.05 
(5.14)*** 
421.71 
(2.8)*** 
629.06 
(7.24)*** 
Wages -1154.6 (-5.42)*** 
-803.42 
(-5.02)*** 
-655.87 
(-4.18)*** 
-515.52 
(-3.59)*** 
-349.05 
(-2.49)** 
-207.85 
(-4.62)*** 
Investment Cost -2.03 (-1.00)  
-26.94 
(-3.59)***   
-24.86 
(-9.04)*** 
Skill Difference 2.82 (0.18)   
80.87 
(4.01)***  
111.05 
(3.36)*** 
Openness 12.78 (7.8)*** 
25.61 
(12.77)*** 
18.37 
(8.7)*** 
13.86 
(6.29)*** 
16.69 
(8.67)*** 
1.89 
(1.93)* 
Political Environment 219.13 (3.41)*** 
1593.88 
(11.1)*** 
1381.62 
(13.14)*** 
1283.54 
(10.08)*** 
1059.41 
(10.91)*** 
-45.45 
(-2.55)** 
Real Exchange Rate -4.32 (-2.2)** 
18.19 
(5.79)*** 
5.07 
(2.22)** 
11.9 
(4.58)*** 
3.49 
(1.8)* 
-6.57 
(-5.79)*** 
ICREAL*RER  -0.43 (-6.57)***  
-0.44 
(-7.88)***   
SD*RER  1.28 (5.56)*** 
0.76 
(2.28)**    
RER*ICREAL*SD     -0.01 (-2.17)**  
       
SE of regression 932.71 1016.34 978.97 979.16 953.85 488.63 
Hansen J-test (p-value)a 0.74 0.83 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.33 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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2. Exchange rate and Political Environment 
I now discuss the GMM results on RER level effects on Japanese outward FDI. 
In the regional aspect (table 5.1), first, I examine the results of GMM specification for Asian 
countries. The sign of Real Exchange Rate (RERit) is negative and significant in 2001-2009 
(GMM(f)). This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Indeed, Yen appreciation is 
associated with Japanese outward FDI to Asian countries particularly in 2001-2004 and 2006-2009. 
Thus the so-called “hollowing-out” hypothesis is successfully validated for Asian countries (low cost 
and technologically disadvantageous) due to probable vertical orientation of FDI flows. Japanese 
MNCs’ products as parts or intermediate products can be imported in Japan (or any other countries) 
with much lower costs, meaning that the competitiveness advantage is large. Indeed, it was observed 
that Japanese MNCs moved a part of their production facilities to Taiwan, Thailand, China and other 
Asian countries.16 
However, in 1995-2000 the sign is positive and significant meaning that Yen appreciation in this 
period is associated with FDI increase (GMM(e)). From the figure 5.5 one can see that in 1995- 1997 
the Japanese Yen was depreciating in real terms and in 1997-2000 it was appreciating. At the same 
time according to JETRO (2001, 2002) Japanese FDI in Asia declined considerably in 1998 (by 
46,4%) and in 2000 (by 17,2%). Thus, these declines might be associated with Yen appreciation. It 
                                                           
16
 As noted in Chapter I Xing and Zhao (2008) as well argued that Yen appreciation leads to an increase of 
”reverse imports” meaning an intensification of vertical FDI activities. 
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could be explained by the fact that due to Yen appreciation and the Asian crisis the operating cost 
increased considerably for Japanese MNCs, and having a more stable situation in Europe, they 
preferred to invest there. I note that according to JETRO (2002) in this period Japanese MNCs 
increased significantly their investment in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in electric and 
machinery equipment.  
In case of Euro-zone and European non-Euro-zone countries in 1995-2000 (GMM(a), GMM(c)) 
the sign of RER is also negative and significant. 17 It could be explained by the fact that in this period 
due to the Asian crisis and Yen appreciation, Japanese MNCs were more inclined to invest in 
European countries.  
However, in case of the second period the sign is positive and significant meaning that Yen 
appreciation discourages FDI for Euro-zone and European non-Euro-zone countries (GMM(b), 
GMM(d)). This result is new and different from the prior presumption. I will discuss it later in this 
section. 
Now I turn to discuss the results of estimation for developed and developing countries (table 5.2). 
First, I examine the results of GMM specification for developing countries. The sign of Real Exchange 
                                                           
17
 After performing Variance Inflation Analysis we found that there is multicollinearity in GMM(a) 
specification. In order to correct for multicollinearity I excluded Openness (a collinear term) from the 
specification. However, the result was similar with RER being negative significant, and, thus, I do not report the 
result here. 
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Rate (RERit) is negative and significant (GMM(f)). This result is again consistent with the prior 
presumption.  
In case of developed countries (GMM(a)) the sign of RER is also negative and significant. 
However, in this specification ICREAL and SD are not significant. I suspected that these results might 
be insignificant due to composite (balanced) effect of the exchange rate on FDI. In order to investigate 
this possibility I decided to analyze the existence of direct and indirect effects of exchange rate. Thus, 
the following regressions were examined: 
GMM(b): regression with all 3 variables reflecting the direct and the 2 indirect effects:  
(FDI)it = δ FDIit-1 + β1LOG_GDPit + β2LOG_Wit + β3OPENNESSit + β4PEit + 
β5RERit  + β6RER*SD + β7RER*ICREAL + εit.       
(3) 
GMM(c): regression with 2 variables reflecting the direct and one of the 2 indirect effects:  
(FDI)it = δ FDIit-1 + β1LOG_GDPit  + β2LOG_Wit + β3OPENNESSit + 
β4ICREALit + β5PEit + β6RERit  + β7RER*SD + εit.       
(4) 
GMM(d): regression with 2 variables reflecting the direct and the rest of the 2 indirect effects:  
(FDI)it = δ FDIit-1 + β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + β4OPENNESSit + 
β5PEit + β6RERit  + β7RER*ICREAL + εit.       
(5) 
GMM(e): regression with 2 variables reflecting the direct and a single variable of 2 indirect 
effects:  
(FDI)it = δ FDIit-1 + β1LOG_GDPit  β2LOG_Wit + β3OPENNESSit + β4PEit + 
β5RERit  + β6RER*SD*ICREAL + εit.       
(6) 
As evident from the results, direct effect of exchange rate on FDI turned out to be positive and 
significant, meaning that Yen appreciation discourages FDI for developed countries and it confirms 
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the results for European countries (mainly developed ones) in the regional aspect of analysis. This 
result is new and different from the initial presumption. I would like to propose the following 
explanation. It is plausible that Japanese manufacturers have not invested in high cost developed 
countries as vertical FDI. They have invested as horizontal FDI in, e.g. the UK, for local production 
and sales. Thus, with Yen appreciation, the sunk cost of (initial) investment increased, and Japanese 
manufacturers possibly could not tolerate it anymore, because future internalization advantage18 would 
not be as large as in the developing countries case. Thus, they had to cut their FDI in developed 
countries. In fact, FDI in several developed countries, e.g. U.K., has been on a decreasing trend since 
around 2000. 
The cross variable RER*ICREAL has a negative effect (GMM(b), GMM(d)), meaning that a 
composite effect of ER and Investment cost influences FDI negatively. Likewise, an SD*RER 
composite effect (GMM(b), GMM(c)) is positive. Finally, the cross effect ICREAL*SD*RER is 
negative and significant (GMM(e)). A possible interpretation of these results is based on an interaction 
of a positive RER effect with a negative ICREAL effect and a positive SD effect. Thus, these 
regressions again support the hypothesis that a sunk cost effect of Exchange Rate on FDI is stronger 
than an export substitution effect for developed countries. This result is new and highly important for 
policy prescriptions when considering Exchange Rate regime strategies. 
                                                           
18
 In view of Itaki (1991) explanations changes in exchange rate may be related to sunk costs and, thus, affect 
MNC’s “perceived cost of integration”. 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
127
To support these findings Appendix 3 presents a simple theoretical model suggesting an 
additional economic reasoning to explain ER effects on optimal FDI. In fact, the level of MNCs 
attitude to the risk might play an additional role in their perception of ER effects on outward FDI. 
I now turn to address the GMM results on Political environment level effects on Japanese outward 
FDI. In the regional aspect of analysis (table 5.1), the coefficient is statistically significant for Euro-
zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries. In case of Asian countries in 2001-2009 and 
European non-Euro-zone countries in 1995-2001 it is negative and corresponds to the prior 
presumption that the Japanese MNCs are concerned about political stability and reduce their 
investment when perceiving a higher PE (GMM(c), GMM(f)). However, in case of Euro-zone and 
European non-Euro-zone countries in 2001-2009 the estimator is positive and consistently significant 
for Japanese FDI flows (GMM(b), GMM(d)). Literally interpreted, this would suggest that Japanese 
MNCs tend to invest in the more politically unstable countries, which contradicts the prior 
presumption. 
Holding countries' level of development constant (table 5.2), the coefficient is statistically 
significant for both developed and developing countries. In case of developing countries it is negative 
and corresponds to the prior presumption that the Japanese MNCs are concerned about political 
stability and reduce their investment when perceiving a higher political risk. This confirms the 
empirical estimates in preceding literature (Singh and Jun, 1996; Eicher et al., 2011). In case of 
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developed countries the estimator is again positive and consistently significant for Japanese FDI 
flows (see GMM(a)-GMM(e)). Again, this suggests that Japanese MNCs tend to invest in the more 
politically unstable countries, which contradicts my prior presumption. Nevertheless, this result 
confirms the preliminary estimations and the corresponding result for PE in chapter IV. Thus, I could 
expect the PE effect on Japanese outward FDI is not as straightforward as it appears to be from first 
sight. I will discuss this aspect in more detail in the next chapter. However, in the Appendix 3 I present 
a simple theoretical model suggesting that actually the sign might be different depending on the MNCs 
attitude towards risk. 
Finally, I also would like to emphasize that these results are highly important from the policy 
prescription perspective as the host countries’ government could consider exchange rate risk, political 
stability, economic development level and the regional aspect together when prescribing FDI 
attracting policies. In case of Asian countries and in case of developing countries depreciation of host 
country’s currency and an increase in Political stability potentially lead to more FDI. On the other 
hand in case of European countries and in case of developed countries the issue may be more 
controversial. I found that there are both a sunk cost effect (a positive coefficient meaning that an 
appreciation discourages FDI) and an export substitution effect (a negative coefficient meaning that an 
appreciation encourages FDI) as a result of a change in the real exchange rate. However, my 
estimation revealed that the former sunk cost effect dominates the export substitution effect in the 
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second period (2001-2009) for European countries. For developed countries, my estimation with cross 
effects also revealed that the former sunk cost effect dominates the export substitution effect. PE was 
shown to have a seemingly puzzling effect on FDI. This puzzle will be addressed in more detail in 
Chapter VI. 
D. Concluding remarks 
This Chapter empirically examined the outward Japanese FDI with a panel data of a total of 30 
developed and developing countries for the period 1995-2009 and 29 Euro-zone countries, European 
non-Euro-zone countries and Asian countries for two periods: 1995-2000 and 2001-2009. Based on 
the OLI theoretical framework and knowledge-capital model, a number of traditional determinants 
(GDP, Human capital indicators, Investment cost, Trade cost, etc.) are complemented with 2 
additional determinants for Japanese FDI, namely Political Environment and Real Exchange Rate 
level. The main results are mostly consistent with the preceding studies and are robust for all 
specifications. 
One of the main concerns in this Chapter, Exchange Rate was differently signed for developed 
and developing countries as well as for Euro-zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries. In 
the case of Asian countries in 2001-2009 the sign was negative and significant which is consistent 
with previous studies. In case of European countries in the same period RER positive effect proved to 
be significant and consistent meaning that real Yen appreciation caused a decrease in Japanese 
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outward FDI flows to European countries in this period due to a possible sunk cost effect which was 
stronger than the export substitution effect. In 1995-2000 the sign was negative and significant for 
European countries and positive for Asian countries. That was probably caused by Asian crisis effects 
and reallocation of Japanese FDI to European countries.   
In case of developing countries the sign was negative and significant which is consistent with 
previous studies. In case of developed countries the estimated coefficient was not consistently signed 
among the specifications. In order to depict different channels of the exchange rate effect on FDI, 
cross variables analysis was employed. As a result RER positive direct effect proved to be significant 
and consistent, meaning that real yen appreciation caused a decrease in Japanese outward FDI flows to 
developed countries due to a possible sunk cost effect which was stronger than the export substitution 
effect. To suggest an additional explanation of these findings I propose a theoretical model of optimal 
FDI. The model is inspired by Clare and Gang (2010), but it aims at full optimization (not a partial 
one). As a result, ER risk may affect FDI differently depending on the MNC attitude towards risk. In 
case an MNC is risk-averse an increase in ER risk may negatively affect FDI. However, if an MNC is 
risk-preferring an increase in exchange rate risk may positively affect FDI. Thus, a possibility that 
Japanese MNCs are risk-lovers might be one way of explanation of the RER positive sign in case of 
developed countries. However, this possibility is unlikely in my data since as economic agents 
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Japanese MNCs are on average risk-averters. Hence, the sunk cost’s dominating effect in case of 
developed countries remains as a plausible economic inference about the macro-data empirical results.   
Another main concern, Political Environment, was, as well, differently signed for developed and 
developing countries as well as for European and Asian countries. In case of Asian countries in 2001-
2009 as well as in case of developing countries it has a negative sign, which is consistent with most of 
the preceding literature. However, in case of European countries in the same period as well as in case 
of developed countries, the sign is positive, implying that Japanese MNCs tend to increase FDI for a 
marginal increase in PE. On this seemingly contradictory result I introduce new hypotheses and extend 
the discussion in the next Chapter VI. Nevertheless, the proposed, in Appendix 3, theoretical model 
suggests an alternative interpretation in the sense of nonlinear relationship between PE and FDI 
depending on the MNCs’ attitude towards risk. In case Japanese MNCs are risk-averse an increase in 
probability of retained profit after expropriation (decrease of “political risk”) is associated with higher 
FDI. However, in case Japanese MNCs are risk-preferring a decrease of PE is associated with lower 
FDI.  
In sum, I conclude that Japanese FDI can be reasonably explained by the proposed independent 
variables. As far as the author knows, this is the first formal attempt to empirically examine the effects 
of exchange rate change and political factors on Japanese FDI to Euro-zone, European non-Euro-zone 
and Asian countries as well as to developed and developing countries. I have successfully found that 
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exchange rate and political environment are significantly associated with Japanese FDI flows. These 
findings have important implications for future policy consideration by host countries and academic 
research on Japanese outward FDI. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 List of countries included in analysis 
Euro-zone countries: 
Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands 
(NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Austria (AT), Finland (FI) 
European non-euro-zone countries: 
Denmark (DK), Norway (NO), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), Sweden (SE), Hungary 
(HU), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ) 
Asian countries: 
Hong Kong (HK), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Malaysia (MY), Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), 
Taiwan (TW), Thailand (TH), China (CN), Korea (KR) 
Developed countries: 
Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg 
(LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Switzerland (CH), United 
Kingdom (UK), Sweden (SE), Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Czech 
Republic (CZ), Korea (KR) 
Developing countries: 
Hong Kong (HK), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Malaysia (MY), Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), 
Taiwan (TW), Thailand (TH), China (CN), Turkey (TR) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics of variables in the study 
Developed countries 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS RER PE 
 Mean 541.27 5.31 2.64 30.57 105.48 0.58 1.12 86.97 
 Median 68.05 5.46 3.01 27.68 87.15 0.50 0.63 85.10 
 Maximum 12491.66 6.86 3.88 61.51 324.31 4.05 4.84 143.75 
 Minimum -615.67 2.92 0.04 14.70 37.96 -1.48 0.00 33.17 
 Std. Dev. 1603.37 0.86 0.93 10.34 55.64 1.00 1.15 22.39 
 Skewness 4.72 -0.74 -1.10 0.99 1.91 0.50 1.15 0.30 
 Kurtosis 27.64 3.31 3.25 3.43 6.90 3.16 3.23 2.46 
 Sum 122326.30 1200.91 596.70 6908.44 23838.98 131.62 254.00 19655.85 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5.78e+08 165.70 196.52 24058.59 696509.30 224.27 297.54 112838.50 
 Observations 226.00 226.00 226.00 226.00 226.00 226.00 226.00 226.00 
Developing countries 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS RER PE 
 Mean 760.04 5.30 0.66 38.24 156.85 0.73 3.43 97.05 
 Median 518.33 5.22 0.92 39.87 110.49 0.45 3.51 97.51 
 Maximum 4591.26 6.86 3.17 57.49 443.08 4.60 10.00 149.19 
 Minimum -28.02 4.20 -2.81 16.29 28.23 -1.77 0.34 41.63 
 Std. Dev. 744.80 0.65 1.26 10.94 122.49 1.30 1.84 20.38 
 Skewness 2.01 0.39 -0.56 -0.42 0.90 0.92 0.47 -0.25 
 Kurtosis 8.46 2.47 2.51 2.19 2.53 3.43 3.12 3.07 
 Sum 94244.73 657.42 82.10 4741.42 19449.44 90.13 425.25 12034.25 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 68230731.00 52.35 195.91 14723.95 1845432.00 207.54 415.66 51090.02 
 Observations 124.00 124.00 124.00 124.00 124.00 124.00 124.00 124.00 
 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
134
 
Euro-zone countries, 1995-2000 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS RER PE 
 Mean 558.37 5.68 2.8 28.9 0.27 90.2 9582.82 75.74 
 Median 126.42 5.54 2.92 27.19 0.15 62.08 9509 76.72 
 Maximum 10146.63 7.83 3.41 45.57 3.33 265.04 11169 93.98 
 Minimum 0 2.92 1.53 16.07 -1.48 37.96 7843 40.05 
 Std. Dev. 1365.37 1.35 0.45 6.83 1 57.44 847.6 11.17 
 Skewness 5.59 -0.26 -1.46 0.46 0.64 1.62 0.02 -0.7 
 Kurtosis 38.43 2.37 4.7 2.36 3.23 4.9 3.23 3.44 
 Sum 36852.49 374.71 184.63 1907.62 17.67 5953.29 632466 4999.02 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 121000000 118.05 13.14 3032.11 65.07 214483.7 46697674 8112.65 
 Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Euro-zone countries, 2001-2009 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS PE RER 
 Mean 980.1 6.12 3.1 31.1 0.73 110.28 0.56 98.92 
 Median 144.05 5.99 3.23 30.67 0.66 84.16 0.48 100 
 Maximum 12491.66 8.2 3.75 53.61 2.94 324.31 1.96 127.79 
 Minimum 
-615.67 3.01 1.53 14.7 -1.34 47.43 0 68.99 
 Std. Dev. 2123.55 1.28 0.49 8.34 0.97 69.31 0.41 15.63 
 Skewness 3.13 -0.28 -1.45 0.35 0.23 1.62 0.98 -0.17 
 Kurtosis 13.6 2.43 4.82 2.64 2.42 5.06 3.72 2.2 
 Sum 97029.53 605.48 306.62 3078.84 71.97 10917.28 55.75 9792.69 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 442000000 160.71 23.17 6817.75 92.85 470835.2 16.19 23927.63 
 Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
European non-euro-zone countries, 1995-2000 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS PE RER 
 Mean 1170.31 5.22 2.15 30.17 0.58 72.79 1.5 73.55 
 Median 26.15 5.15 2.93 26.18 0.61 72.87 0.67 73.66 
 Maximum 19618.84 7.32 3.33 58.07 4.05 114.55 4.84 99.59 
 Minimum 0 3.82 0.04 15.26 -1.24 41.88 0 49.38 
 Std. Dev. 3498.89 1.03 1.23 10.58 0.98 17.43 1.55 13.11 
 Skewness 3.84 0.57 -0.67 0.89 0.84 0.29 0.74 0.07 
 Kurtosis 18.39 2.77 1.57 2.97 4.95 3.01 1.99 2.28 
 Sum 58515.58 260.87 107.42 1508.39 28.82 3639.69 74.99 3677.53 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 600000000 52.05 74.62 5485.76 47.43 14881.08 117.63 8420.76 
 Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
European non-euro-zone countries, 2001-2009 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS PE RER 
 Mean 562.81 5.79 2.71 31.19 0.74 96.62 1.19 102.52 
 Median 98.33 5.74 3.19 28.87 0.45 88.26 0.44 100 
 Maximum 7240.22 7.94 3.88 61.51 3.06 177.93 3.3 145.25 
 Minimum 
-102.28 4.2 0.76 15.86 -1.32 52.36 0 75.87 
 Std. Dev. 1414.66 0.9 1.01 11.07 0.95 32.67 1.23 15.18 
 Skewness 3.41 0.83 -0.68 1.13 0.44 0.92 0.54 0.59 
 Kurtosis 14.47 3.51 2 3.63 2.59 3.05 1.48 2.9 
 Sum 35456.72 364.53 170.48 1964.69 46.88 6086.98 75.25 6458.55 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 124000000 50.3 62.7 7592.89 56.45 66170.76 93.06 14294.68 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Asian countries, 1995-2000 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS PE RER 
 Mean 924.73 5.37 0.53 40.77 1.14 130.73 3.12 97.46 
 Median 622.66 5.17 0.67 42.87 1.01 97.65 3.2 99.42 
 Maximum 4591.26 7.09 2.16 58.85 4.6 335.86 7.33 133.71 
 Minimum 132.88 4.2 -2.81 19.28 -1.77 28.23 0.64 57.15 
 Std. Dev. 790.15 0.83 1.39 11.39 1.51 102.44 1.55 17.62 
 Skewness 2.33 0.39 -0.71 -0.63 0.27 0.85 0.46 -0.15 
 Kurtosis 10.07 2.05 2.29 2.28 2.54 2.25 3.07 2.32 
 Sum 50859.93 295.43 28.9 2242.58 62.68 7190 171.71 5360.25 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 33714200 36.85 104.55 7001.58 122.3 566622.5 129.42 16773.64 
 Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Asian countries, 2001-2009 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS PE RER 
 Mean 1328.86 5.77 0.81 40.77 0.71 158.36 3.18 103.21 
 Median 710.15 5.4 0.99 42.27 0.43 107.85 3.08 100.01 
 Maximum 6938.12 8.52 2.77 57.81 3.59 443.08 10 138.9 
 Minimum 78.24 4.27 -1.97 16.29 -1.01 34.51 0.34 73.47 
 Std. Dev. 1611.05 1.03 1.2 11.82 1.17 126.55 1.69 12.87 
 Skewness 2.21 0.77 -0.18 -0.61 0.81 1.09 1.07 0.31 
 Kurtosis 7.18 2.83 1.77 2.29 2.73 2.74 5.14 3.27 
 Sum 112952.8 490.08 68.98 3465.05 60.46 13460.69 269.88 8772.83 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 218000000 88.63 120.54 11738.1 114.3 1345251 240.7 13911.45 
 Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
 
Appendix 3. Theoretical model of ER and PE effects on FDI 
I. Background 
In this Appendix I present a theoretical model that attempts to explain the empirical finding of 
non-linear relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI. Also this model suggests different 
signs of Exchange rate risk (that could be proxied by RER in my empirical specification) depending 
on the Japanese MNCs’ level of risk aversion. 
This theoretical modeling is inspired by the Clare and Gang (2010) model. However, their model 
is reformulated since their incomplete analysis (i.e. partial maximization of the expected utility with 
respect to FDI) is not a full optimization. I present a complete optimization with respect to the all 
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choice variables and solve for FDI by taking into account of possible influences from other 
endogenous variables. This Appendix constructs the model by combining Clare and Gang's model 
with that of Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010). The latter considered several political risk (PR) factors 
that can be applied to FDI analyses. The optimal solution of FDI based on the recent theories of ER 
and PR clearly shows possible directions of change in FDI by optimally reacting to exogenous 
changes, and hence theoretical sign conditions. 
II. The Model 
Consider a Japanese MNC with a foreign affiliate producing a single homogeneous product with 
inputs at constant prices. The product is distributed to home and foreign market, and the randomness 
in exchange rate is the only variation in the firm’s value. Assuming that the firm is a risk averter, and 
it seeks to maximize its expected utility of profits. 
Thus, the following are some essential assumptions: 
(A-5-1) Two-country model: H(home) and F(foreign) 
(A-5-2) H - The parent company; F - The foreign subsidiary (the foreign affiliate) 
(A-5-3) A single homogeneous product is produced by the affiliate, and is sold by both the parent and 
the affiliate. 
(A-5-4) The exchange rate (e) is measured in units of home currency per unit of foreign currency. This 
is the only random variable for the baseline model. (PE is considered later). 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
137
(A-5-5) Timing:  
(1) FDI is carried out by home parent to foreign affiliates. There is no production by the parent. 
(2) Production by foreign affiliate is done by employing Labor (L) and Specific factor (Z). 
(3) The output (Y) is distributed to H's and F's markets with no transport costs. 
(4) H's parent makes profits (R) by the sales after paying FDI costs. 
(5) F's affiliates make profits (R*) by the sales after paying factor costs. 
(6) The parent counts the joint profits (Q~). 
(A-5-6) Risk: Both the parent and the affiliates are "risk averters" in the sense of Arrow-Pratt. This 
assumption will be considered in more detail later. 
(A-5-7) FDI represents the Capital (K) bought in H and sent to F. The cost of K for Parent is the 
implicit rental cost (r) (for example, the opportunity costs). 
(A-5-8) Factor markets for Z and L in Foreign country are competitive. Factor Prices are constant (w* 
for L and r* for Z). 
(A-5-9) A fixed proportion "a" of output is sold in H's market (0<a<1): The rest (1-a) in F's market. 
(A-5-10) The final prices are P and P* for H and F. The prices are assumed constant throughout the 
analysis. 
(A-5-10) Production function is Cobb-Douglass with Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) for closed-form 
solutions. 
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(A-5-11) ER and PE are mutually independent 
Production: The output (Y) is produced only in F. 
Y=KαZβLγ; α+β+γ=1,         (1) 
Where K represents FDI, Z is a Foreign Specific factor (cost=r*) and L= Foreign Labor(cost=w*). 
The MNC’s profit is restrained by these three factors. Following Clare and Gang (2010) K and Z are 
not regarded as substitutes. Z is foreign country capital and “contains within it knowledge of host 
country institutions which multinationals lack”. (2010, 4) 
The MNC’s Domestic Profits are defined as Domestic Revenue minus cost:  
R ≡ PaY - rK     (measured in the Home currency)      (2) 
Foreign Affiliate's Profits are defined as Foreign Affiliate's Revenue minus Costs: 
R* ≡ P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L      (measured in the Foreign currency)    (3) 
PE is considered to represent “political risk” (PR) for the MNC. Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) 
consider three PRs namely: 
(1) outright expropriation representing a classical form of political risk when the foreign country 
government takes the MNC’s property without compensation (Buckley, 2003; Hill, 1998). 
(2) creeping expropriation “negatively affects the expected returns on the investment project (e.g. 
exchange rate restrictions, failure to enforce or respect the agreed property and contract rights)” 
(Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010, 211). 
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(3) confiscatory taxation “directly affects the MNC’s profits (e.g. corruption, discriminatory 
taxation)” (Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010, 212). 
The baseline model abstracts from any "local taxation" (Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010, 210). 
Outright expropriation is functionally equal to confiscatory taxation. Thus, I consider (1) and (2) 
below. 
III. The Joint Profits (measured in the Home currency). 
a. Outright expropriation 
I capture this form of political risk by a probability to retain profit after expropriation (s1). The 
part of foreign affiliate’s revenue is expropriated and, thus is random. 
The expected revenue is:  
E[R*] = (1- s1)R*+ s1R* = s1R*        (4) 
Where,  
s1 is probability of retained profit after outright expropriation;  
(1- s1) is probability of outright expropriation (a decrease in s1 is associated with an increase in 
PR). 
This leads to the following form of the MNC’s joint profit defined as a sum of H and F profits 
from equations (2), (3) and (4): 
Q~ ≡ R + e~ s1R* = (PaY - rK) + e~ s1[P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L ]   (5) 
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Where, 
e~ is the random exchange rate with the mean e and a constant variance. 
Q~ represents random joint profits. It is random through the random exchange rate e~ . 
Thus, the Utility function of the parent firm is 
U = U(Q~) =U(R + e~ s1R*)        (6) 
Expanding the utility function around the neighborhood of zero (Maclaurin's expansion) and 
approximating it by the second order yields 
U(Q~) = U'(Q~)Q~ + 
2
1 U''(Q~)Q~2        (7) 
Since the marginal utility is assumed to be positive, division yields the normalized utility 
V(Q~) ≡ )~('
)~(
QU
QU
 = Q~ + )~('2
)~("
QU
QU Q~2 = Q~ - 
2
AR Q~2     (8) 
Where RA is Arrow-Pratt's absolute risk aversion measure (RA= - U"/U' > 0 and assumed 
constant). 
Then I can derive the expected utility as follows 
E[V(Q~)] = Q - 
2
AR E[Q~2]        (9) 
where the expected value of joint profit is 
Q = E[Q~] = R+E[ e~ ]s1R* = R + e s1R*       (10) 
And the variance is  
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Var(Q~) ≡ 2Qσ  ≡ E[(Q
~
 - Q)2] = E[Q~2] - Q2 ＝ E[{R + e~ s1R* - (R + e s1R*)}2] =  
= (s1R*)2E[( ee −~ )2] = (s1R*)2 2eσ      (11) 
where 2eσ ≡E[( ee −~ )2] is the variance of the exchange rate, or exchange risk. 
Therefore, E[Q~2] = 2Qσ + Q2 = (s1R*)2 2eσ + Q2      (12) 
Substituting (12) into (9) yields 
E[V(Q~)] = Q  - 
2
AR Q2 - 
2
AR 2
Qσ ,       (13)   
or 
E[V(Q~)] = Q  - 
2
AR Q2 - 
2
)( 22*1 eA RsR σ
         (13') 
Now I can formally hypothesize how exchange rate risk ( 2eσ ) and political risk (s1) will affect the 
expected utility from joint profits. In case an MNC is a risk-averter (RA>0) an increase in exchange 
rate risk decreases utility (and hence FDI, 2
][
e
VE
σ∂
∂
= -
2
)( 2*1RsRA <0). However, if an MNC is risk-
preferring (RA<0) an increase in exchange rate risk increases utility (and hence FDI, 2
][
e
VE
σ∂
∂
 > 0). 
In the same way in case an MNC is risk-averse (RA>0) a change in PR (meaning a change in 
probability of retained profit s1) will negatively affect the expected utility and hence FDI (
1
][
s
VE
∂
∂
=-
2*
1 eA RsR σ  < 0). If, however, an MNC is risk-loving (RA<0) a change in PR will positively affect the 
expected utility and hence FDI ( 0][
1
>
∂
∂
s
VE ). In sum, attitudes towards risk play an important role for 
the sign. 
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Now, I turn to derive the Optimal FDI with outright expropriation. Assuming that 2Qσ is constant 
the expected utility function is maximized with respect to the factors of production (from equations 
2,3,10,13):  
max E[V(Q~)] = PaY - rK + e s1[P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L] - 2
AR { PaY - rK + + 
es1[P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L]}2 
(14) 
where Y=KαZβLγ; α+β+γ=1 
The maximization with respect to K, Z, and L yields the following still incomplete solutions: 
(1) FDI 
K = 
Dr
Y
/
α
            (15-1) 
(2) Foreign Labor 
L = 
Dwes
Y
/*1
γ
          (15-2) 
(3) Foreign Specific Factor 
Z = 
Dres
Y
/*1
β
          (15-3) 
Where the expected price D is defined as D ≡Pa+e s1P*(1-a). 
Solving (15-1) with (1) for the optimal K (FDI), given the optimal Z and L yields 
K = 　　　
/
1
1
α
γβα
−






Dr
LZ
          (16) 
Now I can suggest the sign conditions for the optimal K (FDI). 
            -  +  +  +  +  +   +    +/-  +/- 
K = K( r, e; Z, L, P, P*,α; 2eσ , s12)     (sign conditions)     (16') 
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Thus, exchange rate risk as well as PR can both affect positively and negatively FDI depending on 
the MNCs’ attitudes towards risk. Hence, this theoretical prediction supports the empirical findings in 
this chapter.  
b. Creeping expropriation 
In case of creeping expropriation only revenue is affected and not the whole profit of the foreign 
affiliate. In the same fashion as for outright expropriation I capture this form of political risk by a 
probability to retain revenue after expropriation (s2). Thus the expected revenue of foreign affiliate is 
defined as  
E[R*]=(1-s2)[P*(1-a)Y]+s2[P*(1-a)Y] =s2P*(1-a)Y      (17)  
Where, 
s2 is probability of retained revenue after creeping expropriation;   
(1-s2) is probability of creeping expropriation (a decrease in s2 is associated with an increase in 
PR) 
Note that this probability is applicable only to Foreign revenue by definition but not to the costs.  
The joint profit (Q~) is random through the random exchange rate ( e~ ) and it is defined as follows: 
Q~ ≡ R + e~ R* = (PaY - rK) + e~ [s2P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L ]     (18) 
From equation (18) the expected joint profit is defined as 
E[Q~] = Q = R+E{ e~ [s2P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L]}= R + eR* = R + e[s2P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L]   (19) 
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The utility function of an MNC is 
U = U(Q~) =U(R + e~ R*)          (20) 
Expanding this utility function around the neighborhood of zero (Maclaurin's expansion) and 
approximating it by the second order as before yields 
U(Q~) = U'(Q~)Q~ + 
2
1 U''(Q~)Q~2         (21) 
Since the marginal utility is assumed to be positive, division yields the normalized utility: 
V(Q~) ≡ )~('
)~(
QU
QU
 = Q~ + )~('2
)~("
QU
QU Q~2  = Q~ - 
2
AR Q~2     (22) 
Where RA is Arrow-Pratt's absolute risk aversion measure (RA= - U"/U' > 0 and is assumed 
constant). 
The Expected Utility is derived as follows: 
E[V(Q~)] = Q  - 
2
AR E[Q~2]          (23) 
Where the expected value of joint profit is 
Q = E[Q~]=R+E[ e~ ]R*= R + eR*        (24) 
And the variance is defined as  
Var(Q~)≡ 2Qσ ≡E[(Q
~
 - Q)2] = E[Q~2] - Q2 ＝ E[{R + e~ R* - (R + eR*)}2] =  
= (R*)2E[( ee −~ )2] = (R*)2 2eσ  
(25) 
where 2eσ ≡E[( ee −~ )2] is the variance of the exchange rate, or exchange rate risk. 
Therefore,  
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E[Q~2] = 2Qσ + Q2 = (R*)2 2eσ + Q2         (26) 
Substituting equation (26) into equation (23) yields 
E[V(Q~)] = Q  - 
2
AR Q2 - 
2
AR 2
Qσ                    (27)  
or 
E[V(Q~)] = Q - 
2
AR Q2 - 
2
)( 22* eA RR σ
= Q -
2
AR Q2 - 
2
])1([ 22***2 eA LwZrYaPsR σ−−−
     (27') 
In the same fashion as for outright expropriation I can formally hypothesize how exchange rate 
risk ( 2eσ ) and political risk (s2) will affect the expected utility from joint profits. In case an MNC is 
risk-averse (RA>0) an increase in exchange rate risk decreases utility (and hence FDI, 2
][
e
VE
σ∂
∂
= -
2
])1([ 2***2 LwZrYaPsRA −−− <0). However, if an MNC is risk-preferring (RA<0) an increase in 
exchange rate risk increases utility (and hence FDI, 2
][
e
VE
σ∂
∂
 > 0). 
In the same way in case an MNC is risk-averse (RA>0) a change in PR (meaning a change in 
probability of retained profit s2) will negatively affect the expected utility and hence FDI (
1
][
s
VE
∂
∂
= -
2****
2 )1(])1([ eA YaPLwZrYaPsR σ−−−− < 0). If, however, an MNC is risk-loving (RA<0) a 
change in PR will positively affect the expected utility and hence FDI ( 0][
1
>
∂
∂
s
VE ). In sum, attitudes 
towards risk play an important role for the sign. 
Now, I turn to derive the Optimal FDI with creeping expropriation. Assuming that 2Qσ is constant 
the expected utility function is maximized with respect to the factors of production (from equations 24, 
27):  
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max E[V(Q~)] = PaY - rK + e [s2P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L] –  
-
2
AR { PaY - rK + e [s2P*(1-a)Y - r*Z - w*L]}2 
(28) 
where Y=KαZβLγ ; α+β+γ=1 
Following the same optimization procedure as for outright expropriation I obtain 
 K = 
'/ Dr
Yα
, L= 
'/* Dew
Yγ
, Z = 
'/* Der
Yβ
       (29) 
D' represents the weighted effective price (in terms of home currency), defined by 
D'=Pa+es2P*(1-a). 
The optimal solution of K is exactly the same as (16) except s2. Solving K with (1) for the optimal 
K (FDI), given the optimal Z and L yields 
K = 　　　
'/
1
1
α
γβα
−






Dr
LZ
         (30) 
Again I can suggest the sign conditions for the optimal K (FDI). 
              - +  +  +    +  +   +   +/-  +/- 
  K = K(r, e, P, P*; Z, L, α; 2eσ , s22)  (sign conditions)     (30') 
Thus, exchange rate risk as well as PR can both affect positively and negatively FDI depending on 
the MNCs’ attitudes towards risk. Hence, this theoretical prediction supports the empirical findings in 
this chapter.  
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IV. Final remarks 
The theoretical model derived in this appendix suggests that equations (16) and (30) for the 
optimal K (FDI) are qualitatively the same. Thus, it is not necessary to distinguish "outright" and 
"creeping" expropriations. 
Exchange rate risk can affect both positively and negatively FDI and it depends on the MNC’s 
attitude to the risk. In my empirical estimation exchange rate risk may be proxied by RER level. 
Hence, this theoretical model suggests an additional interpretation to the differently signed coefficients 
in case of developed and developing countries as well as in case of Euro-zone, European non-euro-
zone and Asian countries. 
Interestingly, one of the main focuses of my study PE also is shown to have different signs 
depending on the MNCs’ attitudes toward risk. As the expected joint profit is defined to depend on 
"s", the optimal FDI (=K) is shown to depend not only on "s" (probability of retained profit/revenue), 
but also "s2" (see, equations (16), (16'), (30) and (30')). Thus, in case Japanese MNCs are risk-averse 
an increase in probability of retained profit (decrease of “political risk”) is associated with higher FDI. 
However, in case Japanese MNCs are risk-preferring a decrease of PE (increase of probability of 
retained profits) is associated with lower FDI.  
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In line with the above this theoretical modeling supports the hypotheses of nonlinear relationship 
between PE and FDI. I further explore, in Chapters VI and VII, this nonlinear relationship in a 
different econometric framework. 
 
Appendix 4. Additional estimation with a modification on FDI dependent variable 
In this appendix I present additional estimation of the empirical model with a modification on 
FDI. The scope of the analysis is to provide additional evidence of the results presented in the main 
body of the Chapter V. 
I follow the same empirical strategy as in Chapters IV-VII. The dependent variable in the study is 
FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in Japanese Yen (FDI). In fact, around 3.11% of the data have 
negative values. These negative FDI flows represent the capital withdrawals by the parent company 
from the foreign affiliate. For instance, it may appear under the form of shares’ sale to the local or 
other multinational company. Thus the dependent variable cannot be transformed logarithmically 
which leads to its higher variation. Hence the statistical inference may be affected by this dependent 
variable nature. 
In this appendix I perform the analysis with two transformations of the dependent variable with 
the objective of reducing its variance. First, I replace the negative values by a conventionally small 
number 0.001 which is negligibly small but can be transformed logarithmically. By this procedure I 
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aim at keeping a higher number of observations. At the same time it allows for considering additional 
information of negative FDI flows. Then I transform logarithmically the obtained positive values of 
Japanese outward FDI in order to scale down its variation. Second, I transform logarithmically a stock 
of FDI which is calculated as a sum of FDI flow from 1995 to year t. The objective of these 
transformations is to scale down the FDI flow value and use negative values information as well. 
 The statistical characteristics of these two transformed dependent variables for developed and 
developing countries are shown in table A4-1 below. 
Table A4-1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable in the study 
 Developed   Developing  
 
Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
 Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
Mean 3.52 6.86  6.53 8.59 
Median 4.65 6.80  6.67 8.72 
Maximum 10.07 11.39  9.37 10.84 
Minimum -7.03 0.49  -7.06 5.35 
Std. Dev. 4.56 2.05  1.72 1.07 
Skewness -1.38 -0.02  -3.71 -0.54 
Kurtosis 3.93 3.26  28.42 2.94 
 
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
                   yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the transformed outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it 
denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
dimension. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. yit-1 is a 
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lagged dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6RERit + β7PEit + εit.       (1) 
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. PEit 
represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t. The political index is calculated from the 
Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index, and has been recalculated to be scored from 0 to 10 with a 
higher score indicating a higher “political risk”.  RER index is calculated in a way that its increase 
(positive sign) is associated with Yen depreciation (host country currency appreciation) and its 
decrease is associated with Yen appreciation (host country currency depreciation). 
The data set consists of annual observations for the period 1995-2009 for the 2 sets of countries: 
20 developed and 10 developing countries19. I follow the same methodology as in the main body and 
estimate the model by Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator with orthogonal deviations set-up. 
The results are presented in table A4-2. 
In general the results are consistent with the main body of the dissertation. Note that the main 
variables of interest are significant and signed consistently with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 
                                                           
19
 I use OECD membership as a criterion for highly-developed economies. Developed and developing countries 
in the study are listed in the Appendix 1.  
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V. Political Environment is positive and significant in case of developed countries (GMM(a), 
GMM(b)) and it is negative and significant in case of developing countries (GMM(c), GMM(d)).  
Table A4-2. The determinants of Japanese outward FDI 
  Developed   Developing   
 Dependent: 
Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
  GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) 
FDI(-1) 0.05 (1.77)* 
0.56 
(17.09)*** 
0.23 
(5.83)*** 
0.68 
(44.07)*** 
GDP 4.56 (2.53)** 
0.99 
(4.62)*** 
0.89 
(3.44)*** 
0.29 
(8.66)*** 
Wages -5.63 (-3.26)*** 
-0.41 
(-3.67)*** 
-0.22 
(-1.27) 
0.02 
(1.35) 
Openness 0.02 (1.52) 
0.008 
(7.13)*** 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(3.81)*** 
Skill Difference -0.32 (-0.99) 
0.01 
(0.51) 
0.38 
(4.54)*** 
0.05 
(5.95)*** 
Investment Cost -0.05 (-2.35)** 
-0.01 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.1 
(-10.22)*** 
-0.01 
(-11.66)*** 
PE 3.02 (3.13)*** 
0.1 
(2.03)** 
-0.1 
(-2.07)** 
-0.01 
(-2.65)*** 
RER 0.02 (1.76)* 
-0.01 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.03 
(-6.39)*** 
-0.01 
(-11.94)*** 
SE of regression 4.28 0.45 1.27 0.15 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.35 0.89 0.63 0.62 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
Real Exchange Rate is positively and significantly associated with Japanese outward FDI flows in 
case of developed countries (GMM(a)). Thus the dominating sunk cost’s hypothesis is confirmed in 
this case. Nevertheless the effect on Japanese outward FDI stock is negative and significant 
(GMM(b)). The same negative effect is observed in case of developing countries (GMM(c), 
GMM(d)). Thus, the hollowing-out hypothesis is confirmed for this setting as well.   
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In sum, I could conclude that the main findings discussed in Chapter V are successfully 
vindicated by these additional estimations with the transformed FDI dependent variable. In particular, 
PE was confirmed to have a non-linear effect on Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing 
countries. In case of RER both sunk-cost and hollowing-out hypotheses where confirmed by the 
analysis. However, the dominating effect depends on the data structure and estimation. By and large, 
the main conclusions of the Chapter V are confirmed successfully. 
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CHAPTER VI RECONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL FACTORS 
ON JAPANESE OUTWARD FDI1 
A. Introduction 
The central objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of political factors on the recent 
Japanese outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI, hereafter) with a panel data of 30 developed and 
developing countries for the period of 1995-2009. 
In the previous two chapters we have seen that the effect of Political environment (PE) on 
Japanese outward FDI is not consistent among a number of econometric methods under different 
countries’ classifications. Logically, I suspected that PE measure itself might emphasize various 
political factors and should not be limited to “political risk” interpretation. 
In fact, a work by Peng and Beamish (2008) is probably one of the first to interpret an effect on 
FDI of a Political factor measure, namely National Corporate Responsibility differently depending on 
the countries’ level of economic development. In this dissertation I use an alternative composite index 
of political environment measure which is based on Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) scores. To my 
                                                           
1
 This chapter is based on a forthcoming paper namely Deseatnicov, Ivan and Hiroya, Akiba. 2012. 
“Reconsideration of the effects of Political Factors: evidence from Japanese outward FDI”, Review of Economic 
& Finance, forthcoming.  
Earlier versions of that paper were presented at various Conferences and Workshops, including ICE-TEA 
(Grine-TRNC), IAEC (Athens), ICOAE (Perugia), JEPA (Kwansei Gakuin University), EUIJ (Pusan), GLOPE 
II (Waseda University), Graduate Workshop (Waseda University), WEAI (San-Francisco), HSS (Paris). I would 
like to express my sincere thanks to Professors Sara Calvo, Antonin Rusek, Shujiro Urata, Fukunari Kimura, 
Kenichiro Tamaki, Koji Takase, Hisatoshi Tanaka, Hideki Konishi, Ueda Atsuko, John Devereux, Nathan Cook, 
Lein Lein Chen and Aleksander Petkovic, and other participants for their critical but constructing comments and 
suggestions that improved the paper considerably. Usual disclaimer applies. 
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knowledge despite its all-emphasizing character this measure has rarely been used for FDI analysis.2 
In fact, the PE index used in my study embraces six components: Corruption, Government non-
payments/non-repatriation, government stability, information access/transparency, institutional risk 
and regulatory and policy environment (see table 6.1).3 These multiple dimensions actually might be 
assessed differently by Japanese Multinational Companies (MNCs). On the one hand, Japanese MNCs 
might be concerned, for example, with the level of corruption as an impediment to investment. On the 
other hand, they might treat, for instance, lower information access/transparency as an opportunity to 
obtain higher profits due to asymmetric information argument. Thus, PE effect on Japanese outward 
FDI should be reconsidered within the different levels of countries’ economic development. 
Table 6.1. Variables and indicators incorporated into the Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index 
Political 
risk 
Component Score (qualitative expert opinions) 
1 Corruption 10=no corruption, 0=serious corruption 
2 Government non-payments/non-
repatriation 
10=no government interference, 0=high government 
interference 
3 Government stability 10=stable, 0=highly unstable 
4 Information access/transparency 10=unrestricted, 0=totally restricted 
5 Institutional risk 10=efficient and independent institutions, 0=no state 
institution 
6 Regulatory and policy 
environment 
10=highly consistent, 0=no regulatory environment 
exists 
Note that due to ECR reporting system specifics it is not possible to obtain and analyze a more 
detailed information on the sub-factors of PE index. Thus, in this chapter I focus on the effect of the 
                                                           
2
 Clare and Gang (2009) is probably the only exception. They used Euromoney Country Risk rating to measure 
the nations’ political stability, and estimated its effects on US outward FDI to 53 countries. 
3
 For measurement details and PE data analysis see Chapter III 
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composite PE index. Nevertheless, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provides some 
information on the political environment as well.  For instance three of the PE sub-factors namely 
Government stability, Corruption and Regulatory and Policy environment could be associated 
respectively with ICRG Government Stability, ICRG Corruption and ICRG Law and Order indexes. 
For informational purposes I provide additional time-series on these ICRG indexes as well. (see figure 
6.1.) Thus, as mentioned above this multidimensionality of the PE index might have different effects 
on Japanese outward FDI.  
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Figure 6.1. ICRG Government Stability ([0,12] scale), Corruption ([0,6] scale),  and Law and Order 
([0,6] scale) change over a sample period 1995-2010 for the whole sample, developed economies and 
developing economies. The values on the vertical axis represent a mean for the respective year of the 
respective countries sample (56 countries, 32 developed countries, 24 developing countries – for 
details see Chapter III Appendix 1). 
Source: Author’s calculations from International Country Risk Guide.  
Inter alia, it is also worth mentioning that previously FDI flows were more concentrated in 
developed countries and the knowledge-capital model (Carr et al., 2001) explained to a certain extent 
this behavior. Moreover, Lucas (1990) in his highly influential paper suggested that despite standard 
theoretical prediction (under neoclassical assumptions capital is expected to flow from richer to poorer 
nations since marginal product of capital is higher in poorer economies due to law of diminishing 
returns) capital actually flew from developed economies to developed ones – the well-known “Lucas 
paradox”.4 However, recent FDI flows to developing countries represent a higher share in the global 
                                                           
4
 These actual capital flows from “rich” to “rich” countries were called a “paradox” since the standard 
neoclassical theory under its main assumption predicted that capital should flow from rich to poor countries. 
Thus, Lucas (1990) and after him many other theoretical works suggested that in order to explain actual capital 
flows from developed to developed economies some of the standard neoclassical assumptions should be slightly 
modified (King and Rebelo, 1993; Razin and Yuen, 1994; Gertler and Rogoff, 1990; Gordon and Bovenberg, 
1996). For a more detailed discussion see Chapter II. 
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FDI flows, which is in contrast to Lucas’s theoretical work. As mentioned in Chapter II, according to 
UNCTAD (2012) in 2011 FDI inflows to developing and transition economies surpassed FDI inflows 
to developed economies with a share of 51% of Global FDI. Why did this fundamental shift happen? 
Developed and developing countries have different characteristics not only in the aspect of 
economic development. Different levels of institutional quality, democracy, political and social rights, 
and property protection are only a few examples of other distinguishing factors. Thus, MNCs decision 
to invest and the expected profits might depend not only on the economic factors but also on a general 
level of institutional and political environment that is hard to assess. In this sense, my conjecture is 
that reconsideration of institutional risk and Political Factors effects on FDI might shed light on the 
economic behavior of Japanese MNCs. 
On balance, in this chapter I reconsider the established analytical framework by focusing 
specifically on PE effect on Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing countries. In fact, as it 
can be seen from the previous chapters, I expect that PE effects on Japanese MNCs activities differ for 
developed and developing countries. Thus, first I introduce a simple theoretical model aimed at 
reconsidering the non-linear relationship between PE and FDI depending on the countries’ level of 
economic development which was suspected in the previous chapters. In fact, as suggested by the 
model, if Japanese MNCs associate PE with Institutional Quality (IQ), then they may assess 
differently the composite elements of the PE index for developed and developing countries (see table 
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6.1). And, thus, the relationship between PE and FDI may be non-linear. Second, I re-estimate the 
econometric model by focusing specifically on two cross-sections: developed and developing 
countries. By employing Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model I account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity problems. Nevertheless I also 
address some multicollinearity that might remain among control variables. A formal econometric 
examination is necessary in order to ensure results robustness. 
Thus, this chapter has been motivated by at least four reasons: First of all, although a recent trend 
of FDI research has stressed an importance of political factors that might affect FDI flows (e.g. Busse 
and Hefeker, 2007), as far as I know, the empirical results of the effect of political factors on FDI has 
been mixed when a composite index of political environment is used (Peng and Beamish, 2008). 
Secondly, although Japanese FDI has been considered as a sample country among many others in 
cross-section or panel data analyses, there is seldom any empirical analysis isolating and focusing only 
on Japanese FDI activities in developed and developing countries.5 Thirdly, although a number of 
papers consider FDI flows to developed and developing countries, there has rarely been conducted a 
formal econometric examination of Political factor as a determinant of outward FDI from the supply 
side of these capital flows to developed and developing countries.6  And fourthly, I use another 
                                                           
5
 To my knowledge few rare examples are Urata and Kawai (2000) and Makino et al. (2004). 
6
 To my knowledge Peng and Beamish (2008) is the only paper that addressed PE related concepts as a Japanese 
FDI determinant in developed and developing countries.  
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composite index reflecting multiple dimensions of host country's political environment for empirical 
investigation, the Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) data. To my knowledge, this composite index has 
rarely been used previously in the analysis of FDI.7 Thus, I am interested in how differently Japanese 
MNCs behave as a function of this index. Since I in fact found some differences in sensitivity to the 
index between developed and developing countries, I propose my tentative but new theoretical 
hypothesis for the difference, and discuss several alternative reasons as well. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B presents my simple theoretical 
framework of PE and FDI relationship. In section C I specify an empirical model and work out the 
econometric strategy. Section D describes the estimation results. Section E provides the summaries 
and conclusions. 
B. Theoretical framework 
The empirical estimations in Chapters IV and V suggested a non-linear relationship between PE 
and FDI in developed and developing countries. The model that is elaborated in this section B aims at 
establishing a theoretical background for empirical investigation in sections C and D.  
The theory is based on the following assumptions: 
(A-6-1) Assume a Japanese MNC that is planning to undertake FDI in a foreign country, and it is 
assumed that there exists a following function F:  
                                                           
7
 To my knowledge Clare and Gang (2010) is the only study that used ECR data to measure political stability as 
one of the determinants of US outward FDI to 53 countries. 
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F(PE,OLI,FDI)=0,          (1) 
Where F is assumed to be positive, continuous, and continuously differentiable real-valued 
function defined on the non-negative domain of PE, OLI (ownership, location and internalization) 
index, and FDI. 
PE represents the political environment in the host country that is assessed by Japanese MNCs as 
an additional factor that influences their decision to invest. Since in my study PE is a composite index 
it could be associated with Institutional Quality (IQ) depending on Japanese MNCs assessment of the 
factors composing PE (corruption, government non-payments/non-repatriation, government stability, 
information access/transparency, institutional risk and, regulatory and policy environment). Further, 
this assessment may depend on the level of countries’ economic development (developed and 
developing countries). Thus, lower PE may be associated with higher advantages and profitability in 
case of developed countries if MNCs view too good institution (IQ) as an impediment in their activity. 
On the other hand in case of developing countries lower PE may be associated with lower advantages 
and profitability if MNCs are not satisfied with the level of IQ in the foreign countries. 
OLI index represents a set of advantages in the sense of Dunning’s OLI’s framework. These 
advantages allow an MNC maximizing its profits when operating in the foreign market and, thus show 
their willingness to invest abroad. 
FDI is the value of investment undertaken by an MNC in the host country. 
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(A-6-2) Assume that F is solved for OLI (advantages/profitability index) such that 
OLI=f(PE,FDI). 
(A-6-3) Also, assume f as a positive, continuous, and continuously differentiable real-valued 
function.  
3. Total differentiation of f for a given level of OLI is as follows 
0=





∂
∂
+





∂
∂ dFDI
FDI
fdPE
PE
f
       (2) 
Equation (2) shows the "transformation curve" such that: 
FDI
PE
f
f
FDIf
PEf
dPE
dFDI
−=
∂∂
∂∂
−=
        (3)
 
Since f is a transformation curve, the numerator (denominator) has an economic interpretation of 
the marginal cost of PE (FDI) in terms of OLI. 
4. The inverse function rule implies: 
FDIfOLI
FDI 1
=
∂
∂
 and 
PEfOLI
PE 1
=
∂
∂
                                  (4) 
Where FDIf  and PEf  are partial derivatives of f with respect to FDI and PE.  
5. (3) and (4) yield: 
OLIPE
OLIFDI
f
f
dPE
dFDI
FDI
PE
∂∂
∂∂
−=−=
                   (5) 
6. Higher OLI advantages are associated with higher profitability for an MNC and hence higher 
FDI is undertaken. In line with this: 
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0>∂∂ OLIFDI .          (6-1) 
As presented in the description of PE MNCs may assess differently institutional quality change in 
the host countries depending on their level of economic development. In line with this: 
(6-2-a) OLIPE ∂∂ < 0 if an increase in PE from too good institutions meaning a decrease in IQ 
corresponds to a higher OLI (willingness to invest) for developed countries, but 
(6-2-b) OLIPE ∂∂ > 0 if an increase in PE (becoming poorer institution) meaning lower IQ 
corresponds to a lower OLI (willingness to invest) for developing countries. 
7. Conclusions: 
From (5), (6-1), (6-2-a) and (6-2-b) I can summarize the relationship between FDI and PE as 
follows: 









<
>
ninstitutiopoorwithcountriesdeveloping
ninstitutiobettermuchtoowithcountriesdevelopedfor
dPE
dFDI
 
    
0
 
This conclusion indicates that the relationship between FDI and PE may be depicted as an 
"inverted" U-shaped figure between PE and FDI.  
In addition, this conclusion implies the following theoretical results: 
Result 1: Higher PE is associated with higher FDI in case of developed countries whose level of 
PE has been well below the average PE values. 
Result 2: Higher PE is associated with lower FDI in case of developing countries whose level of 
PE has been well above the average PE values. 
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The next sections are devoted to testing these theoretical findings by means of various 
econometric estimations. 
C. The empirical model and estimation strategy 
This section presents my basic specification for the empirical strategy. The dependent variable in 
the study is FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in US Dollars (FDI), and the independent variables 
are chosen as explained in Chapter III. Two of them (GDP and Wage cost) are expressed in 
logarithmic form, and the other remains as they are, as they represent the computed indexes.8  
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
 yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the net annual outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it denote 
an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time dimension. δ 
is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. yit-1 is a lagged 
dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
                                                           
8
 FDI flows are not logarithmically transformed since they are positive and negative for some countries in 
different years. In addition, FDI measure is not normalized since I am interested in the actual effect of PE on FDI 
flows. I expect that a problem of heteroscedasticity which might appear due to a high standard deviation of FDI 
measure will be reduced by the use of GMM estimation. In fact, this is one of the reasons why the GMM 
Arellano-Bond estimator is preferred to other alternative econometric methods of panel data analysis. 
Nevertheless, in appendix 6 I provide additional estimation with a transformed FDI measure to scale down its 
variance. The results are consistent with the main body of the chapter. 
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(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICREALit + β6PEit + β7TIit + β8NCit + εit.       
(8) 
Data for FDI activity are collected from the OECD database which provides data for Japanese 
FDI for a large number of countries for the period 1995 to 2009.9 The explanatory variables are 
selected from those used in previous empirical studies to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the 
OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. 
PEit represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t that has recently been emphasized as 
one of the most researchable issues in international economics, as reviewed and discussed in Chapter 
III. In this chapter I rescale the index from zero to 10, then the index is subtracted from the maximum 
value of 10 to indicate that a higher number is supposed to indicate higher "country risk". According 
to the conventional wisdom, the Political risk is expected to have negative sign as higher political risk 
might have adverse effects on FDI flows.10 However, the theoretical framework presented in Section B 
suggests that the relationship, in fact, may be non-linear depending on the Japanese MNCs attitude 
towards composite elements of the PE index. 
The data set consists of annual observations for the period 1995-2009 for the 2 sets of countries: 
19 developed and 11 developing countries11 12 . The data source for Japanese FDI is the OECD 
                                                           
9
 I use the statistics reported in US dollars in the analysis. As discussed in Chapter III this statistics was compiled 
by the OECD statistical division from Bank of Japan and Japanese Ministry of Finance statistical sources.  
10
 A detailed discussion of PE measure and data specifics is presented in Chapter III. 
11
 A list of countries is presented in Appendix 1. In this chapter I use a UN classification of developed and 
developing countries UNCTAD (2012).  
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database, and for other variables different sources such as the WDI (the World Bank), the WCY 
(International Institute for Management Development), Penn-World Tables, and Euromoney.  
I employ a panel data analysis in order to capture static and dynamic nature of the FDI flows, 
accounting for at the same time possible heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity. By 
including lagged FDI flows as an additional regressor I change a static model to a dynamic panel 
model. Thus my panel data set consists of two sets and two dimensions: one dimension is cross-
section (19 developed countries and 11 developing countries: i = 1,….,N), and the other is time 
dimension (15 years: 1995-2009: t=1,…,T).  The total number of observations in this context is 285 
for developed countries and 165 for developing ones, and it can be considered adequate to produce 
robust estimations for the scope of our analysis.13  
Generally the problems of autocorrelation, endogeneity and heteroscedasticity are characteristics 
of economic data sets. First, some explanatory variables can be endogenous, and therefore OLS 
estimators might be biased and inconsistent. Second, unobserved panel-level effects (fixed effects) 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Finally, the inclusion of lagged dependent variable 
can lead to autocorrelation. In order to deal with all these problems a commonly used method for 
dynamic panels is the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As their estimator is 
set up, the fixed effects are eliminated using first differences, and an instrumental variable estimation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12
 The countries selection among others is limited by data availability. 
13
 The descriptive statistics of the data and the correlation matrix are presented in Appendix 3 and 4. 
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of the differenced equation is performed.14 However, a potential problem with this first-difference 
estimator is that the lagged levels of regressors can be weak instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995). 15 Therefore, I follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and estimate equation (8) 
by employing a “forward orthogonal deviations” set-up. In contrast to “first difference” it subtracts the 
average of all future available observations of a variable. In addition to other benefits this 
transformation preserves the orthogonality among the transformed errors.16 Independent variables in 
their transformed form are included in the standard instrument matrix, and lagged FDI is included in a 
GMM type instrument matrix as proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988). Finally, I 
perform the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions for the selected instruments. All the 
regressions were shown to be robust according to these criteria. 
In addition, a method of coefficient variance decomposition by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (2004), 
is a useful tool for detecting potential collinearity problems amongst the regressors. This is in fact the 
case, particularly for developed countries, as will be discussed later. In case of developing countries I 
perform a robustness check of the results simply by excluding the correlated regressors. 
                                                           
14
 Since most of the variables are non-stationary in level, the first-differences are used as the instrument variables 
for my GMM estimation (Appendix 2). 
15
 Indeed, a first difference method produced the estimators that were statistically insignificant. Hence, since I 
could not draw a robust conclusion about the independent variables’ effect on FDI the results are not reported 
here. 
16
 If the original εit are not autocorrelated and have constant variance, then so are the transformed errors 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
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D. Results and analysis 
Since dealing with macroeconomic data, I started with a panel unit root test (Nelson and Plosser, 
1982) according to Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. (2003), Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). The 
results are presented in Appendix 2. All variables are shown not to have a unit root at the 5% 
significance level. Hence I can consider them to be stationary, and I can proceed with Panel Data 
analysis methods. 
I estimate equation (8) by using the GMM method in order to analyze the Japanese FDI with my 
data sample under different econometric specifications. The results are presented in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. The determinants of Japanese FDI 
Countries: Developed Developed Developing Developing Developing Pooled 
Variables GMM (a) GMM(b) GMM (c) GMM (d) GMM(e) GMM(f) 
FDI(-1) 
0.19 
(7.07)*** 
0.17 
(7.54)*** 
0.59 
(24)*** 
0.59 
(27.7)*** 
0.72 
(27.3)*** 
0.0008 
(0.10) 
GDP 
1122.83 
(9.35)*** 
1071.96 
(8.9)*** 
932.37 
(11.35)*** 
960.09 
(22.35)*** 
 
 
672.31 
(3.78)*** 
Wages 
-921.35 
(-8.16)*** 
-1223.67 
(-7.2)*** 
8.98 
(0.13)  
109.06 
(3.25)*** 
-369.99 
(-3.66)*** 
Investment Cost 
-27.08 
(-7.57)*** 
-11.55 
(-2.59)** 
-11.65 
(-2.62)** 
-15.59 
(-4.07)*** 
-9.24 
(-2.46)*** 
-29.817 
(-3.96)*** 
Skill Difference 
-94.27 
(-4.98)*** 
-126.43 
(-7.17)*** 
245.34 
(9.98)*** 
153.54 
(8.68)*** 
179.16 
(17.59)*** 
77.25 
(3.02)*** 
Openness 
13.18 
(5.05)*** 
14.66 
(5.32)*** 
5.24 
(4.32)*** 
4.29 
(6.62)*** 
8.50 
(10.80)*** 
11.56 
(5.59)*** 
Technological Index 
-69.89 
(-8.56)*** 
-40.56 
(-2.93)*** 
-27.06 
(-2.11)** 
-24.58 
(-5.74)*** 
32.10 
(9.46)*** 
-63.07 
(-3.81)*** 
National Culture 
-103.4 
(-2.39)** 
-100.83 
(-2.48)** 
-69.72 
(-1.67)* 
11.24 
(0.45) 
-134.37 
(-3.97)*** 
-189.10 
(-2.36)** 
Politcal Environment 
 
229.8 
(3.19)*** 
 -36.26 
(-2.28)** 
-11.49 
(-3.57)*** 
-56.96 
(-2.43)** 
900.35 
(6.34)*** 
(residual)  251.25 (3.36)***     
 (squared)      -84.93 (-5.77)*** 
SE of regression 1405.75 1408.24 678.71 648.48 711.02 828.41 
Hansen J-test (p-value)a 0.17 0.27 0.39 0.26 0.40 0.32 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
I applied the Arrelano-Bond GMM technique using orthogonal deviations with a one-period 
lagged dependent variable. The results present robust estimators and the Hansen J-test of over-
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identifying restrictions confirmed the appropriateness of the selected instruments. The results are 
presented in the rightmost six columns of table 6.2. Several interesting features are disclosed, and in 
what follows, I give some interpretations and evaluations for them. 
1. Control variables 
GDP has a significant role in investor’s decision as expected. The market size (proxied by GDP) 
that gives prospects for high level of sales opportunity, high level of expected growth and hence high 
level of profitability, is considered by Japanese MNCs to be important. Indeed, the positive coefficient 
estimate which is statistically significant supports this presumption.  
The role of Human capital is also supported by the estimation and reveals some differences 
between Developed and Developing countries. First, Wages (LOG_Wit) are negative and significant 
for developed countries, which is consistent with the prior expectations and theoretical predictions. 
This confirms that Japanese MNCs are concerned about level of labor cost when undertaking FDI. 
However, in case of developing countries the estimator is not statistically significant. This result might 
be caused by a multicollinearity effect which is discussed later in sub-section 2. 
On the other hand the coefficient of Skill Difference (SDit) is significant, and the sign is negative 
for developed countries, while it is positive for developing countries. This result implies that, in case 
of developed countries, an increase in skilled labor abundance level in the host country relative to 
Japan (meaning β2 < 0) will lead to higher FDI. This suggests that Japanese MNCs invest in developed 
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countries when they perceive that the availability of skilled labor increases. From theoretical point of 
view it is consistent with the knowledge-capital model (Carr et al., 2001), and implies that horizontal 
FDI are attracted to skilled labor-abundant host countries. In case of developing countries a decrease 
in skilled labor abundance relative to Japan (meaning β2 > 0) will lead to higher FDI. According to the 
theory this would correspond to vertical FDIs that are motivated by different factor endowments, 
meaning existence of skilled-labor intensive activities in headquarters and/or unskilled-labor intensive 
activities in the foreign country with relatively low wages. 
Openness (OPENNESSit) is positively associated with FDI flows and its influence is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result shows that Japanese MNCs would prefer to increase their 
investment if the openness is increased. Thus, I could interpret that this result supports the 
presumption that Japanese FDI activities take on average vertical type form. Indeed, as their 
experience shows, some Japanese investments in Taiwan or China are aimed at producing for the 
Japanese Market. However, horizontally oriented types of Japanese FDI still should not be neglected 
and this interpretation has to be reconfirmed by further econometric specifications.  
Investment cost (ICREALit) has a negative sign as expected and is statistically significant for 
developing countries, supporting the hypotheses that high level of local impediments in terms of 
financial, administrative and juridical restrictions will negatively influence Japanese FDI flows. 
Indeed, since 2000, a Free Trade Agreement activity in East Asia region which facilitated, to a certain 
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extent, trade between countries, might have stimulated Japanese vertical type FDI. In case of 
developed countries its statistical significance is not strong enough to draw a robust conclusion. 
Technological index (TIit) has a negative and significant effect on Japanese FDI for both 
developed and developing countries. This result is consistent with the hypothesis and with the result in 
Chapter IV that Japanese MNCs would prefer to invest in countries with lower technological 
developments, so that they can exploit their technological competitive advantage.  
In addition, the sign of national culture (NCit) also turns out to be negative and significant for 
both developed and developing countries. Thus I could interpret that, according to this GMM 
estimation, Japanese MNCs tend to invest in the countries with more closed national culture. This can 
be explained by the fact that Japanese society was historically more concerned with the internal 
cultural and social environment, and hence tends to cooperate more with the same type of national 
culture.  
In sum, traditional determinants are shown to be robust and their estimation results correspond to 
the prior presumptions. Thus, I can focus on PE which is the main concern of this chapter. 
2. Political Environment and Multicollinearity 
A seemingly puzzling result of the GMM estimation appears in case of Political environment 
(PEit), a composite index of "political risk". The coefficient is statistically significant both for 
developed and developing countries. In the case of developing countries it is negative and corresponds 
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to the prior anticipation that the Japanese MNCs are concerned about political stability and reduce 
their investment when perceiving a higher political risk. This result is in line with the theoretical result 
two derived in section B, and confirms the empirical estimates in preceding literature (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2007; Eicher et al., 2011; Singh and Jun, 1996; Wei, 2000). In the case of developed 
countries the coefficient is positive and statistically significant for Japanese FDI flows (see GMM(a)). 
Literally interpreted, this suggests that Japanese MNCs tend to invest in the more politically unstable 
countries, which contradicts the conventional wisdom a priori expectation. The next section is devoted 
to addressing this seemingly puzzling phenomenon, and to offer my new hypothesis regarding 
difficulties in interpretation for aggregate indices.17 18 Nevertheless, this finding is consistent with the 
theoretical result 1 derived in section B. Thus, the theoretical results are successfully confirmed with 
these empirical findings. 
In order to investigate the possible reasons why I have a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the political environment (PE, a composite index of "political risk") variable for the 
sample of developed countries, I first suspected a problem of multicollinearity among regressors. 
                                                           
17
 It is interesting to note that I am not the only one FDI research that encounters different and contradicting 
signs for developed and developing countries samples for PE. A similar sign pattern was reported in a recent 
empirical research by Peng and Beamish (2008) who discussed difficulties in interpreting the effect of another 
composite index, the National Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI) on the Japanese outward FDI. 
18
 It is also interesting to note that the fact that the effects of some composite indices may be ambiguous has been 
found in another area, the choice of the (optimal) exchange rate regime. Alesina and Wagner (2006) used the 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) index and the Composite Indicator Dataset of the World Bank 
in order to examine the ambiguous effects of institutional quality on the choice of the exchange rate regime. 
Likewise, Bearce and Hallerberg (2011) used another aggregate index named "Democracy" which was compiled 
by Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1990) and scored from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic), to 
investigate the choice of the exchange rate regime. 
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Second, in case of developing countries, I noticed that the coefficient of Wages is not statistically 
significant while that of PE is negative and significant.  
Note that if Government stability (item 3 in table 6.1) and Institutional risk (item 5 in table 6.1) of 
PE, meaning an unstable administration, are associated with economic performance and in this regard 
with unemployment (and the resultant undesirable phenomenon such as inflation), then PE may have a 
collinear relationship with inflation or wage increase following the Phillips curve argument.19 If this 
kind of reasoning is in fact true, then whenever I have a negative PE sign, I might have an 
insignificant coefficient for Wage, as in GMM(c)20. Thus, I also suspect that there may remain a 
collinear relationship between Wages and PE. 
Following “coefficient variance decomposition” proposed by Belsley et al. (2004) I analyze 
information on the eigenvector decomposition of the coefficient covariance matrix (Appendix 5). For 
both developed and developing countries cases I found high level of collinearity; in case of developing 
countries between four variables, namely FDI(-1), LOG_GDP, LOG_W, and OPENNESS. As I 
expected, indeed Wages are one of the collinear variables. On the other hand, in case of developed 
countries there are two out of nine collinear variables and they are LOG_GDP and PE. So, indeed, in 
                                                           
19
 Indeed, coefficient of correlation between wages and PE is equal to -0.86. 
20
 In fact, I noticed this kind of Wages and Political environment behavior in a larger number of GMM 
specifications under different assumptions that are not reported here. 
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GMM(a) the positive and significant coefficient of Political environment might be a result of 
multicollinearity between some independent variables. 
I start to correct multicollinearity with the sample of developed countries. In order to eliminate 
collinear relationships of PE, first I follow the conventional method of running an OLS regression of 
PE on all other regressors. The purpose of the regression is to extract the orthogonal component of PE 
that is represented by the residuals. These residuals are used as the “true” PE to perform another GMM 
regression.21 The result is presented in GMM(b). Since by the described procedure I eliminated all the 
collinearity from Political Environment index, GMM(b) is expected to provide robust and legitimate 
estimation. The signs and significance of the variables remains consistent with the previously 
estimated GMM(a) specification. Thus, the main concern of my study, Political Environment, remains 
to be associated positively and significantly with FDI flows. Before discussing the possible reasons 
why PE has a “positive” effect on FDI for developed countries, I briefly discuss how to eliminate 
multicollinearity from GMM regressions for developing countries case. 
Serious multicollinearity is also detected among regressors (FDI(-1), GDP, Wage, Openness) for 
developing countries. To deal with it, I follow another conventional method; I first eliminate Wage 
and second GDP from my GMM specification. The results are respectively reported as GMM(d) and 
GMM(e) in table 6.2. As it can be seen by comparison, all the variables (except for National Culture) 
                                                           
21
 VIF result for “true” PE is 5.64 and hence it can be considered that there is no remaining multicollinearity of 
this term. 
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keep their sign and significance level for GMM(d). The result of GMM(e) supports my strategy of 
coping with multicollinearity, as the sign of the coefficients is comparable with those of GMM(c) 
(except Technological Index and Wages).22  
I now turn to discuss and offer several reasons that seem to be plausible and convincing for the 
consistently positive coefficient of PE for my sample of developed countries. The reasons may not be 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive. In fact, these results are consistent with the theoretical result 1 
presented in Section B. Thus, my explanation follows the same logic and associates PE with 
Institutional Quality as it may be perceived by Japanese MNCs. 
I first propose my hypothesis as follows: Since the composite index PE is constructed with six 
different qualitative components (see table 6.1), they may have different effects on MNCs behaviours 
for developed and developing countries I may term these qualitative components as “institutional 
quality” (IQ, hereafter), reflecting multiple qualitative characteristics of host countries. Then, if MNCs 
are more concerned with IQ, there might be a case that an increase in IQ is associated with an increase 
in FDI positively. Specifically, if the level of "government stability" (item 3 in table 6.1) reflects such 
factors as juridical, bureaucratic and social development in the host country, a lower value of the PE 
                                                           
22
 The negative coefficient of TI (Technological Index) can be easily interpreted as the result of elimination of 
GDP. In fact, TI and GDP are negatively correlated, implying that a decrease in TI is associated in an increase in 
GDP that may encourage FDI. Similar but opposite interpretation is possible for a positive coefficient of Wages. 
GDP is nothing but a single (though important) determinant of FDI. In fact, according to the ”2010 FDI 
Database” compiled by RIETI (www.rieti.go.jp/database/FDI2010/), Japan made FDI to small countries like 
Dominica and Sierra Leone. Their GDPs are small, 0.38 and 1.91 bil.US$, respectively in 2010. 
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variable means a relatively higher level of IQ, resulting in a lower level of law's and social 
environment pressure. In other words, Japanese MNC's might expect lower pressure from the 
government and public sector, which could serve as an incentive for their FDI. From this point of 
view, starting from a point where PE has been sufficiently low (i.e., IQ has been high enough) as in 
developed countries, it is likely that Japanese MNC’s could tolerate a slightly lower IQ (i.e. a slightly 
higher PE) to undertake additional FDI if profitable. Several reasons could be put forth. First reason 
for it may be that an increase in PE (a decrease in IQ) means a slightly higher level of law’s and social 
environment pressure, which could be perceived as a good sign by Japanese MNC’s as it might imply 
“more discipline”. The second reason for it may be that if an increase in PE (a decrease in IQ) is 
associated with slightly deteriorated information access within the market (item 4 in table 6.1) then 
some wider and more profitable business opportunities could be opened for Japanese MNC’s due to 
asymmetric information argument. Interestingly, the first reason put forth as above is similar in spirit 
to Peng and Beamish (2008, p.691) who emphasize MNC's corporate responsibility. They used a word 
"political environment" to have an opposite meaning to my PE, and concluded that "(a) loosening of ... 
(political) environment will attract more FDI" (emphasis added) for developed countries, because "the 
levels of (political environment) may be far above what is necessary" for MNCs' operations.   
Needless to say, when PE is high, implying a low level of IQ, as in a case of developing countries, 
a higher level of PE (i.e. lower IQ) is always associated with a lower FDI. This implies that Japanese 
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MNCs may react differently to Political environment in developing host countries, compared with 
developed ones. Specifically, observing a composite Political environment variable, Japanese MNCs 
may be more sensitive to risk factors such as corruption and government non-payment/non-
repatriation, (items 1 and 2 in table 6.1) when deciding FDI to developing countries. 
I formalize my hypothesis of the effects of IQ on FDI with the following three steps.23 First, there 
is some level of IQ for which Japanese FDI is insensitive. In general, Japanese MNC’s may not be 
concerned with IQ if the host’s IQ is not significantly different from theirs.24 Second, FDI may not be 
undertaken to countries with a very poor record of IQ. Thus, for a marginally lower IQ, FDI is 
reduced. Third, for very stable (developed) countries, FDI is undertaken. Moreover, a marginally 
lower level of IQ (i.e., higher PE) is interpreted as a good sign for a more disciplined economy, and 
thus more FDI.  
Formally, let F be the appropriately-defined real-valued functional relationship between PE and 
FDI. I postulate that the function F(PE, FDI │Z)=0 be a real and multi-valued function on its domain, 
where Z stands for the other variables in equation (8). To reiterate my hypothesis, it is equivalent to 
assume that there is some non-linearity between PE and FDI (cf. Alesina and Wagner, 2006; Peng and 
                                                           
23
 For a similar formulation for exchange rate regimes with IQ, see Alesina and Wagner (2006). 
24
 According to my Japanese data (not shown), their mean and the standard deviation of PE are, respectively, 
0.67 and 0.31. Thus, the 95% confidence interval is [0.06, 1.28]. 
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Beamish, 2008). Figure 6.1, with my estimated elasticities (evaluated at the sample means), visualizes 
the hypothesis.25,26 
The above is an alternative, but slightly more formal, presentation of what I explained in Section 
B with empirical counterparts. 
Figure 6.2. Relationship between PE ([0,10] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollar). The figure depicts 
inverted U-shape non-linear relationship between PE and FDI for developed and developing countries. Figures 
on the axes are the sample means: PE=0.92 for developed countries and PE = 3.24 for developing countries, 
FDI=819.6 for developed countries and 1083.97 for developing countries. η represents elasticity of FDI with 
respect to PE: . η=0.26 for developed countries and η=-0.11 for developing countries.  
As illustrated in the figure, the elasticity of FDI with respect to PE evaluated at the mean values 
for developed countries is 0.26, which is more than twice as larger than that for developing countries 
in absolute term (i.e. 0.11). This implies that Japanese MNC’s are not insensitive to PE when investing 
in developed countries. It may be inferred from the figure that the function F attains the (unique or 
                                                           
25
 Figure 6.1 is inspired by the idea of Alesina and Wagner (2006). A similar figure can be found in Peng and 
Beamish (2008), but they have not mentioned the possibility of multi-valued function of F(PE,FDI│Z)=0, or 
non-linearity. 
26
 The null hypothesis of equality of the mean for PR, 0.92(s.d.=1.01) for developed countries and 
3.42(s.d.=1.74) for developing countries, is rejected by a normal test with the 1% level of significance.  
PE 
FDI 
0 
819.6
1083.97 
0.92 3.42 
η=0.26 
η= - 0.11 
Developed countries     Developing countries 
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non-unique) maximum at some PE level between the mean values of developed countries (0.92) and 
developing countries (3.42).  
In order to test this hypothesis I pooled the sample and estimated the following equation: 27 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICREALit + β6TIit + β7NCit + β8PEit + β9PE2it + εit.       (3) 
Thus, the panel data set is represented by 30 developed and developing countries for the period of 
1995-2009 years.28 It is estimated as well by Arellano-Bond GMM method. The results are robust and 
consistent with the previous estimations. If my hypothesis is correct then the expected sign of β9 is 
negative (β9<0). The results of the estimation are presented in the rightmost column 6 in table 6.2 
(GMM(f)). Indeed, the coefficient sign of β9 is negative implying an inverted U-shape nonlinear effect 
of PE on Japanese outward FDI. My simple point estimate from GMM(f) (∂FDI/∂PE = -169.86PE + 
900.35) implies that the inverted U-shaped curve has a vertex at (PE, FDI)=(5.30, 2386.17), and cuts 
the PE axis at 0 and 10.60. Thus, pooled sample estimation confirmed my hypothesis. 
Although I have put forth my hypothesis, and interpret the positive coefficient on the PE variable, 
alternative interpretations could be possible. I will finish this section by enumerating some of them. 
First of all, as noted in the section III, the PE variable is usually associated with, inter alia, the risk of 
corruption, non-payment, or other qualitative factors. Since my sample of developed countries has 
been relatively stable politically and financially, the relative change in political situation would not 
                                                           
27
 I would like to thank Professor John Devereux for suggesting this estimation to confirm my hypothesis 
empirically. 
28
 Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the pooled data are presented in Appendixes 3 and 4. 
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necessarily mean an increase of the corruption, or non-payment risk. Thus, the coefficient of PE could 
be either positive or negative. My theoretical framework and new hypothesis proposed earlier provide 
a plausible interpretation to compromise those seemingly contradictory observations, and emphasizes 
an important implication as “more discipline” and “more profitable opportunities” behind the positive 
parameter of PE for developed countries. Putting differently, a slight loosening of political 
environment will attract more FDI for developed countries, because the levels of political environment 
may be far above what is necessary for MNCs' operations (Peng and Beamish, 2008).   
The second possible reason for the positive sign of PE comes from a general characteristic of 
investments. Since some FDI activities continue for a long time, it may happen that some investments 
started from previous periods still continue even after the political situation changed. Thus, depending 
on sample period or countries, the coefficient of PE could be negative. 
The third reason is somewhat related to the first. It emphasizes a special nature of my sample 
developed countries which include the former Socialist countries that have been in transition to the 
system of market economy. So even if Political Environment is getting higher in European countries, 
this might be a good sign for Japanese multinationals, as it implies that the sample European countries 
will be more democratic or liberal after, for example, changes of government (administration). Thus, it 
could be possible that the coefficient is on average positive. 
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At this moment, I am not certain which of the above suggested reason(s) is more convincing for 
the positive coefficient of PE for developed countries. I am more inclined to interpret the positive 
coefficient with the hypothesis of non-linearity á la Alesina and Wagner (2006) and Peng and Beamish 
(2008). But in order to ensure theoretical consistency for the presented hypothesis, it should be tested 
by further empirical research, and thus, in Chapter VII I estimate it again. However, to my knowledge, 
this is a new and significant contribution to the previous literature on FDI and Political Environment. I 
also would like to emphasize that this result is highly important from the policy prescription 
perspective as the host countries’ government could consider political stability and the aspect of 
economic development stage together when prescribing FDI attracting policies. In case of developing 
countries an increase in Political stability will potentially lead to more FDI. On the other hand in case 
of developed countries the issue may be more controversial. Up to a certain threshold level of political 
stability an increase in IQ will lead to more FDI, but if institutional reforms go further beyond the 
level that is necessary for MNCs operations it might actually lead to less FDI. Thus, a certain balance 
might be necessary. 
E. Concluding remarks 
This chapter empirically examined the outward Japanese FDI with a panel data of a total of 30 
developed and developing countries for the period 1995-2009. Based on the OLI theoretical 
framework and knowledge-capital models, a number of traditional determinants (GDP, Human capital 
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indicators, Investment cost, Trade cost, etc.) are complemented with three non-traditional determinants 
for Japanese FDI, namely Political Environment, Technological Index, and National Culture. I 
estimate a linear dynamic panel-data model to capture lagged effect of FDI. To deal with 
autocorrelation, and additionally heteroscedasticity and endogeneity problems inherent to the data, 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is applied to this data set. However, due to the identified 
multicollinearity problem a formal econometric procedure is employed in order to attenuate, if not 
eliminate, multicollinearity and to ensure robust specification and results interpretation. In case of 
developing countries Wages, followed by GDP, are eliminated from the GMM specification as being a 
collinear term. In case of developed countries a procedure to ensure the orthogonality of Political 
Environment to all other independent variables is employed and “true” PE (i.e. residual) is used in 
GMM specification. 
The main results are mostly consistent with the preceding chapters and are robust for all 
specifications. One of my main concerns in this dissertation, Political environment (PE), was 
differently signed for developed and developing countries. In case of developing countries it has a 
negative sign which is consistent with most of the preceding literature. However, in case of developed 
countries even after a formal econometric procedure is applied, the sign is positive, implying that 
Japanese MNCs tend to increase FDI for a marginal increase in PE (i.e. a marginal decrease in 
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institutional quality), because political environment in developed countries may be far above what is 
necessary for MNCs' operations (Peng and Beamish, 2008).  
In fact, from the previous chapters’ findings I suspected a possible non-linear relationship 
between PE index and FDI. Thus, first I suggest a theoretical framework that attempts to predict PE 
effect on FDI depending on the different perception of PE by Japanese MNCs in developed and 
developing countries. 
Second, I elaborate my hypothesis of the existence of non-linearity between Political environment 
and FDI, following an interpretation by Alesina and Wagner (2006). I postulated that the political 
environment might be associated with institutional quality (as shown in table 6.1) and, if an economy 
has been in a sufficiently higher IQ environment, its marginal deterioration might be perceived by 
Japanese MNC’s as laws’ and social environment pressure increasing slightly, leading to a “more 
discipline” and “more profitable opportunities” operational environment. Moreover, a few possible 
interpretations could be suggested to explain this result. This line of research is highly important from 
the government policies perspective since countries’ development stage and Political environment 
could be considered simultaneously.     
Thus, I conclude that Japanese FDI can be reasonably explained by the proposed independent 
variables. The most probable and/or dominant form of Japanese FDI according to the results is vertical 
type when investing in developing countries and horizontal type when investing in developed 
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countries. And finally, as far as I know, this is the first formal attempt to empirically examine the 
effects of political environment on Japanese FDI to developed and developing countries using the 
Euromoney Country Risk index. I successfully found that political environment is, as expected, 
significantly associated with Japanese FDI flows. These finding have important implications for future 
policy consideration by host countries and academic research on Japanese outward FDI. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of countries included in analysis 
Developed countries: 
Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), Sweden 
(SE), Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ) 
Developing countries: 
Hong Kong (HK), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Korea (KR), Malaysia (MY), Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), 
Taiwan (TW), Thailand (TH), China (CN), Turkey (TR) 
 
Appendix 2. Panel Unit Root test results 
Developing countries 
Variable Name Levin, Lin & 
Chu t* 
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-stat 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
FDI* -3.43 -3.57 48.95 112.86 
GDP 2.54 3.80 2.71 2.28 
Wage costs -4.91 -1.85 33.17 25.41 
Investment cost** -6.14 -7.14 84.19 181.64 
Skill difference -9.66 -6.41 78.06 49.18 
Openness* 2.69 -1.40 30.88 64.65 
Technological Index** -2.64 -6.82 80.92 212.29 
National Culture* -4.54 -5.07 62.74 151.12 
Political Environment *  -5.11 -3.93 53.92 115.53 
*First difference; **Second difference 
 
Developed countries 
Variable Name Levin, Lin & 
Chu t* 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
FDI* -4.35 -7.36 128.17 343.13 
GDP* -3.68 -3.37 66.46 36.31 
Wage costs* -8.00 -4.22 80.41 85.08 
Investment cost* -3.45 -4.83 90.48 154.41 
Skill difference -4.62 -2.63 65.07 115.83 
Openness -5.31 -1.57 46.81 40.16 
Technological Index* -8.94 -8.90 147.53 284.74 
National Culture* -10.51 -8.96 147.70 284.31 
Political Environment  -2.44 -1.48 47.66 62.58 
*First difference; **Second difference 
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics of variables in the study 
Developed countries 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS TI NC PE 
Mean 819.62 5.78 2.77 30.43 0.59 95.67 18.58 7.00 0.92 
Median 104.46 5.60 3.04 28.66 0.48 78.93 19.14 6.90 0.54 
Maximum 19618.84 8.20 3.89 61.51 4.05 324.31 26.40 9.08 4.84 
Minimum -615.67 2.92 0.04 14.70 -1.48 37.96 8.57 4.32 0.00 
Std. Dev. 2170.03 1.21 0.86 9.15 0.99 54.27 3.65 0.91 1.01 
Skewness 4.63 0.02 -1.51 0.89 0.44 2.04 -0.39 -0.09 1.64 
Kurtosis 29.97 2.52 4.52 3.62 3.01 7.65 2.47 2.92 5.04 
Coef. of 
variation 
2.65 0.21 0.31 0.30 1.67 0.57 0.20 0.13 1.09 
Sum 227854.3 1605.59 768.68 8459.54 165.34 26597.22 5165.0 1945.55 256.76 
Sum Sq. Dev. 1.3E+09 408.80 202.95 23166.08 272.02 815686.2 3699.49 228.41 281.45 
Observations 278.00 278.00 278.00 278.00 278.00 278.00 278.00 278.00 278.00 
 
Developing countries 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W ICREAL SD OPENNESS TI NC PE 
Mean 1083.97 5.54 0.59 39.55 0.84 145.64 16.85 7.43 3.42 
Median 591.80 5.33 0.67 40.62 0.55 104.45 16.65 7.44 3.40 
Maximum 6938.12 8.52 3.17 57.81 4.60 443.08 25.39 8.93 10.00 
Minimum -28.02 4.20 -2.81 16.29 -1.77 28.23 7.80 5.66 0.34 
Std. Dev. 1393.23 0.94 1.22 11.13 1.31 120.15 4.12 0.74 1.74 
Skewness 2.58 0.99 -0.42 -0.50 0.72 1.05 0.13 -0.15 0.52 
Kurtosis 9.75 3.67 2.47 2.28 2.94 2.84 2.16 2.38 3.49 
Coef of 
variation 
1.29 0.17 2.08 0.28 1.56 0.82 0.24 0.10 0.51 
Sum 150672.1 769.91 81.76 5497.89 116.50 20244.29 2341.81 1032.95 475.24 
Sum Sq. Dev. 2.68+08 120.88 205.67 17091.14 236.57 1992199.0 2347.32 74.72 416.77 
Observations 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 
 
Pooled sample 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W SD ICREAL OPENNESS TI NC PE 
          
Mean 620.72 5.31 1.94 0.63 33.33 123.57 18.15 7.2 1.94 
Median 179.41 5.38 2.11 0.46 31.62 94.23 18.7 7.27 1.33 
Maximum 12491.66 6.96 3.88 4.6 61.51 443.08 26.4 9.08 10 
Minimum -615.67 2.92 -2.81 -1.77 14.7 28.23 7.8 3.57 0 
Std. Dev. 1363.78 0.79 1.42 1.11 11.17 88.72 4.05 0.95 1.8 
Skewness 4.92 -0.51 -0.86 0.8 0.43 1.74 -0.29 -0.58 1.05 
Kurtosis 33.07 3.34 3.07 3.69 2.19 5.53 2.21 3.44 3.76 
Sum 217872.9 1865.28 681.57 221.44 11697.48 43373.32 6370.02 2527.62 681.5 
Sum Sq. Dev. 6.51E+08 220.76 706.46 434.37 43696.76 2754716 5744.68 318.25 1138.9 
Observations 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 
 
 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
186
Appendix 4. Correlation matrix (t-statistics included) 
Developed countries 
 FDI  LOG_GDP  LOG_W  SD  ICREAL  OPENNESS  TI  NC  PE  
FDI  1         
 -----          
LOG_GDP  0.32 1        
 5.51 -----         
LOG_W  0.14 0.43 1       
 2.37 7.87 -----        
SD  0.05 -0.04 -0.28 1      
 0.8 -0.61 -4.75 -----       
ICREAL  -0.14 0.13 -0.56 0.53 1     
 -2.3 2.15 -11.25 10.29 -----      
OPENNESS  -0.02 -0.58 0.1 0.07 -0.2 1    
 -0.3 -11.85 1.65 1.25 -3.36 -----     
TI  0.06 0.06 0.72 -0.38 -0.74 0.22 1   
 1.06 1.08 17.08 -6.79 -18.2 3.8 -----    
NC  0.14 -0.37 0 -0.03 -0.34 0.34 0.02 1  
 2.33 -6.62 -0.02 -0.46 -5.98 6.01 0.33 -----   
PE  -0.22 -0.33 -0.86 0.23 0.67 -0.1 -0.62 -0.12 1 
 -3.72 -5.72 -28.52 3.99 14.89 -1.61 -13.29 -2 -----  
 
Developing countries 
 FDI  LOG_GDP  LOG_W  SD  ICREAL  OPENNESS  TI  NC  PE  
FDI  1         
 -----          
LOG_GDP  0.58 1        
 8.32 -----         
LOG_W  -0.16 -0.26 1       
 -1.92 -3.18 -----        
SD  0.31 0.21 -0.37 1      
 3.84 2.57 -4.67 -----       
ICREAL  0.17 0.43 -0.7 0.29 1     
 2 5.6 -11.4 3.53 -----      
OPENNESS  -0.05 -0.5 0.62 -0.24 -0.85 1    
 -0.61 -6.75 9.21 -2.86 -19.09 -----     
TI  -0.03 -0.2 0.68 -0.36 -0.72 0.76 1   
 -0.34 -2.34 10.95 -4.49 -12.25 13.58 -----    
NC  -0.16 -0.42 0.5 -0.51 -0.61 0.56 0.5 1  
 -1.95 -5.45 6.67 -6.97 -9.05 7.91 6.72 -----   
PE  -0.13 0.07 -0.64 0.2 0.65 -0.67 -0.72 -0.45 1 
 -1.48 0.8 -9.67 2.42 10.08 -10.61 -11.97 -5.86 -----  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
187
Pooled sample 
 FDI  LOG_GDP  LOG_W  SD  ICREAL  OPENNESS  TI  NC  PE  
FDI  1         
 -----          
LOG_GDP  0.25 1        
 4.85 -----         
LOG_W  0.01 0.12 1       
 0.25 2.24 -----        
SD  0.07 -0.06 -0.29 1      
 1.28 -1.18 -5.75 -----       
ICREAL  -0.05 0.15 -0.7 0.39 1     
 -0.92 2.89 -18.1 7.98 -----      
OPENNESS  0.15 -0.42 0.14 -0.05 -0.39 1    
 2.79 -8.56 2.58 -0.87 -7.93 -----     
TI  0.09 0.1 0.68 -0.36 -0.73 0.41 1   
 1.69 1.91 17.42 -7.14 -20.02 8.41 -----    
NC  0.21 -0.3 0.03 -0.21 -0.39 0.4 0.16 1  
 4.11 -5.77 0.49 -3.95 -7.92 8.14 3.03 -----   
PE  -0.06 -0.04 -0.85 0.23 0.74 -0.24 -0.67 -0.15 1 
 -1.21 -0.69 -30.22 4.49 20.47 -4.64 -16.7 -2.83 -----  
 
Appendix 5. Coefficient Variance Decomposition 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
Eigenvalues 423839 9920.159 
Smallest Condition 1.46E-10 9.02E-12 
 
Variance Decomposition Proportions 
Associated Eigenvalue 
Variable Developed countries Developing countries 
FDI(-1) 0.02 0.55* 
LOG_GDP 0.78* 0.92* 
LOG_W 0.05 0.61* 
ICREAL 0.39 0.08 
SD 0.09 0.34 
OPENNESS 0.26 0.699* 
TI 0.15 0.33 
PE 0.77* 0.43 
NC 0.098 0.09 
Note: Only smallest condition and associated eigenvalue are shown 
* means collinear terms 
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Appendix 6. Additional estimation with a modification on FDI dependent variable 
In this appendix I present additional estimation of the empirical model with a modification on FDI 
dependent variable. The scope of the analysis is to provide additional evidence of the results presented 
in the main body of the Chapter VI. 
I follow the same empirical strategy as in Chapters IV-VII. The dependent variable in the study is 
FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in US dollars (FDI). In fact, around 3.11% of the data have 
negative values. These negative FDI flows represent the capital withdrawals by the parent company 
from the foreign affiliate. For instance, it may appear under the form of shares’ sale to the local or 
other multinational company. Thus the dependent variable cannot be transformed logarithmically 
which leads to its higher variation. Hence the statistical inference may be affected by this dependent 
variable nature. 
In this appendix I perform the analysis with two transformations of the dependent variable with 
the objective of reducing its variance. First, I replace the negative values by a conventionally small 
number 0.001 which is negligibly small but can be transformed logarithmically. By this procedure I 
aim at keeping a higher number of observations. At the same time it allows for considering additional 
information of negative FDI flows. Then I transform logarithmically the obtained positive values of 
Japanese outward FDI in order to scale down its variation. Second, I transform logarithmically a stock 
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of FDI which is calculated as a sum of FDI flow from 1995 to year t. The objective of these 
transformations is to scale down the FDI flow value and use negative values information as well. 
 The statistical characteristics of these two transformed dependent variables for developed and 
developing countries are shown in table A6-1 below. 
Table A6-1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable in the study 
 Developed  
 
Developing  
 
Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
 Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
Mean 3.78 6.73  6.44 8.48 
Median 4.58 6.70  6.51 8.61 
Maximum 9.99 11.26  9.28 10.75 
Minimum -7.03 0.37  -7.06 5.41 
Std. Dev. 4.05 2.06  1.65 1.04 
Skewness -1.57 0.00  -3.74 -0.50 
Kurtosis 5.06 3.21  29.55 2.90 
 
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
                   yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the transformed outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it 
denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
dimension. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. yit-1 is a 
lagged dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
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(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6TIit + β7NCit + β8PEit + εit.       (1) 
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. PEit 
represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t. The political index is calculated from the 
Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index, and has been recalculated to be scored from 0 to 10 with a 
higher score indicating a higher “political risk”.   
The data set consists of annual observations for the period 1995-2009 for the 2 sets of countries: 
19 developed and 11 developing countries29. I follow the same methodology as in the main body and 
estimate the model by Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator with orthogonal deviations set-up. 
The results are presented in table A6-2. 
In general the results are consistent with the main body of the dissertation.30 Note that the main 
variable of interest is significant and signed consistently with the hypotheses presented in Chapter VI. 
Political Environment is positive and significant in case of developed countries (GMM(a), GMM(b)) 
and it is negative and significant in case of developing countries (GMM(c), GMM(d)).  
 
                                                           
29
 I use a UN classification of developed and developing countries (UNCTAD 2012). Developed and developing 
countries in the study are listed in the Appendix 1.  
30
 An unexpected result is that Investment Cost is signed positively and is statistically significant in case of 
developing countries suggesting that Japanese MNCs are attracted by higher business and operational activity 
costs. This counterintuitive result might be explained by a higher expected profit effect which is probably 
dominating the cost side of the investment and operational activity. Japanese MNCs might expect higher profits 
when moving their production from high-cost developed countries to relatively lower-cost developing countries.  
Indeed, recent trends show that Japanese MNCs invested heavily in developing countries and particularly in Asia 
(e.g. China, Korea, and Thailand). 
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Table A6-2. The determinants of Japanese outward FDI 
  Developed   Developing   
 Dependent: 
Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
Log of FDI 
flow 
Log of FDI 
stock 
  GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) 
FDI(-1) 
-0.03 
(-2.1)** 
0.6 
(22.33)*** 
0.32 
(17.14)*** 
0.82 
(46.89)*** 
GDP 
-0.14 
(-0.42) 
0.37 
(3.9)*** 
0.25 
(2.92)*** 
0.1 
(5.53)*** 
Wages 
-2.8 
(-9.72)*** 
-0.55 
(-4.96)*** 
0.14 
(2.08)** 
0.03 
(1.48) 
Openness 
0.02 
(2.98)*** 
0.01 
(7.11)*** 
0.006 
(4.1)*** 
0.001 
(1.77)* 
Skill Difference 
0.12 
(4.97)*** 
0.009 
(2.85)*** 
-0.06 
(-9.35)*** 
-0.01 
(-11.84)*** 
Investment Cost 
-0.15 
(-1.71)* 
0.01 
(0.69) 
0.35 
(19.29)*** 
0.11 
(12.96)*** 
Technological Index 
0.32 
(4.97)*** 
0.05 
(4.5)*** 
-0.06 
(-6.42)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.43) 
National Culture 
0.43 
(2.8)*** 
0.07 
(2.38)** 
0.2 
(3.72)*** 
0.02 
(1.84)* 
Political 
Environment 
0.71 
(3.12)*** 
0.08 
(2.05)** 
-0.03 
(-2.55)** 
-0.01 
(-1.78)* 
SE of regression 3.27 0.38 1.18 0.14 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.38 0.98 0.50 0.53 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
In sum, I could conclude that the main findings discussed in the main body of Chapter VI are 
successfully vindicated by these additional estimations with the transformed FDI dependent variable. 
In particular, PE was confirmed to have a non-linear inverted U-shape effect on Japanese outward FDI 
to developed and developing countries. Thus the main conclusions of the dissertation are confirmed 
successfully.   
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CHAPTER VII POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, DEMOCRACY AND JAPANESE 
OUTWARD FDI1 
A. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I reconsidered the effects of Political Environment (PE, hereafter) on 
Japanese outward FDI (FDI, hereafter) to both developed and developing countries, and found that 
actually the multiple dimensions of the PE measure may have opposite effects on Japanese MNCs 
decisions. The central objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of democracy and PE on the 
recent Japanese outward FDI with a panel data of 55 developed and developing countries for the 
period of 1995-2010. 
Democracy is another aspect of institutional environment that has been emphasized recently as an 
important determinant of economic activities. However, despite its importance, the volume of research 
addressing democracy effects on FDI is relatively limited. Due to the difficulties in economic 
modeling of this aspect, a theoretical background is also lacking. Thus, although most of the studies 
examined empirically the effects of Democracy on FDI, there is no consensus. On the one hand, 
democratic institutions may have a positive effect on FDI since government institutions are more 
sensitive to social pressure and thus the risk of policy reversal or property rights violation is reduced 
(Li, 2009). On the other hand, MNCs may prefer to invest in less-democratic countries since they can 
                                                           
1
 Earlier versions of this chapter’s were presented at various Conferences and Workshops, including WEAI (San-
Francisco), HSS (Paris), JSIE (Konan University), JEPA (Nagoya Gakuin University), and Graduate Workshop 
(Waseda University). I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professors Shujiro Urata, John Devereux, 
Nathan Cook, Lein Lein Chen, Aleksander Petkovic, Toshiyuki Matsuura and other participants for their critical 
but constructing comments and suggestions that improved the content considerably. Usual disclaimer applies. 
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take advantage of a possibility to negotiate higher prospects for monopoly and thus obtain higher 
profits and increase the utility of their investment. (Li and Resnick, 2003). Thus, multiple dimensions 
of democracy might lead to various effects on Japanese outward FDI and it should be analyzed 
empirically. 
Moreover, a country’s level of development may play a crucial role in differentiating these 
effects. As mentioned in the previous Chapter VI Lucas (1990) in his highly influential paper 
suggested that despite standard theoretical prediction (under neoclassical assumptions capital is 
expected to flow from richer to poorer nations since marginal product of capital is higher in poorer 
economies due to law of diminishing returns) actually capital flew from developed economies to 
developed ones – a well-known “Lucas paradox”.2. However, recent trends show an opposite tendency 
with developing economies receive a higher share of FDI. In my view, effects of institutional 
environment under the form of Democracy may play as well an important role in determining a 
direction of FDI flows. As discussed in Chapter III a preliminary data analysis of my sampled 
countries suggest that there might be multiple dimensions of Democracy’s effect on Japanese outward 
FDI to developed and developing countries.  
In line with the above, I suspected that the relationship between Democracy and FDI may be non-
linear for developed and developing countries. Thus, in the same fashion as for PE and FDI in Chapter 
                                                           
2
 For a detailed discussion see Chapter II. 
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VI, in this chapter I derive a theoretical framework of non-linear relationship between Democracy and 
FDI. This theoretical framework suggests hypotheses that are tested empirically by econometric 
analysis. 
Thus, the first main objective of this chapter is to examine a role of democracy in Japanese MNCs 
activities and thus embrace another aspect of institutional environment as FDI determinant. I use three 
measures of democracy that are largely used in the literature, namely the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) democratic accountability index, Polity democracy score, and Freedom House political 
rights index.3 A use of three different measures from three different sources increases robustness and 
credibility of the results.  
Nevertheless, PE as well remains in the analytical framework in order to re-estimate the previous 
chapters’ results and robustness in a different setting. Thus, the second objective is to verify the 
multidimensional effect of PE on Japanese outward FDI and to confirm my hypothesis of the inverted 
U-shaped relationship put forth in the last chapter. 
Next, a logical inference would be to suspect some causality between Democracy and PE since 
these two aspects address institutional environment of a host country but from different perspectives. 
On the one hand Government stability, and Regulatory and Policy Environment which are component 
elements of the PE index might have an effect on civil liberties and property rights leading to changes 
                                                           
3
 Democracy measures’ calculation details and data discussion in presented in Chapter III. 
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in Democracy. On the other hand higher Democracy may be associated with an increased pressure on 
the government, and thus provoking less corruption and bureaucracy that leads to a PE index decrease. 
Surprisingly, these causality and cross-effects were only marginally addressed in the previous 
literature. To my knowledge, Mathur and Singh (2013) were probably the first to suspect and examine 
this cross-section effect in their examination of Corruption Perception and Democracy effects on FDI 
inflows to 29 emerging economies.  
Note that Democracy is measured by three variable choices (ICRG Democratic Accountability, 
Polity IV and Freedom House Political Rights). In fact, Democracy represents the voice of citizens to 
influence political movement, political decisions. Thus it is directly related to political parties’ 
competitiveness. So the higher is democracy the higher would be a pressure on the current 
government. As a consequence, the government cannot take inappropriate decisions like for example 
lobbying a big multinational company to pursue its interests of maximizing profit strategies on the 
expense of employees’ working conditions and environmental issues.  
PE is another side of the coin. It is more about how the system works and it reflects such issues 
like corruption, bureaucracy, any confiscatory taxation policies.  
One example could be Singapore (Figure 7.1). It is known that Democracy is low in Singapore. 
But at the same time property rights and other aspects of political environment are ensured for foreign 
companies. Although Democracy is low (0.38) PE is relatively stable (0.08). Hence many MNCs 
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activities are observed in Singapore. If property rights are not protected and local government pursues 
a policy of confiscatory taxation and/or profits’ expropriation MNCs would probably avoid Singapore-
based activities.  
 
Figure 7.1. ICRG ([0,1] scale) and PE ([0,1] scale), 55 countries, 1995-2010. Values are averaged 
by country from 1995 to 2010. A higher ICRG value is associated with higher level of democracy. A 
higher PE value is associated with increased political risk. The regression represented by the fitted line 
yields a slope coefficient of -0.4208, R2 = 0.2326.  
In sum, Democracy and PE represent two aspects of institutional environment. Nevertheless, they 
may influence each other. As shown in the figure 7.1 the correlation between Democracy and PE is 
negative since higher Democracy might be associated with lower political risk.  
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Thus, I employ a formal econometric method, namely a Granger causality test in order to identify 
possible bilateral causality. In fact, after identifying Granger causality I use these findings to include 
the cross-effects of PE and Democracy in the estimation framework. 
 Thus, a third main objective of this chapter is to examine causality between PE and Democracy 
and their cross-effects on Japanese outward FDI. To my knowledge, this is a new and promising 
approach that allows a more extensive interpretation of the effects of institutional environment risk on 
Japanese MNCs’ activities. 
I extend the number of sample countries used in the previous chapters to a larger one – 55 
countries over a period of 1995-2010. This extension allows for a higher number of observations. 
However, a panel data set becomes unbalanced and thus the econometric approach should be adjusted 
accordingly. First, I use an FDI three year moving average measure in order to take a better account of 
cyclical fluctuations. 4  Second, I present Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed effects (FE) and 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) results. OLS and FE estimation serve only as a reference 
point, and the main discussion is based on the GMM results. Possible endogeneity between FDI and 
control variables is treated in a stricter way as well. 
                                                           
4
 A discussion of measurement details is presented in Chapter III. However, in case of a dynamic model three 
year moving average might lead to a difficulty in overlapping data interpretation. Thus, I present an additional 
robustness check estimations with a three year averaged data for five periods in Appendix 5.   
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section B presents my theoretical framework of 
Democracy and FDI relationship. In section C I specify an empirical model and work out the 
econometric strategy. Section D describes the estimation results. Section E provides the summaries 
and conclusions. 
B. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework and econometric results proposed in Chapter VI suggested a non-linear 
relationship between PE and Japanese FDI. The previous studies of Democracy effects on FDI 
proposed different ways that MNCs might perceive Democracy. Some of them suggested that 
Democracy stimulates FDI (e.g. Jensen 2003). The others proposed that Autocratic government can 
actually attract more FDI (e.g. Li and Resnick 2003). Logically I suspected a possible non-linear 
relationship between Democracy and FDI for developed and developing countries. Thus in this sub-
section I derive a theory of FDI with Democracy and OLI in the same fashion as the theory of FDI 
with PE and OLI presented in section B of Chapter VI.  
It is based on the following assumptions: 
(A-6-1) Assume a Japanese MNC that is planning to undertake FDI in a foreign country, and it is 
assumed that there exists a following function G:  
G(DEM,OLI,FDI)=0,         (1) 
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Where G is assumed to be positive, continuous, and continuously differentiable real-valued 
function defined on the non-negative domains of DEM, OLI (ownership, location and internalization) 
index, and FDI. 
DEM represents democracy level in the host country that is assessed by Japanese MNCs as an 
additional factor that influences their decision to invest. This assessment may depend on the level of 
countries’ economic development (developed and developing countries). Thus, higher Democracy 
may be associated with higher advantages and profitability in case of developed countries if MNCs 
view lower corruption as a facilitator of their activity. On the other hand in case of developing 
countries, higher Democracy may be associated with lower advantages and profitability if MNCs are 
not satisfied with the level of monopolistic advantages that they can obtain in the foreign countries. 
OLI index represents a set of advantages in the sense of Dunning’s OLI’s framework. These 
advantages allow an MNC to maximize its profits when operating in the foreign market and, thus, to 
show their willingness to invest abroad. 
FDI is the value of investment undertaken by an MNC in the host country. 
(A-6-2) Assume that G is solved for OLI (advantages/profitability index) such that 
OLI=g(DEM,FDI). 
(A-6-3) Also, assume g as a positive, continuous, and continuously differentiable real-valued 
function.  
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3. Total differentiation of g for a given level of OLI is as follows: 
0=





∂
∂
+





∂
∂ dFDI
FDI
gdDEM
DEM
g
        (2) 
Equation (2) shows the "transformation curve" such that: 
FDI
DEM
g
g
FDIg
DEMg
dDEM
dFDI
−=
∂∂
∂∂
−=
        (3)
 
Since g is a transformation curve, the numerator (denominator) has an economic interpretation of 
the marginal cost of DEM (FDI) in terms of OLI. 
4. The inverse function rule implies: 
FDIgOLI
FDI 1
=
∂
∂
 and 
DEMgOLI
DEM 1
=
∂
∂
                                 (4) 
Where FDIg  and DEMg  are partial derivatives of g with respect to FDI and DEM.  
5. (3) and (4) yield: 
OLIDEM
OLIFDI
g
g
dDEM
dFDI
FDI
DEM
∂∂
∂∂
−=−=                                   (5) 
6. Higher OLI advantages are associated with higher profitability for an MNC and hence higher 
FDI are undertaken. In line with this: 
0>∂∂ OLIFDI .          (6-1) 
As presented in the description of DEM MNCs may assess differently Democracy change in the 
host countries depending on their level of economic development. In line with this: 
(6-2-a) OLIDEM ∂∂ > 0 if an increase in DEM corresponds to a higher OLI (willingness to 
invest) for developed countries, because of lower corruption, but 
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(6-2-b) OLIDEM ∂∂ < 0 if an increase in DEM corresponds to a lower OLI (willingness to 
invest), because of loss of monopolistic advantages, etc. for developing countries. 
7. Conclusions: 
From (5), (6-1), (6-2-a) and (6-2-b) I can summarize the relationship between FDI and DEM as 
follows: 









>
<
advantagesicmonopolistlowerforcountriesdeveloping
corruptionlessforcountriesdevelopedfor
dDEM
dFDI 0
 
This conclusion indicates that the relationship between FDI and DEM may be depicted as an 
"inverted" U-shaped figure between DEM and FDI.  
In addition, this conclusion implies the following theoretical results: 
Result 1: Higher DEM is associated with lower FDI in case of developed countries whose level of 
DEM has been well above the average DEM values. 
Result 2: Higher DEM is associated with higher FDI in case of developing countries whose level 
of DEM has been well below the average DEM values. 
In what follows, the next sections are devoted to testing these theoretical results by means of 
various econometric estimations. 
C. The empirical model and estimation strategy 
This section presents my basic specification for the empirical strategy. The dependent variable in 
the study is FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in US Dollar (FDI) that is averaged over 3 years to 
  
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
202
smooth out cyclical fluctuations, and the independent variables are chosen as explained below. Two of 
them (real GDP and Wage cost) are expressed in logarithmic form, and the other remains as they are, 
as they represent the computed indexes.5  
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
                   yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the net 3-year averaged outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and 
X'it denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
dimension. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. 6 yit-1 is 
a lagged dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which 
is assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEMit + εit.       (8) 
 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + εit.       (9) 
                                                           
5
 FDI flows are not logarithmically transformed since they are positive and negative for some countries in 
different years. In addition, FDI measure is not normalized (e.g. by GDP) since I am interested in the actual 
effect of PE on FDI flows. I expect that a problem of heteroscedasticity which might appear due to a high 
standard deviation of FDI measure will be resolved by GMM estimation. In fact, this is one of the reasons why 
GMM Arellano-Bond estimator is preferred to other alternative econometric methods of panel data analysis. 
Nevertheless, in appendix 4 I provide additional estimation with a transformed FDI measure to scale down its 
variance. The results are consistent with the main body of the chapter.  
6
 In fact, since the FDI variable is transformed by a moving average process it is difficult to interpret the 
economic meaning of the lagged FDI effect. In appendix 5 I present an alternative estimation with the FDI 
variable transformed by a simple average process. The results are comparable with the main body of the chapter. 
Thus, I conclude that the effect of the overlapping case is not seriously biased. 
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I use FDI flow as my dependent variable, as this first provides a larger number of observations 
and second, allows statistical inferences for flow effect of real FDI. Data for FDI activity are collected 
from the OECD database which provides data of Japanese FDI for a large number of countries for the 
period 1995 to 2010.7  
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. DEMit  
shows a level of democracy of a host country i at time t whose change is expected to influence FDI 
flows. Democracy measure is calculated from the ICRG democratic accountability index, Polity 
democracy score and Freedom house index, and is normalized to lie from zero to one in order to 
ensure the comparability of results.8 PEit represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t that 
has recently been emphasized as one of the most researchable issues in international economics, as 
reviewed and discussed in Chapter III. The political index is calculated from the Euromoney Country 
Risk (ECR) index, and has been scored from 0 to 25 with a higher score indicating a higher “political 
risk”.  
                                                           
7
 I use the statistics reported in US dollars in our analysis. These statistics were compiled by the OECD statistical 
division from Bank of Japan and Japanese Ministry of Finance statistical sources. 
8
 For additional details see Chapter III section E. 
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The data set consists of annual observations for the period 1995-2010 for the 2 sets of countries: 
32 developed and 23 developing countries9. The data source for Japanese FDI is the OECD database, 
and for other variables different sources such as the WDI (the World Bank), the WCY (International 
Institute for Management Development), Penn-World Tables, ICRG, Polity, Freedom house and 
Euromoney. 
I employ a panel data analysis in order to capture static and dynamic nature of the FDI flows, 
accounting for at the same time possible heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity. By 
including lagged FDI flows as an additional regressor I change a static model to a dynamic panel 
model.10 Thus my panel data set consists of two sets and two dimensions: one dimension is cross-
section (32 developed countries and 23 developing countries: i = 1,….,N) and the other is time 
dimension (16 years: 1995-2010: t=1,…,T).  The total number of observations in this context is 512 
for developed countries and 368 for developing ones, and it can be considered adequate to produce 
robust estimations for the scope of the analysis.11  
Generally the problems of autocorrelation, endogeneity and heteroscedasticity are inherent in 
economic data sets. First, some explanatory variables can be endogeneous and therefore OLS 
                                                           
9
 I use OECD membership as a criterion for highly-developed economies. Developed and developing countries 
in the study are listed in the Appendix 1. The countries selection among others is limited by data availability. 
10
 A linear dynamic panel-data model aims at capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. I expect that 
FDI in previous periods stimulates contemporaneous FDI due to an agglomeration effect argument (e.g. 
Krugman 1991). 
11
 The descriptive statistics of the data is presented in Appendix 2. 
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estimators might be biased and inconsistent. Second, unobserved panel-level effects (fixed effects) 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Finally, the inclusion of lagged dependent variable 
can lead to autocorrelation. 12 In order to deal with all these problems a commonly used method for 
dynamic panels is the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As their estimator is 
set up, the fixed effects are eliminated using first differences, and an instrumental variable estimation 
of the differenced equation is performed. However, a first difference has a weakness in unbalanced 
models since it magnifies gaps in it. Due to the nature of the data my sample contains some missing 
data, particularly for developing countries. Thus, I follow the second common transformation 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) that is called “forward orthogonal deviations”. In contrast to 
“first difference” it subtracts the average of all future available observations of a variable.13  
Next, I estimated two forms of GMM. I use GMM style instruments as proposed by Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1988) in order to distinguish two assumptions. First, in GMM(01) I treat all explanatory 
variables as predetermined. It implies that the current period error term is uncorrelated with current 
and lagged values of the predetermined variable but may be correlated with future values. This is a 
weaker restriction than strict exogeneity. In this case, according to Roodman (2009) the variables are 
                                                           
12
 Nevertheless, a common constant (pooled OLS) and Fixed Effects methods’ analysis was also performed. 
Although the results are not statistically significant I report them here in order to provide a comparison of 
coefficients values. According to Roodman (2009) the value of coefficient in GMM estimation is plausible to be 
expected to lie in between OLS and Fixed effects estimators values. 
13
 Indeed, a first difference method produced the estimators that were statistically insignificant. Hence, since I 
could not draw a robust conclusion about the independent variables’ effect on FDI the results are not reported 
here. 
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added in GMM style instruments matrix starting with lag 1. However, potential endogeneity might be 
present. Thus, in order to control for this potential bias and increase the credibility of the results I 
present an alternative model GMM(02) that treats the explanatory variables as endogenous. In this 
case they are included in GMM style instruments matrix starting from lag 2. I then performed the 
Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions for the selected instruments. All the regressions were 
shown to be robust according to this criterion. 
In all the estimations I include PE and Democracy variables in a standard instrument variables 
matrix. By doing this I imply that PE and Democracy are strictly exogenous. This is a plausible 
assumption due to the fact that the direction of effect is one-way. It is very unlikely that FDI affects 
PE and Democracy variables. Finally, I do not include any additional (external) instruments. 
D. Results and analysis 
1. Democracy and PE direct effects on Japanese outward FDI 
I estimate equation (8) in order to analyze the Japanese FDI with my data sample under different 
econometric specifications. The results are presented in tables 7.1-7.3. Several interesting features are 
disclosed, and, in what follows, I give some interpretations and evaluations for them. The control 
variables estimators are mainly consistent with the prior presumptions, and the results in the previous 
chapters. FDI in the previous periods and market size stimulate FDI flows. As it can be inferred from 
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Openness estimators Japanese MNCs tend to be of horizontal type in case of developed countries 
(β4<0) and of vertical type in case of developing countries (β4>0).14 
Now, I turn to the discussion of the Democracy effects on the Japanese outward FDI. As 
mentioned above in order to increase the credibility of the results I employ 3 measures of Democracy 
namely ICRG, Polity and FH. 
Table 7.1. ICRG effects on Japanese outward FDI 
  Developed Developing 
  OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 
0.94 
(59.17)*** 
0.78 
(23.64)*** 
0.77 
(105.62)*** 
0.77 
(199.02)*** 
1.06 
(29.28)*** 
1.01 
(22.62)*** 
1.01 
(363.66)*** 
1.01 
(55.88)*** 
GDP 
135.99 
(2.14)** 
482.95 
(0.83) 
325.42 
(6.87)*** 
348.38 
(8.7)*** 
75.16 
(2.99)*** 
460.62 
(3.18)*** 
478.2 
(15.2)*** 
472.46 
(8.95)*** 
Wages 
-38.85 
(-1.15) 
22.93 
(0.18) 
14.23 
(2.53)** 
5.47 
(0.89) 
9.23 
(0.44) 
46.54 
(1.23) 
38.23 
(5.51)*** 
45.94 
(3.53)*** 
Openness 
1.27 
(1.97)* 
-0.82 
(-0.15) 
-0.31 
(-1.03) 
-0.66 
(-2.44)** 
0.59 
(1.89)* 
2.24 
(2.07)** 
2.17 
(16.46)*** 
1.95 
(6.2)*** 
Skill 
Difference 
25.01 
(0.72) 
-4.6 
(-0.07) 
2.87 
(1.57) 
8.79 
(5.37)*** 
13.71 
(0.95) 
49.75 
(2.14)** 
49.65 
(8.52)*** 
44.22 
(5.7)*** 
Investment 
Cost 
61.36 
(1.74)* 
-61.03 
(-0.52) 
-51.73 
(-11.88)*** 
-58.72 
(-13.09)*** 
-4.42 
(-0.19) 
31.1 
(0.92) 
45.03 
(5.62)*** 
47.86 
(5.73)*** 
ICRG 198.35 (0.49) 
-129.41 
(-0.17) 
-91.11 
(-3.42)*** 
-93.72 
(-4.35)*** 
364.69 
(3.42)*** 
441.95 
(1.93)* 
305.53 
(6.37)*** 
245.42 
(4.11)*** 
Constant -4094.15 (-2.18)** 
-11853.82 
(-0.79)   
-2240.8 
(-3.25)*** 
-12610.14 
(-3.37)***   
Rsquared 0.93 0.93   0.88 0.91   
SE of 
regression 888.44 879.26 879.46 879.55 252.59 234.86 234.73 235.15 
Hansen J-test (p-value)a  0.86 0.93   0.53 0.55 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
                                                           
14
 The only unexpected result is a consistent positive sign of Wages and negative sign of IC for developed 
countries implying that Japanese MNCs’ investments are encouraged by higher real wages and higher IC in 
developed countries. Although this is a seemingly puzzling result and I will not discuss it in detail here, but 
propose the following brief explanation. Higher wages and higher IC in developed countries might imply an 
existence of business environment impediments for operational activities. At the same time MNCs can benefit 
from this environment since they can obtain a competitive advantage over local firms by attracting highly skilled 
local labor and establishing a more efficient management. Thus, MNCs can become more competitive at the 
local market and enjoy monopolistic advantages. Also note that I am not the only one to obtain a result of higher 
wages positively affecting inward FDI. This result was also found in some other empirical works (Basile, 
Castellani, and Zanfei, 2008; Hayakawa and Matsuura, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2004). 
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Table 7.2. Polity IV effects on Japanese outward FDI 
  Developed Developing  
  OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 0.93 (50.08)*** 
0.78 
(23.31)*** 
0.77 
(117.77)*** 
0.77 
(171.19)*** 
1.08 
(28.09)*** 
1.07 
(27.33)*** 
1.03 
(54.8)*** 
1.06 
(36.54)*** 
GDP 146.55 (2.31)** 
602.44 
(0.99) 
430.02 
(11.64)*** 
555.56 
(15.08)*** 
70.44 
(2.52)** 
69.04 
(2.47)** 
515.41 
(10.7)*** 
477.69 
(7.32)*** 
Wages -49.85 (-0.67) 
34.81 
(0.26) 
25.34 
(6.2)*** 
32.46 
(5.76)*** 
5.36 
(0.25) 
0.31 
(0.01) 
42.34 
(2.93)*** 
50.23 
(3.03)*** 
Openness 0.97 (0.58) 
-2.95 
(-0.49) 
-2.14 
(-10.55)*** 
-3.46 
(-11.23)*** 
0.26 
(0.74) 
0.15 
(0.43) 
2.27 
(17.12)*** 
2.52 
(9.43)*** 
Skill 
Difference 
27.13 
(0.49) 
-8.39 
(-0.12) 
-2.06 
(-1.25) 
0.96 
(0.4) 
6.46 
(0.44) 
6.72 
(0.46) 
50.61 
(5.74)*** 
49.56 
(4.83)*** 
Investment 
Cost 
53.95 
(0.82) 
-66.57 
(-0.55) 
-49.67 
(-6.62)*** 
-73.33 
(-13.44)*** 
5.41 
(0.22) 
-4.99 
(-0.19) 
70.94 
(6.13)*** 
74.71 
(7.82)*** 
Polity 733.18 (0.63) 
-1067.71 
(-0.46) 
-853.82 
(-5.8)*** 
-1069.75 
(-8.38)*** 
52.75 
(0.46) 
116.64 
(0.92) 
24.05 
(2.36)** 
35.64 
(2.28)** 
Constant -4803.47 (-2.12)** 
-13963.06 
(-0.89)   
-1916.8 
(-2.6)** 
-1771.93 
(-2.37)**   
Rsquared 0.93 0.93   0.88 0.88   
SE of 
regression 902.9 892.67 892.91 892.81 259.88 259.57 238.72 239.08 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value)a   0.96 0.66   0.73 0.84 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
Table 7.3. Freedom House effects on Japanese outward FDI 
  Developed Developing 
  OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 0.94 (52.36)*** 
0.78 
(23.65)*** 
0.78 
(72.59)*** 
0.77 
(157.07)*** 
1.08 
(28.28)*** 
1.04 
(22.64)*** 
1.04 
(41.92)*** 
1.04 
(53.63)*** 
GDP 136.29 (2.36)** 
530.14 
(0.87) 
398.32 
(9.63)*** 
520.33 
(15.39)*** 
70.83 
(2.59)** 
558.29 
(4.07)*** 
546.69 
(12.19)*** 
512.25 
(14.6)*** 
Wages -38.55 (-0.55) 
10.24 
(0.07) 
9.12 
(2.44)** 
5.5 
(1.38) 
3.63 
(0.16) 
54.36 
(1.44) 
58.21 
(5.57)*** 
61.2 
(4.56)*** 
Openness 1.24 (1.04) 
-0.9 
(-0.17) 
-0.54 
(-2.39)** 
-1.31 
(-6.38)*** 
0.28 
(0.81) 
2.48 
(1.79)* 
2.08 
(16.98)*** 
2.33 
(12.78)*** 
Skill 
Difference 
26.63 
(0.52) 
-6.13 
(-0.09) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.65 
(-0.36) 
5.4 
(0.37) 
57.88 
(2.52)** 
49.05 
(5.36)*** 
44.77 
(5.3)*** 
Investment 
Cost 
59.04 
(0.95) 
-58.52 
(-0.51) 
-57.1 
(-12.43)*** 
-69.81 
(-12.91)*** 
3.03 
(0.12) 
49.47 
(1.54) 
61.95 
(6.39)*** 
61.24 
(6.35)*** 
FH 215.09 (0.41) 
-421.84 
(-0.28) 
-295.53 
(-3.51)*** 
-415.54 
(-7.38)*** 
59.94 
(0.69) 
162.42 
(1.18) 
176.2 
(5.14)*** 
187.82 
(5.32)*** 
Constant -3891.75 (-2.3)** 
-13205.21 
(-0.83)   
-1849.69 
(-2.48)** 
-14954.17 
(-4.25)***   
Rsquared 0.93 0.93   0.88 0.91   
SE of 
regression 888.46 879.2 879.29 879.28 259.69 237.02 237.43 237.84 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value)a   0.70 0.62   0.59 0.82 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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Does Democracy have a direct effect on FDI? To answer this question I estimate equation (8) for 
developed and developing countries using three different democracy measures. I am interested in the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficient β6. In case of developing countries GMM estimators 
are significant and positive. This result suggests that an increase in Democracy is likely to encourage 
FDI inflows in developing countries. Indeed, if a higher democracy is associated with higher property 
rights, less corruption and higher institution quality, then Japanese MNCs perceive a secure business 
environment and more profitable opportunities and increase their investments. For instance, an 
increase in Democracy level measured by ICRG (GMM(01)) from 3.00 to 4.00 can encourage an 
increase in Japanese FDI by 305.53 millions of US$ [∂FDI/∂DEM = 305.53(4.00 – 3.00)]. In addition 
these findings confirm the theoretical result 2 derived in sub-section B. Thus, a theoretical prediction 
is in line with the econometric results in case of Developing countries. 
However, in case of developed countries, the coefficient is negative and significant. It implies that 
Japanese outward FDI are discouraged by an increased Democracy in developed countries. As it was 
mentioned earlier there is still a debate on the Democracy benefits for MNCs. For instance, this result 
supports Li and Resnick (2003) findings and could be explained by the fact that too much Democracy 
provides less opportunities for monopolistic advantages and MNCs’ interest lobbying in the 
government. Indeed, in highly democratic societies (e.g. France) labor rights protection, anti-trust laws 
and local business protection increases the vulnerability and operational cost for MNCs. Thus, it is 
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reasonable to assume that there is a certain level of Democracy above which a further increase leads to 
an increased probability of lower FDI. In fact, my theoretical result 1 in sub-section B is confirmed by 
these findings. Thus, a suspected earlier non-linear relationship between Democracy and FDI is 
successfully validated by the econometric results. 
I formalize the hypothesis of the effects of DEM on FDI in a similar fashion as in the previous 
Chapter VI for PE and FDI with the following three steps.15 First, there is some level of Democracy 
for which Japanese FDI is insensitive. Second, FDI may not be undertaken to countries with a very 
poor record of Democracy. Thus, for a marginally higher Democracy, FDI is higher. Third, for very 
stable (developed) countries, FDI is undertaken. Moreover, a marginally lower level of Democracy is 
interpreted as a good sign for a more profitable opportunities, and thus more FDI. 
Thus, I define a non-linear inverted U-shape functional relationship between Democracy and FDI. 
Let F be the appropriately-defined real-valued functional relationship between Democracy and FDI. I 
postulate that the function G(DEM, FDI │Z)=0 be a real and multi-valued function on its domain, 
where Z stands for the other variables in equation (8). Figure 7.1 illustrates this behavior based on 
ICRG results [GMM(01)]. 
                                                           
15
 For a similar formulation for exchange rate regimes with IQ, see Alesina and Wagner (2006). 
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Figure 7.2. Relationship between Democracy [0,1] and FDI (millions of US dollar). The figure depicts inverted 
U-shape non-linear relationship between Democracy and FDI for developed and developing countries. Figures 
on the axes are the sample means: DEM=0.94 for developed countries and DEM = 0.7 for developing countries, 
FDI=1202.6 for developed countries and 515.4 for developing countries. η represents elasticity of FDI with 
respect to PE: . η=0.07 for developed countries and η=-0.41 for developing countries. 
The above is an alternative, but slightly more formal, presentation of what I explained in Section 
B with empirical counterparts. 
As illustrated in the figure, the elasticity of FDI with respect to DEM evaluated at the mean values 
for developed countries is 0.41, which is more than 5 times as larger than that for developing countries 
in absolute term (i.e. 0.07). This implies that Japanese MNC’s are not insensitive to Democracy when 
investing in developed countries. It may be inferred from the figure that the function G attains the 
(unique or non-unique) maximum at some ICRG democratic accountability level somewhere in 
between the mean values of developing countries (0.70) and developed countries (0.94). 16,17 
                                                           
16
 Figure 7.1 is inspired by the idea of Alesina and Wagner (2006). A similar figure can be found in Peng and 
Beamish (2008), but they have not mentioned the possibility of multi-valued function of G(DEM,FDI│Z)=0, or 
non-linearity. 
17
 The null hypothesis of equality of the mean for DEM, 0.94(s.d.=0.1) for developed countries and 
0.70(s.d.=0.19) for developing countries, is rejected by a normal test with the 1% level of significance.  
ICRG 
FDI 
0 
515.4 
1202.6 
0.70 0.94 
η=0.41 
η= - 0.07 
Developing countries     Developed countries 
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Does Political Environment have an effect on Japanese outward FDI flows in the same way as 
discussed in previous chapters? To answer this question I estimate equation (9). The results are 
presented in table 7.4. 
Table 7.4. Political Environment effects on Japanese outward FDI 
  Developed Developing 
  OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 
0.94 
(52.67)*** 
0.78 
(23.65)*** 
0.77 
(130)*** 
0.77 
(288.65)*** 
1.06 
(28.43)*** 
1.01 
(22.79)*** 
1 
(238.01)*** 
1.02 
(45.89)*** 
GDP 
131.8 
(2.22)** 
536.02 
(0.82) 
490.9 
(12.24)*** 
451.71 
(10.38)*** 
61.79 
(2.4)** 
486.66 
(3.27)*** 
483.08 
(12.9)*** 
473.78 
(8.7)*** 
Wages 
-40.71 
(-0.52) 
25.12 
(0.19) 
29.46 
(4.28)*** 
22.64 
(3.32)*** 
-1.26 
(-0.06) 
56.67 
(1.5) 
33.99 
(3.09)*** 
27.94 
(2.41)** 
Openness 
1.24 
(1.02) 
-0.97 
(-0.18) 
-1.34 
(-5.28)*** 
-1.5 
(-5.82)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.21) 
2.17 
(1.98)** 
2.28 
(17.4)*** 
2.28 
(8.74)*** 
Skill 
Difference 
23.73 
(0.45) 
-3.72 
(-0.06) 
0.51 
(0.32) 
6.24 
(4.51)*** 
3.42 
(0.24) 
50.91 
(2.18)** 
48.64 
(8.72)*** 
46.64 
(5.17)*** 
Investment 
Cost 
54.48 
(0.79) 
-50.32 
(-0.42) 
-47.8 
(-9.64)*** 
-55.78 
(-12.69)*** 
-23.67 
(-0.91) 
32.8 
(0.95) 
52.75 
(5.76)*** 
59.35 
(5.31)*** 
PE -4.36 (-0.21) 
11.84 
(0.21) 
10.96 
(5.09)*** 
9.04 
(3.37)*** 
-13.06 
(-1.93)* 
-9.58 
(-0.84) 
3.7 
(0.8) 
4.96 
(1.32) 
Constant -3726.74 (-2)** 
-13478.8 
(-0.78)     
-1305.14 
(-1.81)* 
-12966.37 
(-3.3)***     
Rsquared 0.93 0.93     0.88 0.9     
SE of 
regression 888.6 879.24 879.31 879.47 257.47 236.75 238.84 238.98 
Hansen J-test (p-value)a 
  
0.57 0.81   0.79 0.81 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
Again, as in Chapter VI the coefficient is statistically significant both for developed and 
developing countries. In the case of developing countries it is negative and significant only in case of 
OLS and it corresponds to my prior assumption that the Japanese MNCs are concerned about political 
stability and reduce their investment when perceiving a higher political risk. Fixed effects and GMM 
estimators are not statistically significant to draw a robust conclusion. In the case of developed 
countries the coefficient is positive and statistically significant for Japanese FDI flows (see GMM(01), 
GMM(02)). This result supports previous findings and the established hypothesis of non-linearity 
  
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
213
between PE and FDI in Chapter VI. To reiterate the suggested non-linear inverted U-shape 
relationship between PE and FDI I present its more formal definition in the same fashion as in Chapter 
VI. However, the numerical estimations are based on the presented above econometric results.  
Let F be the appropriately-defined real-valued functional relationship between PE and FDI. I 
postulate that the function F(PE, FDI │Z)=0 be a real and multi-valued function on its domain, where 
Z stands for the other variables in equation (9). To reiterate the hypothesis, it is equivalent to assume 
that there is some non-linearity between PE and FDI (cf. Alesina and Wagner, 2006; Peng and 
Beamish, 2008). Figure 7.2, with my estimated elasticities (evaluated at the sample means), visualizes 
the hypothesis.18,19 
As illustrated in the figure, the elasticity of FDI with respect to PE evaluated at the mean values 
for developed countries is 0.37, which is more than that for developing countries in absolute term (i.e. 
0.28). This implies that Japanese MNC’s are not insensitive to PE when investing in developed 
countries. It may be inferred from the figure that the function F attains the (unique or non-unique) 
maximum at some PE level between the mean values of developed countries (3.67) and developing 
countries (10.9). 
 
                                                           
18
 Figure 7.2 also is inspired by the idea of Alesina and Wagner (2006). A similar figure can be found in Peng 
and Beamish (2008), but they have not mentioned the possibility of multi-valued function of F(PE,FDI│Z)=0, or 
non-linearity. 
19
 The null hypothesis of equality of the mean for PE, 3.67(s.d.=3.54) for developed countries and 
10.93(s.d.=4.50) for developing countries, is rejected by a normal test with the 1% level of significance.  
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Figure 7.3. Relationship between PE ([0,25] scale) and FDI (millions of US dollar). The figure depicts inverted 
U-shape non-linear relationship between PE and FDI for developed and developing countries. Figures on the 
axes are the sample means: PE=3.67 for developed countries and PE = 10.9 for developing countries, 
FDI=1206.6 for developed countries and 515.37 for developing countries. η represents elasticity of FDI with 
respect to PE: . η=0.37 for developed countries and η=-0.28 for developing countries. 
Thus, both the results for separate regressions of Democracy and PE suggested an inverted U-
shape relationship with respect to FDI. In order to test these findings I pooled my sample and 
estimated the following equations: 20 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEMit + β7Dem2it + εit.       (10) 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + β7PE2it +εit.       (11) 
If the hypothesis is correct then the expected sign of β7 is negative. The results are presented in 
table 7.5 where I report only the results of GMM for my variables of interest. 
Interestingly, all the signs are negative as expected for both Democracy and PE measures. 
However, all of them are insignificant with the exception of ICRG estimators and PE estimators. Thus, 
                                                           
20 I would like to thank Professor John Devereux for suggesting this estimation to confirm my hypothesis 
empirically. 
PE 
FDI 
0 
1202.6 
515.37 
3.67 10.9 
η=0.37 
η= - 0.28 
Developed countries     Developing countries 
  
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
215
the hypothesis is marginally, albeit successfully vindicated. Further investigation is needed to support 
the hypothesis on a broader framework.  Nevertheless, in the next section I put forth a more 
complicated relationship between PE, Democracy and FDI. 
 
Table 7.5. Pooled 55 countries, ICRG squared, Polity squared, FH squared and PE squared 
  
ICRG 
squared  
Polity 
squared  FH squared  PE squared  
  GMM(01) GMM(02) GMM(01) GMM(02) GMM(01) GMM(02) GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 0.83 (34.88)*** 
0.8 
(53.5)*** 
0.79 
(82.1)*** 
0.8 
(47.26)*** 
0.77 
(77.91)*** 
0.79 
(41.47)*** 
0.8 
(62.6)*** 
0.8 
(40.73)*** 
GDP 553.38 (13.27)*** 
469.19 
(15.82)*** 
580.18 
(37.58)*** 
504.37 
(12.55)*** 
532.14 
(31.88)*** 
412.01 
(9.69)*** 
368.81 
(13.81)*** 
373.32 
(7.8)*** 
Wages 84.51 (9.35)*** 
41.34 
(5.13)*** 
30.28 
(6.73)*** 
26.49 
(3.01)*** 
24.3 
(8.49)*** 
20.35 
(2.56)** 
41.9 
(5.42)*** 
28.23 
(2.85)*** 
Openness -0.75 (-2.91)*** 
0.02 
(0.09) 
-1.56 
(-19.06)*** 
-1.57 
(-5.17)*** 
0 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.73 
(6.06)*** 
0.29 
(0.95) 
Skill 
Difference 
22.1 
(9.49)*** 
16.74 
(9.66)*** 
9.55 
(6.4)*** 
17.12 
(6.69)*** 
21.08 
(16.53)*** 
18.13 
(6.95)*** 
-0.92 
(-0.56) 
10.04 
(3.85)*** 
Investment 
Cost 
-26.23 
(-8.23)*** 
20.29 
(10)*** 
19.84 
(26.48)*** 
8.29 
(2.61)** 
45.97 
(30.06)*** 
0.82 
(0.23) 
19.69 
(7.34)*** 
-5.7 
(-1.59) 
ICRG 2698.14 (11.69)*** 
697.38 
(7.97)***       
Polity   -125.44 (-0.63) 
154.76 
(0.4)     
ICRG 
squared 
-1808.47 
(-12.1)*** 
-336.48 
(-5.26)***       
Polity 
squared   
-50.55 
(-0.41) 
-240.31 
(-0.92)     
FH     105.86 (2.25)** 
68.6 
(0.71)   
PE       -7.29 (-2.29)** 
-7.88 
(-1.54) 
FH squared     -196.76 (-5.53)*** 
-140.62 
(-1.48)   
PE squared       -0.07 (-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
SE of 
regression 736.33 733.31 748.22 748.63 741.82 741.51 733.79 733.43 
Hansen J-
test (p-
value)a 
0.67 0.81 0.90 0.98 0.51 0.85 0.81 0.82 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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2. Political Environment, Democracy and FDI 
As suggested in the previous section the results show that it is plausible to expect an inverted U-
shape relationship between PE and FDI, and between Democracy and FDI. As a step further I might 
expect that there is a negative correlation between PE and Democracy. Table 7.6 presents a correlation 
between PE and Democracy.  
Table 7.6. Correlations between PE and Democracy for a pooled sample of 55 countries 
 Correlation with PE 
Polity IV -0.38 
t-statistics -10.22 
ICRG Democratic accountability -0.50 
t-statistics -14.33 
Freedom House -0.56 
t-statistics -16.76 
Indeed all the coefficients are negative. Thus I could illustrate a more complicated relationship 
between PE, Democracy and FDI on a common 3-D figure 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Relationship between Democracy, PE and FDI. An illustration of a suggested non-linear relationship 
between Democracy, PE and FDI in a three-dimensional space. A higher number on PE axis shows an increase 
of the “political risk”. A higher number on Democracy axis is associated with higher level of Democracy. FDI 
axis shows different levels of Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing countries. 
PE and Democracy might influence each other and their interaction might have an effect on 
Japanese outward FDI as well. Mathur and Singh (2013) were probably one of the first who suggested 
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a possible interaction between corruption (as a measure of PE) and Democracy. However, they did not 
perform a strict analysis of this assumption.  
In order to investigate a probable relationship between Democracy and PE I perform a Granger 
causality test. I follow an estimation procedure suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) that takes 
into consideration non-stationarity of the data at their level.21 The results are presented in table 7.8. 
Table 7.8. Re-estimated Granger Causality (follows Toda and Yamamoto (1995)) 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
PE & ICRG ICRG Granger causes PE PE Granger causes ICRG 
PE & Polity No causality PE Granger causes Polity 
PE & FH FH Granger causes PE No causality 
In what follows, I found that in case of Developed countries Democracy (ICRG and FH) Granger 
causes PE, and in case of Developing countries PE Granger causes Democracy (ICRG and Polity)22. 
Thus, as a following step I can estimate an interaction effect of Democracy and PE on Japanese 
outward FDI. In case of developed countries I estimate PE + PE*Democracy. In case of Developing 
countries I estimate Democracy + PE*Democracy.  
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + β7DEMit* PEit + εit.       (6) 
 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEMit + β7DEMit* PEit +εit.       (7) 
 
                                                           
21
 According to Toda and Yamamoto (1995) when the data are not stationary in level direct performance of 
Granger causality test might be not an appropriate procedure. The reason is that if a Wald test is used to test 
linear restrictions on the parameters of a VAR model, and (some of) the data are non-stationary then the Wald 
test statistic does not follow its usual asymptotic chi-square distribution under the null. In line with this the 
procedure accounting for non stationarity is applied. Details are presented in Appendix 3. 
22
 However, no Granger causality was identified in PE and Polity relationship for developed countries, nor in PE 
and FH relationship for developing countries. 
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The results of the estimation are presented in table 7.9 and table 7.10. The hypothesis of a 
nonlinear relationship between FDI and PE/Democracy is again confirmed. The direct effect of PE on 
Japanese outward FDI in case of developed countries is positive. In case of developing countries the 
result is significant only for ICRG and it implies that it has a positive effect on Japanese MNCs 
activities. 
Moreover, I can estimate that in case of Developed countries a marginal effect of PE is as follows: 
∂fdi/∂pe = 22.34 – 17.85*ICRG. Thus a positive effect of PE increase on Japanese FDI is reduced if 
Democracy increases.  
Table 7.9. Developed countries. Political environment and Democracy 
  PE and ICRG  PE and FH 
  OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 0.94 (52.59)*** 
0.78 
(23.61)*** 
0.77 
(151.46)*** 
0.77 
(151.46)*** 
0.94 
(52.06)*** 
0.78 
(23.62)*** 
0.77 
(132.58)*** 
0.77 
(244.42)*** 
GDP 131.83 (2.21)** 
542.25 
(0.83) 
434.39 
(13.04)*** 
439.62 
(13.04)*** 
138.4 
(2.21)** 
578.2 
(0.87) 
506.07 
(14.37)*** 
559.8 
(11.06)*** 
Wages -40.62 (-0.51) 
20.39 
(0.16) 
23.98 
(6.43)*** 
12.36 
(6.43)*** 
-32.5 
(-0.4) 
7.17 
(0.05) 
15.47 
(4.52)*** 
-2.81 
(-0.28) 
Openness 1.24 (1.01) 
-0.96 
(-0.18) 
-0.97 
(-4.73)*** 
-1.13 
(-4.73)*** 
1.28 
(1.04) 
-1.02 
(-0.19) 
-1.18 
(-4.94)*** 
-1.34 
(-5.38)*** 
Skill 
Difference 
23.77 
(0.45) 
-3.43 
(-0.05) 
1.61 
(1.07) 
4.13 
(1.07) 
28.42 
(0.52) 
-5.87 
(-0.09) 
-2.59 
(-1.19) 
-0.53 
(-0.29) 
Investment 
Cost 
54.61 
(0.76) 
-54.49 
(-0.45) 
-53.47 
(-13.11)*** 
-56.47 
(-13.11)*** 
63.76 
(0.86) 
-57.67 
(-0.47) 
-50.79 
(-11.67)*** 
-69.15 
(-11.55)*** 
PE -4.64 (-0.1) 
27 
(0.33) 
22.34 
(6.61)*** 
21.89 
(6.61)*** 
3.39 
(0.11) 
5.28 
(0.09) 
4.2 
(2.74)*** 
3.82 
(1.36) 
PE*ICRG 0.38 (0.01) 
-19.96 
(-0.25) 
-17.85 
(-5.18)*** 
-16.57 
(-5.18)***     
PE*FH     21.14 (0.34) 
-47.78 
(-0.35) 
-40.18 
(-9.04)*** 
-52.66 
(-6.92)*** 
Constant -3728.95 (-1.97)* 
-13592.91 
(-0.79)   
-4010.67 
(-1.96)* 
-14477.03 
(-0.83)   
R-squared 0.93 0.93   0.93 0.93   
SE of 
regression 889.71 880.36 880.48 880.57 889.58 880.29 880.36 880.38 
Hansen J-test (p-value)a  0.76 0.87   0.61 0.64 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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In case of Developing countries (based on ICRG estimations) a marginal effect of ICRG is as 
follows: ∂fdi/∂icrg = 221.99 + 8.8*PE. Thus, a positive effect of Democracy improvement is 
strengthened when a PE increases. 
In sum, in case of developed countries Japanese MNCs might seek lower democracy associated 
with higher political risk. This could be explained by the fact that more profitable opportunities open 
for Japanese MNCs. In addition there are more favourable conditions for monopolistic advantages. 
And since at the initial level democracy and PE are relatively stable in case of Developed countries, 
their slight deterioration does not threaten the profits of foreign affiliates of an MNC. In case of 
developing countries a higher democracy associated with lower PE encourages FDI. This is a new and 
somewhat interesting finding. It suggests that Japanese MNCs seek a higher democracy which 
probably ensures more property rights protection, and a decrease in PE because of an increase in 
Democracy leads to more profitable opportunities for MNCs. Thus, FDI are increased. 
This result is highly important from the policy prescription perspective as the host countries’ 
government could consider democracy, political stability and the aspect of economic development 
stage together when prescribing FDI attracting policies.  
In case of developing countries an increase in Democracy will potentially lead to more FDI. If 
associated with PE, the effect of an increase in Democracy might be strengthened by lower PE.  
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On the other hand in case of developed countries the issue may be more controversial. Up to a 
certain threshold level an increase in Democracy will lead to more FDI, but if the increase in 
Democracy goes further beyond the level that is necessary for MNCs’ operations it might actually lead 
to less FDI. And the effect is even strengthened by higher PE. Thus, a certain balance might be 
necessary. 
 
Table 7.10. Developing countries. Democracy and Political Environment 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
  PE and ICRG PE and Polity 
  OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) OLS FE GMM(01) GMM(02) 
FDI(-1) 1.06 (28.65)*** 
1.01 
(22.62)*** 
1 
(152.85)*** 
1 
(81.68)*** 
1.07 
(27.33)*** 
1.03 
(21.54)*** 
1.03 
(70.09)*** 
1 
(81.68)*** 
GDP 74.33 (2.93)*** 
460.62 
(3.18)*** 
497.4 
(15.98)*** 
517.49 
(11.06)*** 
69.04 
(2.47)** 
505.19 
(3.24)*** 
483.9 
(13.03)*** 
517.49 
(11.06)*** 
Wages 7.75 (0.36) 
46.54 
(1.23) 
32.22 
(3.53)*** 
35.23 
(3.15)*** 
0.31 
(0.01) 
56.25 
(1.47) 
40.08 
(4.49)*** 
35.23 
(3.15)*** 
Openness 0.57 (1.77)* 
2.24 
(2.07)** 
2.07 
(18.56)*** 
1.88 
(6.71)*** 
0.15 
(0.43) 
2.63 
(1.88)* 
2.5 
(16.95)*** 
1.88 
(6.71)*** 
Skill 
Difference 
13.63 
(0.94) 
49.75 
(2.14)** 
48.67 
(7.68)*** 
43.56 
(5.61)*** 
6.72 
(0.46) 
56.03 
(2.34)** 
46.61 
(7.7)*** 
47.01 
(5.91)*** 
Investment 
Cost 
-6.91 
(-0.27) 
31.1 
(0.92) 
47.75 
(4.74)*** 
54.32 
(6.33)*** 
-4.99 
(-0.19) 
42.64 
(1.21) 
51.66 
(5.92)*** 
67.21 
(9.44)*** 
ICRG 381.66 (3.16)*** 
441.95 
(1.93)* 
221.99 
(2.13)** 
123.48 
(1.23)     
Polity     116.64 (0.92) 
109.06 
(0.4) 
-8.42 
(-0.22) 
-27.41 
(-0.72) 
PE*ICRG -2.7 (-0.3) 
-10.16 
(-0.64) 
8.8 
(1.53) 
11.46 
(2.34)**     
PE*Polity     -9.45 (-1.2) 
-5.94 
(-0.41) 
4.03 
(0.86) 
6.82 
(1.31) 
Constant -2192.11 (-3.09)*** 
-12610.14 
(-3.37)***   
-1771.93 
(-2.37)** 
-13647.98 
(-3.4)***   
R-squared 0.88 0.91   0.88 0.91   
SE of 
regression 253.17 234.86 236.57 237.56 259.57 238.58 239.69 239.98 
Hansen J-test (p-value)a  0.77 0.82   0.76 0.67 
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F. Concluding remarks 
This chapter empirically examined the outward Japanese FDI with a panel data of a total of 55 
developed and developing countries for the period 1995-2010. Based on the OLI theoretical 
framework and knowledge-capital models, a number of traditional determinants (GDP, Human capital 
indicators, Investment cost, Trade cost, etc.) are complemented with two non-traditional determinants 
for Japanese FDI, namely Democracy and Political Environment. Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed 
Effects and Generalized method of moments are applied to this panel data set. The main conclusions 
are based on the GMM specifications that implied GMM instruments as predetermined and 
endogenous. The estimated results for traditional variables are mostly consistent with the findings in 
the previous chapters and are robust for all specifications.  
Since from the previous findings and literature review I suspected that the effect of Democracy on 
FDI may be different in case of developed and developing countries I derived a theoretical framework 
in the same fashion as for PE in Chapter VI. The theoretical results suggested a non-linear relationship 
for developed and developing countries. 
And, indeed, in the econometric analysis, Democracy was differently signed for developed and 
developing countries. Although it was measured by three different measures, namely ICRG, Polity and 
Freedom House, the results were robust. In case of Developing countries higher Democracy is 
associated with more FDI which is consistent with most of the previous findings (Jensen 2003, Asiedu 
and Lien 2011 etc). In case of developed counties higher Democracy turned out to be associated with 
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less FDI which is consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Li and Resnick 2003). In explaining 
these theoretical and empirical results I proposed an inverted U-shape non-linear relationship between 
Democracy and FDI. 
Another concern in this chapter, Political environment (PE), was differently signed for developed 
and developing countries as well. In case of developing countries it had a negative sign which is 
consistent with most of the preceding literature. In case of developed countries the sign was positive, 
implying that Japanese MNCs tend to increase FDI for a marginal increase in PE (i.e. a marginal 
decrease in institutional quality), because political environment in developed countries may be far 
above what is necessary for MNCs' operations (Peng and Beamish, 2008). This result supports the 
findings in the previous chapters.  
In order to test the results I pooled all the countries in one sample and regressed it on a squared 
term. An inverted U-shape relationship was confirmed robustly only in case of ICRG as a measure of 
Democracy and in case of PE. 
Finally, I examined a relationship between PE and Democracy and its possible interaction effect 
on Japanese outward FDI. First, the Granger causality test showed same directional causality from 
Democracy to PE in case of developed countries and from PE to Democracy in case of developing 
countries. Second, based on Granger causality I examined effect of interaction term between PE and 
Democracy on Japanese MNCs activities. The results showed that in case of developed countries 
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Japanese MNCs might seek lower democracy associated with higher political risk, while in case of 
developing countries a higher democracy associated with political risk decrease. This line of research 
is highly important from the government policies perspective since countries’ development stage, 
Democracy and Political environment could be considered simultaneously.     
However, one of the possible limitations and extensions of this study could be an industry level 
analysis of institutional factors effects on Japanese outward FDI. This would allow depicting the 
micro-level characteristics of the Japanese MNCs activities’ determinants. It rests on my future agenda 
to extend the research in this direction. Nevertheless, I present in Appendix 6 a preliminary data 
review and estimation.   
Thus, despite several limitations of the analysis, I conclude that Japanese FDI can be reasonably 
explained by the proposed independent variables. As far as I know, this is the first formal attempt to 
examine theoretically and empirically the effects of political environment on Japanese FDI to 
developed and developing countries using the Euromoney Country Risk index and three measures of 
Democracy namely ICRG, Polity and Freedom House. I successfully found that democracy and 
political environment is, as expected, significantly associated with Japanese FDI flows. These findings 
have important implications for future policy consideration by host countries and academic research 
on Japanese outward FDI. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of countries used in the study 
Developed countries (32 countries) Developing countries (23 countries) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, United States 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, 
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, United Arab 
Emirates, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam 
 
Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics of variables in the study 
Developed countries 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W IC SD OPENNESS PE POLITY ICRG FH 
Mean 1202.57 26.38 2.60 6.77 76.12 0.67 3.67 0.98 0.94 0.97 
Median 94.34 26.19 2.93 7.01 69.28 0.56 2.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maximum 23186.66 30.09 7.16 8.77 177.93 4.05 17.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 
-607.84 23.68 0.48 3.81 19.95 -1.48 0.00 0.70 0.33 0.33 
Std. Dev. 3357.61 1.27 0.92 1.04 33.93 0.99 3.54 0.05 0.10 0.10 
Skewness 4.34 0.62 -0.35 -0.68 1.07 0.39 1.10 -2.60 -2.38 -3.63 
Kurtosis 23.68 3.49 4.39 2.76 3.57 2.86 3.49 10.47 10.61 16.51 
Coef of variation 2.79 0.05 0.36 0.15 0.45 1.49 0.96 0.05 0.11 0.10 
 
Developing countries 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W IC SD OPENNESS PE POLITY ICRG FH 
Mean 515.37 25.80 0.79 5.46 98.25 1.29 10.93 0.79 0.70 0.64 
Median 293.31 25.69 0.85 5.59 58.41 1.17 11.18 0.90 0.75 0.67 
Maximum 4408.43 27.51 2.44 8.67 443.08 5.14 22.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 
-2.35 23.01 -1.74 1.81 20.20 -1.77 0.85 0.00 0.17 0.00 
Std. Dev. 717.39 0.91 1.00 1.11 90.71 1.45 4.50 0.21 0.19 0.25 
Skewness 2.56 -0.57 -0.40 0.09 2.18 0.40 -0.18 -1.58 -0.45 -0.60 
Kurtosis 11.16 3.87 2.34 4.00 7.55 2.52 2.84 4.60 2.48 2.49 
Coef of variation 1.39 0.04 1.27 0.20 0.92 1.13 0.41 0.27 0.27 0.38 
 
Pooled sample 
 FDI LOG_GDP LOG_W IC SD OPENNESS PE POLITY ICRG FH 
 Mean  975.69  26.18  2.00  6.33  0.87  83.42  6.07  0.91  0.86  0.86 
 Median  126.17  26.01  2.13  6.37  0.70  65.30  4.85  1.00  0.93  1.00 
 Maximum  23186.66  30.08  7.16  8.77  5.14  443.08  22.33  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 Minimum -607.84  23.00 -1.74  1.81 -1.77  19.94  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.00 
 Std. Dev.  2796.36  1.19  1.27  1.22  1.19  59.89  5.16  0.15  0.17  0.22 
 Skewness  5.26  0.58 -0.45 -0.41 0.66  3.10 0.67 -2.91 -1.38 -1.68 
 Kurtosis  34.59  4.08  3.04  2.65  3.33  15.98  2.48  12.13  4.28  5.04 
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Appendix 3. Granger causality test note 
This appendix describes the details of Granger Causality test for causality between PE and 
Democracy [ICRG, Polity IV and Freedom_house]. According to Toda and Yamamoto (1995) when 
the data are not stationary in level, the direct performance of the Granger causality test might be not an 
appropriate procedure. The reason is that if a Wald test is used to test linear restrictions on the 
parameters of a VAR model, and (some of) the data are non-stationary then the Wald test statistic does 
not follow its usual asymptotic chi-square distribution under the null. In line with this the following 
procedure is applied: 
Step 1: Check for stationarity using Panel Unit Root test 
The results of the Levin Lin Chu t statistics are presented in the table A3-1 below. 
Table A3-1. Panel Unit Root test 
  Developed Developing 
  Levin, Lin & Chu t* Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
Panel Unit Root test Level First 
difference 
Level First 
difference 
Political Environment -0.39672 -2.01854 -0.95173 -9.01669 
ICRG -21.7876   -5.68569   
Polity_IV -3.09896   -4.46013   
Freedom_house -2.3182   -4.95935   
Step 2: Find the maximum order of integration m. 
From this table PE is found to be I(1) for both developed and developing countries. All other 
variables are I(0). Hence, I may state that m=1. 
Step 3: Set up a VAR model for EPR and ICRG (Polity IV and Freedom House respectively). 
Step 4: Determine the appropriate max lag length using Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
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The results of lag order selection according to Akaike information criteria are presented in the 
table A3-2 below. 
Table A3-2. Lag order selection 
  Developed countries  Developing countries  
PE and ICRG 4 7 
PE and Polity_IV 2 2 
PE and Freedom_house 2 2 
Step 5: Test for Granger non-causality using Wald test.  
In order to fix the asymptotics I add m lags as exogenous variables. If at this step one performs 
standard Granger causality F-test it might be biased due to non-stationarity asymptotics. 
The results are presented in table A3-3. 
Table A3-3. Granger causality for developed and developing countries (Wald test) 
 Developed countries Developing countries 
Granger causality p-value Decision Conclusion p-value Decision Conclusion 
Null of no causality     Causality   Causality 
From PE to ICRG 0.2881 not reject No 0.0431 reject PE -> ICRG 
From ICRG to PE 0.0018 reject ICRG -> PE 0.7161 not reject No 
From PE to Polity IV 0.5135 not reject No 0.0356 reject PE -> Polity 
From Polity IV to PE 0.2176 not reject No 0.6773 not reject No 
From PE to FH 0.2011 not reject No 0.7124 not reject No 
From FH to PE 0.0123 reject FH -> PE 0.1665 not reject No 
Conclusion: In case of Developed and Developing countries I have reasonable evidence of 
Granger causality both ways between PE and ICRG based on the lags selection from AIC. For 
developed countries I have reasonable evidence of Granger causality from Democracy to PE. For 
developing countries I have reasonable evidence of Granger causality from PE to Democracy. 
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Appendix 4. Additional estimation with a modification on FDI dependent variable 
In this appendix I present additional estimation of the empirical model with a modification on 
FDI. The scope of the analysis is to provide additional evidence of the results presented in the main 
body of the Chapter VII. 
I follow the same empirical strategy as in Chapters IV-VII. The dependent variable in the study is 
FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in US Dollar (FDI). In fact, around 5.26% of the data have 
negative values. These negative FDI flows represent the capital withdrawals by the parent company 
from the foreign affiliate. For instance, it may appear under the form of shares’ sale to the local or 
other multinational company. Thus the dependent variable cannot be transformed logarithmically 
which leads to its higher variation. Hence the statistical inference may be affected by this dependent 
variable nature. 
In this appendix I perform the analysis with three transformations of the dependent variable with 
the objective to reduce its variance. First, I transform logarithmically a stock of FDI which is 
calculated as a sum of FDI flow from 1995 to year t. Second I divide the flow of FDI by the stock of 
FDI in year t. Finally, I divide the flow of FDI by GDP in the host country in year t. The objective of 
these transformations is to scale down the FDI flow value and use negative values information as well. 
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 The statistical characteristics of these three transformed dependent variables for developed and 
developing countries are shown in table A4-1 below. 
Table A4-1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable in the study 
 Developed   
 
Developing   
 
Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by GDP 
 Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by GDP 
Mean 6.78 0.19 2.09  7.12 0.22 3.18 
Median 6.79 0.12 0.42  7.58 0.13 1.13 
Maximum 12.35 1.00 122.57  9.89 1.00 23.73 
Minimum -4.60 -8.79 -18.93  3.08 -0.07 -0.14 
Std. Dev. 2.39 0.54 8.14  1.83 0.25 4.33 
Skewness -0.43 -10.98 10.51  -0.46 1.90 2.03 
Kurtosis 4.87 183.28 140.25  1.94 6.01 7.64 
 
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
                   yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the transformed outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it 
denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
dimension. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. yit-1 is a 
lagged dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + εit.       (1) 
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(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEMit + εit.       (2) 
 
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. DEMit  
shows a level of democracy of a host country i at time t whose change is expected to influence FDI 
flows. Democracy measure is calculated from the ICRG democratic accountability index. PEit 
represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t. The political index is calculated from the 
Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index, and has been scored from 0 to 25 with a higher score 
indicating a higher “political risk”.  
The data set consists of annual observations for the period 1995-2010 for the 2 sets of countries: 
32 developed and 23 developing countries23. I follow the same methodology as in the main body and 
estimate the model by Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator with orthogonal deviations set-up. 
The results are presented in tables A4-2, A4-3 and A4-4. In general the results are consistent with the 
main body of the dissertation. Note that the main variables of interest are significant and signed 
consistently with the final hypotheses presented at Figure 7.3 in Chapter VII. Political Environment is 
positive and significant in case of developed countries (GMM(a), GMM(e), GMM((j)) and it is 
negative and significant in case of developing countries (GMM(c), GMM(g), GMM(k)).  
 
                                                           
23
 I use OECD membership as a criterion for highly-developed economies. Developed and developing countries 
in the study are listed in the Appendix 1.  
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Table A4-2. The determinants of Japanese FDI 
 Dependent: Log transformation of the FDI stock 
  Developed   Developing   
  GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) 
FDI(-1) 0.59 (123.37)*** 
0.56 
(115.21)*** 
0.59 
(27.72)*** 
0.59 
(24.53)*** 
GDP 1 (9.37)*** 
1.05 
(6.94)*** 
1.19 
(20.82)*** 
1.24 
(16.02)*** 
Wages 0.28 (11.97)*** 
0.23 
(12.12)*** 
0.003 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.6) 
Openness 0.003 (2.09)** 
0.01 
(3.83)*** 
-0.002 
(-7.14)*** 
-0.002 
(-7.39)*** 
Skill Difference -0.01 (-2.02)** 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(2.66)*** 
0.04 
(4.76)*** 
Investment Cost 0.03 (4.22)*** 
0.01 
(0.82) 
0.02 
(3.85)*** 
0.02 
(2.08)** 
PE 0.02 (2.04)**   
-0.01 
(-1.84)*   
ICRG 
  
-0.83 
(-6.16)***   
-0.03 
(-0.29) 
SE of regression 0.37 0.37 0.17 0.17 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.19 0.32 0.62 0.64 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
 Table A4-3. The determinants of Japanese FDI 
 Dependent: FDI flow divided by stock FDI 
  Developed   Developing   
  GMM(e) GMM(f) GMM(g) GMM(h) 
FDI(-1) -0.04 (-3.64)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.86)* 
0.4 
(12.61)*** 
0.38 
(11.62)*** 
GDP -0.85 (-2.93)*** 
-0.66 
(-6.21)*** 
0.06 
(1.76)* 
0.08 
(2.52)** 
Wages 0.03 (0.39) 
0.01 
(0.38) 
-0.03 
(-2.21)** 
-0.03 
(-2.27)** 
Openness -0.0001 (-0.03) 
-0.0003 
(-0.28) 
-0.0001 
(-0.41) 
-0.0005 
(-1.61) 
Skill Difference 0.08 (11.08)*** 
0.05 
(4.7)*** 
0.01 
(1.02) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
Investment Cost 0.09 (3.34)*** 
0.08 
(4.5)*** 
0.02 
(3.45)*** 
0.03 
(4.94)*** 
PE 0.03 (2.42)**   
-0.01 
(-3.09)***   
ICRG 
 
 0.08 
(0.52)  
 0.34 
(4.89)*** 
SE of regression 0.51 0.51 0.12 0.13 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.19 0.03 0.19 0.37 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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Table A4-4. The determinants of Japanese FDI 
 Dependent: FDI flow divided by GDP 
  Developed   Developing   
  GMM(i) GMM(j) GMM(k) GMM(l) 
FDI(-1) -0.05 (-2.99)*** 
-0.06 
(-11.91)*** 
0.23 
(4.4)*** 
0.14 
(3.81)*** 
GDP -1.04 (-0.69) 
-3.96 
(-4.05)*** 
1.62 
(2.11)** 
4.03 
(8.06)*** 
Wages 0.03 (0.12) 
-0.24 
(-0.94) 
-0.18 
(-0.64) 
0.09 
(0.42) 
Openness 0.07 (4.77)*** 
0.08 
(4.88)*** 
-0.02 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.02 
(-2.91)*** 
Skill Difference 0.09 (1.23) 
0.23 
(2.32)** 
0.6 
(4.34)*** 
0.93 
(9.08)*** 
Investment Cost -0.44 (-2.51)** 
-0.57 
(-3.35)*** 
1.3 
(5.2)*** 
1.96 
(11.3)*** 
PE 0.68 (4.54)***   
-0.43 
(-6.43)***   
ICRG 
 
 -2.8 
(-1.86)*  
3.15 
(2.64)*** 
SE of regression 7.29 7.32 2.88 2.86 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.14 0.26 0.38 0.45 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
Democracy measured by ICRG democratic accountability index is negative and significant in case 
of developed countries (GMM(b) and GMM(j)) and it is positive and significant (GMM(h) and 
GMM(l)) in case of developing countries. Thus the main conclusions of the dissertation are validated 
successfully.  
Nevertheless the specifications for developed countries when FDI flow divided by FDI stock and 
FDI flow divided by GDP are used might not be economically meaningful. Lagged FDI and GDP 
showed negative effect on the FDI (GMM(e), GMM(f), GMM(i), GMM(j)). Thus the dynamic effect 
of FDI flows and local market size proxied by GDP have a negative impact on Japanese MNCs 
activities scaled down by stock or host countries’ GDP. This result is counterintuitive and difficult to 
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interpret economically.24 Thus, the conclusions based on GMM(e), GMM(f), GMM(i) and GMM(j) 
specifications should be treated with caution.  
Despite these estimation results’ issues I could conclude that the main findings discussed in the 
main body of the dissertation are successfully vindicated by these additional estimations. In particular, 
PE and Democracy were confirmed to have a non-linear inverted U-shape effect on Japanese outward 
FDI to developed and developing countries. 
 
Appendix 5. Additional estimation with a modification on FDI dependent variable 
In this appendix I present additional estimation of the empirical model with the modification on 
FDI variable average calculation. The scope of the analysis is to provide additional evidence of the 
results presented in the main body of the dissertation. 
I follow the same empirical strategy as in Chapter IV-VII. The dependent variable in the study is 
FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in US Dollar (FDI). In this appendix I use three-year averages of 
the data in order to reduce the potential measurement error and cyclical fluctuations that can influence 
the results. In addition in order to avoid the difficulty of interpreting the lagged FDI as an explanatory 
variable a simple average is calculated.25 Thus, this appendix aims at complementing the estimations 
                                                           
24
 However, I present few interpretations for a negative FDI dynamic effect in the next Appendix 6. 
25
 In the main body of the Chapter VII I use three-year moving average process in order to keep a higher number 
of observations. However, this measurement approach may involve difficulties in interpreting the economic 
meaning of the lagged FDI as an explanatory variable.  
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presented in the main body in Chapter VII by using an alternative measure of Japanese MNCs 
activities.  
Note that ten observations of the three-year FDI average are negative values.26 These negative 
FDI flows represent the capital withdrawals by the parent company from the foreign affiliate. For 
instance, it may appear under the form of shares’ sale to the local or other multinational company. 
Thus, I drop these 10 observations in order to employ only the positive values of the dependent 
variable and transform it logarithmically.  
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
                   yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the transformed outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it 
denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
dimension. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. yit-1 is a 
lagged dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + εit.       
(1) 
 (FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEMit + εit.       
(2) 
                                                           
26
 These are observation for United Arab Emirates, Romania, Colombia, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico 
in the period of 2004-2006 and observations for Greece, Ireland and Portugal in the period of 2007-2010. 
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(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PE2it + εit.       
(3) 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEM2it + εit.       
(4) 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + β7PE*DEMit + εit.       
(5) 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6DEMit + β7PE*DEMit + εit.       
(6) 
 
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. DEMit  
shows a level of democracy of a host country i at time t whose change is expected to influence FDI 
flows. Democracy measure is calculated from the ICRG democratic accountability index. PEit 
represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t. The political index is calculated from the 
Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index, and has been scored from 0 to 25 with a higher score 
indicating a higher “political risk”.  
The statistical characteristics of the variables are shown in table A5-1 below.  
Table A5-1. Descriptive statistics of variables in the study 
Developed Developing All countries 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
LOG_FDI 4.85 2.55 5.48 2.01 5.08 2.38 
LOG_GDP 26.26 1.39 25.93 1.05 26.14 1.28 
LOG_W 2.65 0.90 0.83 0.96 2.00 1.27 
SD 0.66 0.85 1.32 1.29 0.90 1.07 
IC 6.80 0.99 5.56 1.17 6.35 1.21 
OPENNESS 82.31 46.43 110.11 103.47 92.29 73.28 
PE 3.57 3.46 10.32 4.41 5.99 5.01 
ICRG 0.94 0.10 0.64 0.22 0.83 0.21 
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Following the estimation strategy of the Chapter VII I, first, estimate equations 1 and 2 for 
developed and developing countries in order to depict a direct effect of the PE and Democracy on 
Japanese MNCs activities. Second, I add a PE and Democracy squared term (equations 3 and 4) in 
order to estimate the hypothesis of inverted U-shape non-linear relationship between Japanese outward 
FDI and PE (Democracy) indexes. Finally, I estimate an interaction effect of Democracy and PE on 
Japanese outward FDI for developed and developing countries (equations 5 and 6). 
The data set consists of three-year averaged observations for the period 1995-2010 for the 2 sets 
of countries: 32 developed and 23 developing countries27. I employ a panel data analysis in order to 
capture static and dynamic nature of the FDI flows, accounting for at the same time possible 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity. By including lagged FDI flows as an additional 
regressor I change a static model to a dynamic panel model. Most of the variables enter as three-year 
averages. Thus my panel data set consists of two sets and two dimensions: one dimension is cross-
section (32 developed countries and 24 developing countries: i = 1,….,N) and the other is time 
dimension (5 periods: 1995-1997; 1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2010: t=1,…,T).  The 
total number of observations in this context is 280 for all countries; 160 for developed countries and 
120 for developing ones, and it can be considered adequate to produce robust estimations for the scope 
of the analysis. I follow the same methodology as in the main body and estimate the model by 
                                                           
27
 I use OECD membership as a criterion for highly-developed economies. Developed and developing countries 
in the study are listed in the Appendix 1.  
  
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
236
Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator with orthogonal deviations set-up. The results are presented 
in table A5-2 below.  
In general the results are consistent with the main body of the dissertation. Note that the main 
variables of interest are significant and signed consistently with the final hypotheses shown in figure 
7.3 in Chapter VII. Political Environment is positive and significant in case of developed countries 
(GMM(a)) and it is negative and significant in case of developing countries (GMM(d)). Democracy 
measured by ICRG democratic accountability index is negative and significant in case of developed 
countries (GMM(b)) and it is positive and partially significant (GMM(e) and GMM(f)) in case of 
developing countries.  In order to confirm whether the hypothesis of inverted non-linear U-shape 
relationship between Japanese outward FDI and PE (Democracy) is supported by this data set I 
followed the strategy of Chapter VII and added a squared term of PE (Democracy) to the explanatory 
variables. Both, PE and Democracy squared terms are significant and negatively signed thus 
supporting the main hypothesis (GMM(g) and GMM(h)). 
Finally, the interaction term analysis of PE and Democracy effects on Japanese MNCs activities 
was also performed (GMM(c) and GMM(f)). The results are consistent with the main body suggesting 
that in case of developed countries a slight increase in PE together with a slight decrease in 
Democracy level positively affects Japanese FDI. And in case of developing countries a decrease in 
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PE together with an increase in Democracy are positively associated with Japanese MNCs activities. 
Thus the main conclusions of the dissertation are confirmed successfully.  
Table A5-2. The determinants of Japanese FDI 
Dependent
: 
Log transformation of the FDI flow 
 Developed Developing All 
 GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) GMM(e) GMM(f) GMM(g) GMM(h) 
FDI(-1) -0.42 (-6.42)*** 
-0.41 
(-14.08)*** 
-0.5 
(-6.34)*** 
-0.11 
(-4.11)*** 
-0.12 
(-2)** 
-0.04 
(-0.6) 
-0.15 
(-2.13)** 
-0.22 
(-3.53)*** 
GDP -0.51 (-1.32) 
-0.13 
(-0.62) 
-0.42 
(-1.1) 
1.45 
(6.3)*** 
1.13 
(2.1)** 
1.2 
(3.87)*** 
-0.05 
(-0.25) 
0.27 
(0.54) 
Wages 1.73 (6.49)*** 
1.05 
(6.96)*** 
1.37 
(5.82)*** 
0.62 
(7.42)*** 
0.69 
(3.8)*** 
0.25 
(1.56) 
1.07 
(4.2)*** 
1.029 
(5.12)*** 
Openness -0.01 (-0.68) 
-0.0258 
(-7.23)*** 
-0.06 
(-4.08)*** 
0.0005 
(0.18) 
0.0028 
(0.8) 
0.005 
(1.47) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.009 
(-1.35) 
Skill 
Difference 
0.06 
(0.32) 
0.2 
(5.44)*** 
0.75 
(3.44)*** 
0.36 
(2.32)** 
0.59 
(2.53)** 
0.57 
(3.76)*** 
0.15 
(1.11) 
0.35 
(2.33)** 
Investment 
Cost 
0.8 
(2.7)*** 
-0.041 
(-0.14) 
-0.51 
(-1.23) 
0.49 
(2.5)** 
0.333 
(1.72)* 
1.1 
(5.86)*** 
0.45 
(2.07)** 
-0.04 
(-0.21) 
PE 0.32 (1.98)**  
0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.07 
(-2.36)**   
0.3 
(1.42)  
PE*DEM 
  
-0.36 
(-2.39)**   
-0.21 
(-3)***   
ICRG 
 
-2.41 
(-2.04)**   
1.55 
(0.91) 
1.81 
(1.72)*  
15.41 
(2.41)** 
PE2 
      
-0.02 
(-2.23)**  
ICRG2 
       
-11.56 
(-2.56)** 
SE of 
regression 1.1 1.05 1.22 0.66 0.7 0.79 0.97 0.97 
Hansen J-
test (p-
value)a 
0.57 0.80 0.81 0.39 0.29 0.13 0.32 0.42 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
Nevertheless, some explanatory variables’ results were not consistent with prior presumptions. 
For instance, Wages are positively and significantly associated with Japanese outward FDI. However, 
as mentioned in the main body of Chapter VII this counterintuitive result has already been 
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encountered in some previous studies (e.g. Wei 2000). Surprisingly, lagged FDI was negatively signed 
for most of the specifications. In fact the data are three-year averages for five periods. Thus, a possible 
interpretation of this negative effect might consist in the crisis effect (Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and 
the financial crisis started in 2007). It is likely that after the crisis occurred Japanese MNCs ceased 
their foreign activities, and, thus, the negative dynamic effect might be associated with this FDI 
decrease.28 
Despite these estimation results’ issues I could conclude that the main findings discussed in the 
main body of Chapter VII are successfully vindicated by these additional estimations. In particular, PE 
and Democracy were confirmed to have a non-linear inverted U-shape effect on Japanese outward FDI 
to developed and developing countries. 
 
Appendix 6. Additional analysis of the industry level FDI 
In this appendix I present some additional estimation of the industry level data of Japanese 
outward FDI to developed and developing countries. The scope of this analysis is to initiate an 
extension of the research in order to address industry level distribution of Japanese outward FDI. 
These data are collected from two main sources: Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Bank of 
                                                           
28
 However, this result was obtained in several other studies (e.g. Asiedu and Lien 2011, Bayoumi and Lipworth 
1998). For instance, Bayoumi and Lipworth (1998) proposed an alternative interpretation as a stock adjustment 
process. According to them once the FDI stock is largely increased it is followed by a diminution in subsequent 
FDI flows. 
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Japan (BOJ). The data for the period of 1995-2004 years are collected from MOF statistics and the 
data for the period 2005-2010 are collected from BOJ statistics.29  
The manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries’ distribution of Japanese outward FDI in all 
55 countries, 32 developed countries and 23 developing countries is presented at the figures A6-1, A6-
2 and A6-3.30 
According to these data Japanese MNCs tend to invest more in manufacturing sector in 
developing countries and in non-manufacturing sector in developed countries. This could be explained 
by the fact that Japanese MNCs target to relocate production activities to lower cost developing 
countries while financial and wholesale activities to developed countries where higher profit 
opportunities can be found.   
                                                           
29
 There is an issue of data consistency for these two different data sources. For instance all data until 2004 from 
MOF statistics are positive numbers while some FDI values after 2005 from BOJ statistics are negative. 
Nevertheless, OECD statistical department reports the industry level FDI from these two sources without any 
adjustments. (e.g. manufacturing total world FDI value for 1995 in MOF statistics is 18236 of 100 mil. Yen and 
in OECD statistics it is reported as 1823600 mil. Yen. In 2006 BOJ FDI statistics for manufacturing is 40166 of 
100 mil. Yen and in OECD statistics it is reported as 4016600 mil. Yen.) Thus, I consider these two data sources 
consistent for the purpose of the current analysis. 
30
 Manufacturing sector is represented by Food, Textile, Lumber&Pulp, Chemical, Metal, Machinery, Electrical, 
Transport and other industries. Non-manufacturing sector is represented by Farming&Forestry, Fishery, Mining, 
Construction, Trade, Finance&Insurance, Service, Transportation, Real Estate and other industries. 
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Figure A6-1. Japanese Outward FDI to 55 countries by industries (1995-2010, 100 millions of Japanese 
Yen). 
Source: Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance 
 
Figure A6-2. Japanese Outward FDI to 32 developed countries by industries (1995-2010, 100 millions of 
Japanese Yen). 
Source: Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance 
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Figure A6-3. Japanese Outward FDI to 32 developed countries by industries (1995-2010, 100 millions of 
Japanese Yen). 
Source: Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance 
I follow the same empirical strategy as in Chapters IV-VII. The dependent variable in the study is 
FDI flow from Japan to a ‘country i’ in Japanese Yen (FDI). I employ four types of dependent variable 
in the analysis. First is Japanese outward FDI flow. I use a logarithmic transformation of 3-year 
average to smooth out cyclical fluctuations. Second I calculate FDI stock and transform it 
logarithmically. Third I divide FDI flow by FDI stock. Finally I divide  FDI flow by host country 
GDP. The statistical characteristics of these dependent variables for developed and developing 
countries in manufacturing industry are shown in table A6-1 below. In this appendix I present 
preliminary estimation results for the Japanese outward FDI in manufacturing sector. 
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Table A6-1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable in the study 
 Developed Developing 
 
Log of FDI 
3-year 
average 
Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
FDI stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
GDP 
Log of FDI 3-
year average Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
FDI stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
GDP 
Mean 3.82 6.31 0.38 1.05 4.20 6.32 0.13 2.29 
Median 4.24 6.59 0.13 0.26 5.32 6.87 0.14 0.95 
Maximum 9.16 11.72 51.43 81.19 8.54 10.81 1.00 26.54 
Minimum -6.91 0.55 -6.91 -4.68 -6.91 -1.51 -32.11 -1.98 
Std. Dev. 3.47 2.29 2.63 4.74 3.39 2.48 1.93 3.40 
Skewness -1.77 -0.07 18.39 13.25 -2.07 -0.64 -16.06 2.73 
Kurtosis 6.59 2.59 358.15 213.66 7.47 2.69 268.71 13.84 
 
The basic model for GMM is specified in a reduced form as: 
                   yit = δ yit-1 + X'itβ + εit.                                                                                            (7) 
where yit is the transformed outward FDI from Japan into a host ‘country i’ at time t and X'it 
denote an (1 x k) vector of exogenous variables which vary in the cross-section and in the time 
dimension. δ is an autoregressive parameter capturing the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. yit-1 is a 
lagged dependent variable. β is a vector of unknown parameters. εit is a stochastic error term, which is 
assumed to be uncorrelated over all i and t. 
The estimation form of the basic model is linearly specified as:  
 
(FDI)it = δ(FDI)it-1 +β1LOG_GDPit + β2SDit + β3LOG_Wit + 
β4OPENNESSit + β5ICit + β6PEit + εit.       (1) 
 
The explanatory variables are selected mostly from those used in many previous empirical studies 
to test the knowledge-capital model and/or the OLI hypotheses as described in Chapter III. In this 
appendix I estimate only the effect of political environment (PE) on Japanese outward FDI. PEit 
represents political environment for ‘country i’ at time t. The political index is calculated from the 
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Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) index, and has been scored from 0 to 25 with a higher score 
indicating a higher “political risk”.  
My panel data set consists of two sets and two dimensions: one dimension is cross-section (32 
developed countries and 23 developing countries: i = 1,….,N) and the other is time dimension (16 
years and 5 periods by 3 years for averaged data: 1995-2010: t=1,…,T).  The total number of 
observations in this context is 512 for developed countries (160 for averaged data) and 368 for 
developing ones (120 for averaged data), and it can be considered adequate to produce robust 
estimations for the scope of the analysis. I follow the same methodology as in the main body and 
estimate the model by Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator with orthogonal deviations set-up. 
The results are presented in tables A6-2 and A6-3. 
The results are consistent with the main body of the dissertation. Note that the main variable of 
interest is significant and signed consistently with the final hypotheses presented in Chapter VII. 
Political Environment is positive and significant in case of developed countries (GMM(a), GMM(b), 
GMM(c), GMM((d)) and it is negative and significant in case of developing countries (GMM(e), 
GMM(f), GMM(g), GMM(h)).  
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Table A6-2. The determinants of Japanese outward FDI in developed countries 
Dependent 
 
Log of FDI 
3-year 
average 
Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
GDP 
 
GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) 
FDI(-1) -1.73 (-5.34)*** 
0.72 
(23.41)*** 
0.0005 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(3.9)*** 
GDP 
1.97 
(0.82) 
0.5 
(2.18)** 
0.49 
(1.42) 
-0.66 
(-1.03) 
Wages 
-2.06 
(-2.67)*** 
0.03 
(0.74) 
0.15 
(2.88)*** 
-0.17 
(-1.87)* 
Openness 
0.06 
(2.07)** 
0.007 
(3.67)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.25) 
0.02 
(2.42)** 
Skill Difference 
1.54 
(3.64)*** 
0.02 
(1.8)* 
0.004 
(0.17) 
0.48 
(6.66)*** 
Investment Cost 
6.69 
(7.1)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.87) 
0.19 
(3.69)*** 
-0.39 
(-3.1)*** 
Political Environment 
1.27 
(2.51)** 
0.08 
(4.41)*** 
0.14 
(3.32)*** 
0.22 
(3.22)*** 
SE of regression 2.93 0.39 2.98 4.69 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.54 0.70 0.98 0.56 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
 Table A6-3. The determinants of Japanese outward FDI in developing countries 
Dependent 
 
Log of FDI 
3-year 
average 
Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
GDP 
  
GMM(e) GMM(f) GMM(g) GMM(h) 
FDI(-1) 0.08 (2.77)*** 
0.62 
(30.14)*** 
0.23 
(7.23)*** 
0.01 
(0.45) 
GDP 
1.89 
(5.57)*** 
1.01 
(10.59)*** 
-0.24 
(-5.89)*** 
1.22 
(2.23)** 
Wages 
-0.43 
(-3.71)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.29)** 
-0.07 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.16 
(-0.76) 
Openness 
-0.003 
(-0.81) 
-0.0007 
(-1.44) 
0.001 
(4)*** 
-0.01 
(-2.07)** 
Skill Difference 
-0.32 
(-2.06)** 
0.03 
(2.56)** 
0.05 
(6.53)*** 
0.51 
(7.25)*** 
Investment Cost 
0.43 
(3.81)*** 
-0.01 
(-1.07) 
0.09 
(6.62)*** 
0.38 
(3.11)*** 
Political 
Environment 
-0.14 
(-4.17)*** 
-0.02 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.02 
(-5.78)*** 
-0.13 
(-2.59)** 
SE of regression 1.3 0.25 0.17 2.61 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.69 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
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These are preliminary results that address only manufacturing sector. The lower statistical 
significance of explanatory variables for developed countries might be explained by the fact that the 
dominant industry is non-manufacturing in developed countries. Nevertheless, the coefficients’ signs 
are consistent with the prior expectations and the main body findings. 
Thus I could conclude that the main conclusions presented in the main body of the dissertation are 
supported by these additional estimations for manufacturing industry. PE was confirmed to have a 
non-linear inverted U-shape effect on Japanese outward FDI to developed and developing countries, 
As follows, my future agenda for the research extension will consist in further industry level 
analysis of Japanese outward FDI with a particular focus on PE and Democracy effects. 
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CHAPTER VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the association of Japanese outward Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and institutional risk factors such as Political Environment (PE) and 
Democracy along with traditional FDI determinants. In addition, I investigated the role of traditional 
FDI determinants (in particular Real Exchange Rate (RER) level) and of the two newly introduced 
factors namely Technological Index (TI) and National Culture (NC). 
A. The objectives 
Thus, six major objectives were addressed in this dissertation. The first objective was to examine 
the role of institutional factors such as PE and Democracy in specifically Japanese Multinational 
Companies (MNCs) activities. Second was to analyze how these factors affect Japanese outward FDI 
in developed and developing countries. Third was to introduce an alternative measure of PE to be used 
in the empirical analysis. This measure was calculated from Euromoney Country Risk (ECR) data that 
has been rarely used in political factor analysis despite its all emphasizing and qualitatively defined 
nature.1 Fourth was to employ three different measures of Democracy from three different sources 
namely International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Polity, and Freedom House, thus increasing the 
credibility and estimation robustness of the results. The fifth objective was to analyze a causal 
relationship between PE and Democracy and their composite effect on Japanese outward FDI. And 
                                                           
1
 To my knowledge Clare and Gang (2010) is the only study that used ECR data to measure political stability as 
one of the determinants of US outward FDI to 53 countries. 
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finally, the sixth objective was to employ various econometric settings to analyze the data thus 
allowing for different assumptions and increasing credibility of estimations. 
B. Theoretical models 
To attain my objectives I construct an econometric model based on the OLI (Ownership, Location 
and Internalization) theoretical framework (Dunning, 1992) and knowledge-capital model (Markusen, 
2002; Carr et al., 2001). The traditional FDI determinants identified from these theoretical frameworks 
are used as control variables throughout the study. I then derive two additional theoretical models that 
are aimed at supporting econometric analysis of PE and Democracy effects on Japanese outward FDI. 
The first model is introduced in Chapter V. The econometric results of Chapter IV and Chapter V 
suggested a non-linear relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI. Thus, this first model 
attempts to support these econometric findings while taking into consideration the randomness of 
exchange rate. It is inspired by the Clare and Gang (2010) model. However, it is extended to represent 
a full optimization with respect to all the choice variables and to solve for FDI taking into account 
possible influences from other endogeneous variables.  
Thus, this is a two-country model that considers a Japanese MNC with a foreign affiliate 
producing a single homogeneous product with inputs at constant prices. The product is distributed to 
home and foreign market, and the randomness in the exchange rate is the only variation in the firm’s 
value. Assuming that firm is a risk averter it seeks to maximize its expected utility of profits.  
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Political risk may appear under two distinct forms, namely outright expropriation and creeping 
expropriation.2 Their effect on the firms’ activity is captured by the probability to retain profit after 
expropriation (outright or creeping). The firm maximizes its expected utility of profits with respect to 
all choice variables and the optimal FDI is derived given the optimal level of foreign labor and foreign 
specific factor. The theoretical results suggest that if a firm is a risk-averter, an increase in PE will 
negatively affect FDI. However, if a firm is a risk-lover, an increase in PE will positively affect FDI. 
I present, in Chapters VI and VII, an alternative theoretical model of PE and Democracy effects 
on Japanese outward FDI. In view of the fact that theoretical and empirical results in Chapter IV and 
Chapter V suggested a non-linear relationship between PE and FDI for the countries with different 
level of economic development, I suspected that this integral feature may be inherent to institutional 
environment factors including not only PE but Democracy as well. 
Thus, the theoretical models introduced in Chapters VI and VII attempt to derive a non-linear 
relationship between PE and FDI to developed and developing countries, and Democracy and FDI to 
developed and developing in an identical analytical fashion.  
The model assumes a Japanese MNC that is planning to undertake FDI in a foreign country. It is 
assumed that the relationship is mathematically represented as F(PE,OLI,FDI) and G(DEM,OLI,FDI). 
                                                           
2
 I follow Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010) who analyzed the effects of Political risk on the choice of capital 
structure by multinational firms. They suggested three forms of political risk: outright expropriation, creeping 
expropriation and confiscatory taxation. However, in my analysis outright expropriation is identically equal to 
confiscatory taxation. Thus, I consider only outright expropriation and creeping expropriation. 
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Assuming that it can be solved explicitly for OLI (OLI=f(PE,FDI) and OLI=g(DEM,FDI)) I derive a 
transformation curve representing the ration between marginal costs of PE (DEM) and FDI in terms of 
OLI. Next, using inverse function properties I derive a relationship between PE (DEM) and FDI as a 
following rations 
OLIPE
OLIFDI
dPE
dFDI
∂∂
∂∂
−=
 and 
OLIDEM
OLIFDI
dPE
dFDI
∂∂
∂∂
−=
. By interpreting these ratios I suggest a non-
linear relationship between PE (DEM) and FDI. These results are then tested in the empirical analysis. 
Thus, both suggested theoretical models attempt to derive a non-linear relationship between 
institutional risk factors (PE and Democracy) and Japanese outward FDI. Although, these models are 
relatively simplistic they confirm the empirical findings and propose an analytical framework for 
future research. 
C. The econometric approach 
To address the presented objectives and theoretical hypotheses I establish an empirical model 
based on the OLI theoretical framework (Dunning, 1992) and knowledge-capital model (Markusen, 
2002; Carr et al., 2001). Thus, the traditional FDI determinants are derived from these theoretical 
frameworks. Japanese outward FDI determinants are examined with a panel data under different 
settings. The dependent variable is FDI flows from Japan to host countries. A number of traditional 
determinants (GDP, Human capital indicators, Investment cost, Trade cost) are complimented with 
two non-traditional determinants for Japanese FDI, namely Democracy and PE. In addition the effects 
of RER level and two newly introduced determinants (TI and NC) on Japanese MNCs activities are 
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examined. Depending on the analysis framework different data sets are analyzed. The overall panel 
data represents 55 developed and developing countries for the period of 1995-2010. Three different 
cross-section dimensions are analyzed. First, I estimate a pooled sample. Second I address Euro-zone 
countries, European non-Euro-zone countries and Asian countries. And finally I analyze the role of 
countries level of economic development by dividing them in developed and developing ones. 
Several econometric methods are employed. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) provide an 
initial understanding of the determinants’ effects on Japanese outward FDI. Fixed Effects (FE) are 
used to control for unobserved heterogeneity effects. The Hausmann test is applied to confirm the 
appropriateness of the FE method over the Random Effects (RE) method. Finally, in order to account 
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is applied. My 
main conclusions are based on Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation results. A problem of 
multicollinearity is analyzed and corrected by two conventional methods. First, PE residuals are 
introduced as “true PE” in the estimation model in order to eliminate collinearity with all other 
explanatory variables. Second, collinear terms are excluded from the estimation. Several interaction 
terms (PE*TI, PE*NC, RER*ICREAL, RER*SD, RER*ICREAL*SD, PE*DEM) are included in the 
regression in order to account for cross-effects on Japanese MNCs activities.  
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D. Model robustness 
I checked the robustness of the analysis in several ways. First, the classification of sample 
countries into developed and developing ones is a debatable issue. World Bank, United Nations (UN) 
and OECD classifications are commonly used in various studies. In this study I first used a UN 
classification and second I reran the regression considering OECD member countries as developed 
ones and the others as developing ones. In addition, I employed the same framework to analyze Euro-
zone, European non-Euro-zone and Asian countries. The results from all the analyses were quite 
similar. However, I disregarded the analysis using World Bank classification and this could be one of 
the limitations of the present study. Second, the sample period was divided in several sub-periods (e.g. 
1995-2000; 2001-2009). Most of the regressions with different sub-samples showed consistent results. 
Third, dependent FDI variable was transformed in several alternative ways (log of FDI flows, log of 
FDI stock, FDI flow divided by FDI stock, FDI flow divided by GDP, log of FDI 3-year average). 
Most of the results were consistent the main dissertation findings. Fourth, the models were tested 
using different sets of instrumental variables. Although in some specifications the coefficients were 
statistically insignificant, the signs were consistent with the hypothesized results. Fifth, three 
econometric methods were applied, namely OLS, FE and GMM. Most of the results were robust and 
consistent among different specifications. Finally, transformation of variables by first differencing 
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(instead of forward orthogonal deviations) in the Arellano-Bond GMM setting was also performed. 
The coefficients as well were insignificant, but their signs were robust to my estimations.3  
E. The limitations 
Nevertheless, my study has several limitations. First, it focuses exclusively on Japanese outward 
FDI. Although this is one of the study’s uniquenesses, it does not permit to generalize the results and 
to extend the findings for the MNC’s activities from other developed FDI source countries (like US, 
Germany, UK, France and others). Second, since I assume that most of the MNCs’ activities are in 
foreign currency, my variables are mainly calculated in US dollars in order to ensure data 
compatibility. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Japanese MNCs maximize their profits in Japanese 
Yen, a re-estimation of the results using all variables recalculated in Yen might be an alternative 
approach. Third, FDI flows are not standardized, since I am interested in the effect of institutional risk 
factors (PE and Democracy) on the real FDI flows. Nevertheless, a robustness check with FDI 
normalized for instance by Japan’s GDP might be considered as well.4 Forth, the study is limited only 
to 55 countries due to data availability. A larger sample set might be necessary to confirm the 
                                                           
3
 Since I did not assume that the dependent variable (FDI) may be close to random walk, I did not perform the 
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. 
4
 However, I present some additional estimation with transformed FDI variable in Chapter V Appendix 4, in 
Chapter VI Appendix 6 and in Chapter VII Appendix 6. The results are mostly consistent with the main body of 
the dissertation.  
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robustness.5 Fifth, the countries’ division into developed and developing economies is limited to UN 
and OECD classifications. Alternative classifications (e.g. income per capita) might be necessary to be 
considered as well to ensure results’ robustness. Sixth, I focus on aggregate level data. My interest is 
to examine the countries specifics which are linked directly to PE and Democracy at the country level. 
An industry or even firm-level analysis might suggest additional ways and effects of PE and 
Democracy on Japanese outward FDI. Dividing the data by size and/or type of FDI project might be of 
additional interest as well. It remains on my agenda pending microeconomic data availability.6 Finally, 
I used only the Euromoney Country Risk data as a measurement of Political Environment. A 
robustness analysis with exempli gratia ICRG (International Country Risk Guide), World Bank 
Governance indicators, or the ONDD (Office National Du Ducroire) data might improve the 
credibility of the estimation results. A future study needs to overcome these limitations and extend the 
understanding of the effects of Political Factors and Democracy on outward FDI. 
G. Findings and implications 
Notwithstanding these limitations I conclude that Japanese FDI can be reasonably explained by 
the proposed independent variables. Specifically, market size plays a significant positive role; 
investment cost is negatively associated with FDI flows. Wage cost is negatively associated with FDI 
                                                           
5
 Nevertheless, according my calculation the total of FDI to 55 countries in my sample over 1995-2010 
represents around 85% of total Japanese outward FDI in this period. Thus, might not be necessary to use a larger 
observation.  
6
 Nevertheless,  I present some preliminary data analysis for manufacturing sector in Chapter VII Appendix 5. 
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flows. Openness is robust and is positively associated with FDI flows to developing countries, 
suggesting that Japanese MNCs tend to increase their investment in more opened economies. Thus, 
Japanese outward FDI to developing countries are more of vertical type nature. However, openness is 
negatively associated with FDI to developed countries, suggesting that Japanese MNCs are concerned 
about trade barriers. Hence, Japanese FDI to developed countries are more of horizontal type. Skill 
difference influences positively the FDI flows to developing countries and negatively FDI flows to 
developed countries. This means that FDI flows to developed countries are more of horizontal type 
character, while FDI flows to developing countries are more of vertical type character. Technological 
index is also robust and is negatively associated with Japanese FDIs. This enables me to interpret that 
Japanese MNCs prefer to invest in countries that are technologically less developed, so that they can 
ensure technological competitive advantage on the local market. National culture is significant and 
negatively associated with FDI flows. This suggests that Japanese MNCs tend to invest more in 
countries with less opened national cultures, which can be explained by the historical tendency of the 
Japanese companies to be more closed and with narrow business activity. RER level was differently 
signed for developed and developing countries. In case of developing countries the sign was negative 
and significant, suggesting that host country currency depreciation positively affects Japanese FDI 
inflows. In case of developed countries the estimated coefficient was not consistently signed among 
the specifications. In order to explore different channels of exchange rate effect on FDI cross-variables 
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analysis was employed. A result of positive direct effect by RER proved to be significant and 
consistent, meaning that real yen appreciation caused a decrease in Japanese outward FDI flows to 
developed countries due to a possible sunk-cost effect which was stronger than the export substitution 
effect. 
One of my main concerns in this dissertation, Political environment (PE), was differently signed 
for developed and developing countries. In case of developing countries it has a negative sign which is 
consistent with most of the preceding literature. However, in case of developed countries even after a 
formal econometric procedure is applied, the sign is positive, implying that Japanese MNCs tend to 
increase FDI for a marginal increase in PE (i.e. a marginal decrease in institutional quality), because 
political environment in developed countries may be far above what is necessary for MNCs' operations 
(Peng and Beamish, 2008). On this seemingly contradictory result, I put forth my hypothesis of the 
existence of non-linearity between Political environment and FDI. The multi-dimensional nature of PE 
measure might be perceived differently by Japanese MNCs. The two proposed theoretical models 
attempt to predict this non-linearity, and they are in fact successfully validated by the empirical 
analysis. Thus, for a relatively low PE as in developed countries a slight increase in PE is associated 
with more FDI due to “more discipline” and “more profitable opportunities” argument. On the other 
hand for a relatively higher PE as in developing countries even a slight increase in PE is associated 
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with less FDI, since risk of political instability outweighs possible opportunities to obtain higher 
profits.  
The other main concern in this dissertation, Democracy was differently signed for developed and 
developing countries as well. Although it was measured by 3 different measures, namely ICRG, Polity 
and Freedom House, the results were robust. In case of Developing countries higher Democracy is 
associated with more FDI, suggesting that an improvement in democratic institutions provides a more 
stable operational environment for Japanese MNCs, which is consistent with the previous findings 
(Jensen 2003, Asiedu and Lien 2011, etc). In case of developed counties higher Democracy turned out 
to be associated with less FDI, suggesting that Japanese MNCs tend to enjoy less democratic 
institutions in developed countries, since it opens more possibilities for monopolistic competition. In 
explaining this result I proposed an inverted U-shape non-linear relationship between Democracy and 
FDI in the same fashion as for PE. The proposed theoretical model’s results support this non-linearity 
finding.  
Finally, I examined and confirmed a causal relationship between Democracy and PE. Their cross-
effect proved to be significant but differently affecting Japanese MNCs’ activities. In case of 
developed countries Japanese MNCs might seek lower democracy associated with higher PE while in 
case of developing countries a higher democracy associated with a decrease in PE. Thus, I suggested 
an assumption of a three-dimensional association with two inverted U-shape functional relationships 
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between PE, Democracy and Japanese outward FDI. This line of research is highly important from the 
government policies perspective, since countries’ development stage, PE and Democracy could be 
considered simultaneously. 
In sum, the established model and estimations proved to be significant and consistent among 
various specifications. The most probable form of Japanese FDI according to the results is vertical 
type when investing in developing countries and horizontal when investing in developed countries. As 
far as I know, this is the first formal attempt to empirically examine the effects of political 
environment and democracy on Japanese FDI to developed and developing countries using the 
Euromoney Country Risk index and 3 measures of Democracy, namely ICRG, Polity and Freedom 
House. I successfully found that democracy and political environment are, as expected, significantly 
associated with Japanese FDI flows. From the theoretical point of view this analysis introduced 
another important aspect of FDI determinants, suggesting that “Lucas paradox” might actually be 
questioned in the modern economy due to fast changing PE and Democracy environment. Thus, these 
findings have important implications for future policy consideration by host countries and academic 
research on Japanese outward FDI. 
H. Future research possibilities 
Nevertheless, the indicated limitations suggest a necessity to extend the research by at least the 
following. First, a lack of established theoretical foundation is an important issue, since it would 
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provide a solid and stable framework for a stricter analysis from economic point of view. Although, I 
proposed several theoretical models to support the empirical framework and results, they are relatively 
simplistic, and alternative approaches or extensions need to be considered. Thus, one of the main 
important extensions of my dissertation is to establish a solid theoretical background. Second, the 
suggested interpretation of inverted U-shape relationship between PE and FDI, and Democracy and 
FDI to developed and developing countries proved to be robust and significant for Japanese MNCs 
activities. An important extension of the research would be to compare the estimation results with 
other main FDI suppliers such as United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and others. Third, 
the analysis is limited to an aggregate country level, since I am interested in country specific 
characteristics. However, an industry or even firm-level analysis could well suggest an additional 
interpretation to the established hypotheses. Breaking down FDI by different groupings (size or type 
of project) might be of an additional interest as well since FDI to developed countries can be large 
whereas FDI to developing countries can be small. Thus, depending on the microeconomic data 
availability an industry level and/or a project level analysis might be another possibility for research 
extension. Fourthly, in my research I used an alternative measure of PE based on Euromoney Country 
Risk (ECR) and found an inverted U-shape relationship between PE and Japanese outward FDI, and 
this is a uniqueness and originality of this research. Nevertheless, an analysis of the established model 
with alternative PE measures (e.g. ICRG, World Bank Governance indicators, etc.) could be another 
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research extension. Fifthly, in my analysis I used two commonly used classifications of countries’ 
level of economic development (OECD and UN classification) and regional groupings. However, 
another possibility for my study extension would be to use an alternative classification of economic 
development for country level (e.g. income per capita) and other regional groupings in order to 
explore other ways of PE and Democracy effects on MNCs’ activities. Finally, Japanese MNCs tend 
to agglomerate in certain areas (e.g. Guangzhou in China and Bangkok in Thailand). Thus, a 
consideration of agglomeration effect might represent another important extension of the research on 
Japanese outward FDI determinants. 
In sum, I conclude that my dissertation provided a formal and strict econometric analysis of 
Japanese outward FDI determinants with a special focus on institutional risk factors such as Political 
environment and Democracy. The established model successfully explained recent Japanese MNCs 
activities in developed and developing countries and my main concerns in this analysis, namely PE 
and Democracy proved to be significantly associated with Japanese outward FDI. Nevertheless, 
further research is necessary to confirm which of these findings are consistently true in a wider 
theoretical and empirical framework, and this is on my future research agenda.  
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Table A4-4. The determinants of Japanese FDI 
 Dependent: FDI flow divided by GDP 
  Developed   Developing   
  GMM(i) GMM(j) GMM(k) GMM(l) 
FDI(-1) -0.05 (-2.74)*** 
-0.07 
(-2.18)** 
0.23 
(3.91)*** 
0.2 
(3.82)*** 
Wages 0.03 (0.14) 
-0.12 
(-0.45) 
-0.24 
(-0.48) 
-0.06 
(-0.36) 
Openness 0.07 (7.1)*** 
0.05 
(4.02)*** 
-0.02 
(-2.49)** 
-0.01 
(-1.88)* 
Skill Difference 0.12 (1.2) 
0.72 
(3.88)*** 
0.48 
(3.39)*** 
0.47 
(5.01)*** 
Investment Cost -0.37 (-2.39)** 
-0.27 
(-1.13) 
0.97 
(5.16)*** 
0.32 
(3.12)*** 
PE 0.7 (4.85)***  
-0.74 
(-11.49)***  
ICRG 
 
-3.24 
(-2.68)***  
4.79 
(4.98)*** 
SE of regression 7.28 7.31 3.00 2.79 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.16 0.26 0.40 0.18 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
Democracy measured by ICRG democratic accountability index is negative and significant in case 
of developed countries (GMM(b) and GMM(j)) and it is positive and significant (GMM(h) and 
GMM(l)) in case of developing countries. Thus the main conclusions of the dissertation are validated 
successfully.  
Nevertheless the specifications for developed countries when FDI flow divided by FDI stock and 
FDI flow divided by GDP are used might not be economically meaningful. Lagged FDI and GDP 
showed negative effect on the FDI (GMM(e), GMM(f), GMM(i), GMM(j)). Thus the dynamic effect 
of FDI flows and local market size proxied by GDP have a negative impact on Japanese MNCs 
activities scaled down by stock or host countries’ GDP. This result is counterintuitive and difficult to 
 
CORRECTION SHEET 
 
printed on: 3/4/2013 2:35 PM  Ivan Deseatnicov© 2013 
 
244
Table A6-2. The determinants of Japanese outward FDI in developed countries 
Dependent 
 
Log of FDI 
3-year 
average 
Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
GDP 
 
GMM(a) GMM(b) GMM(c) GMM(d) 
FDI(-1) -1.73 (-5.34)*** 
0.72 
(23.41)*** 
0.0005 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(4.05)*** 
GDP 
1.97 
(0.82) 
0.5 
(2.18)** 
0.49 
(1.42)  
Wages 
-2.06 
(-2.67)*** 
0.03 
(0.74) 
0.15 
(2.88)*** 
-0.15 
(-1.58) 
Openness 
0.06 
(2.07)** 
0.007 
(3.67)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.25) 
0.01 
(2.49)** 
Skill Difference 
1.54 
(3.64)*** 
0.02 
(1.8)* 
0.004 
(0.17) 
0.46 
(6.45)*** 
Investment Cost 
6.69 
(7.1)*** 
-0.01 
(-0.87) 
0.19 
(3.69)*** 
-0.42 
(-3.23)*** 
Political Environment 
1.27 
(2.51)** 
0.08 
(4.41)*** 
0.14 
(3.32)*** 
0.23 
(3.95)*** 
SE of regression 2.93 0.39 2.98 4.68 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.54 0.70 0.98 0.45 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
 Table A6-3. The determinants of Japanese outward FDI in developing countries 
Dependent 
 
Log of FDI 
3-year 
average 
Log of FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by FDI 
stock 
FDI flow 
divided by 
GDP 
  
GMM(e) GMM(f) GMM(g) GMM(h) 
FDI(-1) 0.08 (2.77)*** 
0.62 
(30.14)*** 
0.23 
(7.23)*** 
-0.03 
(-1.39) 
GDP 
1.89 
(5.57)*** 
1.01 
(10.59)*** 
-0.24 
(-5.89)***  
Wages 
-0.43 
(-3.71)*** 
-0.04 
(-2.29)** 
-0.07 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.39 
(-1.94)* 
Openness 
-0.003 
(-0.81) 
-0.0007 
(-1.44) 
0.001 
(4)*** 
-0.01 
(-2.66)*** 
Skill Difference 
-0.32 
(-2.06)** 
0.03 
(2.56)** 
0.05 
(6.53)*** 
0.3 
(5.5)*** 
Investment Cost 
0.43 
(3.81)*** 
-0.01 
(-1.07) 
0.09 
(6.62)*** 
0.21 
(2.42)** 
Political 
Environment 
-0.14 
(-4.17)*** 
-0.02 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.02 
(-5.78)*** 
-0.38 
(-6.89)*** 
SE of regression 1.3 0.25 0.17 2.61 
Hansen J-test (p-
value)a 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.69 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
a The null hypothesis is that the overidentification restriction is valid 
